

This digital version of the Drujina dissertation was transcribed from a copy borrowed from the Stanford University Library. The copy was xeroxed, scanned and converted to text by an OCR program. The text was edited and put into a consistent format by William Anikouchine PhD in February, 2003.

Some minor corrections were applied to typos, misspellings, inconsistent spellings of names and archaic usage of geographic names. Current equivalent geographic names are:

Tallinn, Estonia for Revel (also Reval on National Geographic maps)

Helsinki, Finland for Helsingfors

St. Petersburg for Petrograd, Peterburg, St. Peterburg

Lake Peipus for Lake Peypus

Jelgava, Latvia for Mitau

Tblisii, Georgia for Tiflis

Kingisepp, Estonia for Yamburg

Narva River for Narova River

Krasnaya Gorka for Krasnia Gorka

Kronshtadt for Kronstad

Liepaja, Latvia for Libau

Pushkin for Tsarskoi Selo

Daugavpils, Latvia for Dvinsk

Unspecified places are all located in Russia

The library catalog numbers for this dissertation are:

DK 265.D794 in the Hoover Library 3781.S78D in the Stanford Library



from
pygmywars.com

THE HISTORY OF THE NORTH-WEST ARMY
OF GENERAL YUDENICH
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDY
OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Gleb Drujina

June 1950



from
pygmywars.com

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed on Original

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed on Original

Approved for the committee on Graduate study:

Signed on Original

(6/50)



Table of Contents

Table of Contents

.....	
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I: BEGINNINGS OF THE YUDENICH ARMY	
Imperial army officers after the Revolution.....	5
Property class groups after the Revolution	5
Pro-German sentiments of old Imperial officers	6
German plans for Russia after the Revolution	6
German Balts	7
German plans for a White army	8
Conditions for the formation of the Russian army in Baltic	9
Selection of the commander for the army	11
Vandam appointed commander	11
Vandam replaced by von Neff	11
Recruiting begins	12
Conditions of the army at Pskov	12
Collapse of German army after German Revolution	13
Effect of German collapse on North-West army	13
Organization of the North-West army	13
First operations of the North-West army	14
Balakhovich joins the army	15
Characterization of Balakhovich.....	15
Germans fail to keep promises to army	16
Attitude of Pskov population	16
Type of recruits	17
New state of Estonia	21
Suspicious of Estonian government.....	21
North-West army is incorporated into Estonian army	22
German policy in the Baltic	23
Success of Bolshevik propaganda in Latvia	24
CHAPTER II: ARRIVAL OF THE ALLIES	
Capture of Riga by Bolsheviks	25
Latvia liberated from Bolsheviks.....	25
Policy of Allies in the Baltic	26
British-Russian relations in the Baltic	26
Military operation as part of the Estonian Army	28
Composition of the North-West army in the winter of 1919	28



General Rodzianko.....	28
General Yudenich in Finland.....	29
Biography of General Yudenich.....	29
Yudenich in the Russian-Japanese War.....	30
Yudenich in World War I.....	31
Yudenich storms Erzerum.....	34
Yudenich is dismissed after the Revolution.....	37
Characterization of General Yudenich.....	37
Failure of Yudenich in Finland.....	38
Intrigues of Rodzianko.....	38
Yudenich opposes Rodzianko's appointment.....	38
Rodzianko assumes command of the army.....	39
Quarreling among leaders of the army.....	39
CHAPTER III: THE SPRING OFFENSIVE	
Character of the fighting of the North-West army.....	40
Plan of advance on Petrograd.....	41
The advance begins.....	41
Advance is successful.....	42
Advance is checked.....	42
Rodzianko plots.....	42
Financial situation of the North-West army.....	43
Rodzianko issues paper money for army.....	44
Political advisers to Yudenich.....	45
Hostility between Rodzianko and Yudenich.....	45
Yudenich dismisses Rodzianko.....	46
Quarrels between Russians and Estonians.....	46
North-West army becomes independent of Estonian army.....	47
Fort Krasnia Gorka incident.....	47
Trouble with the Ingermanlands.....	48
Ingermanland detachment disbanded.....	49
The army hopes for Allied help.....	50
American Red Cross sends food.....	50
Reds assume offensive.....	50
Military operations in June 1919.....	51
Efforts of Rodzianko to get recruits.....	52
Rodzianko attempts to get supplies.....	52
Excesses of the partisans.....	53
Bulak-Balakhovich—a problem.....	54
Bulak-Balakhovich commits atrocities.....	55
Bulak-Balakhovich deprived of command and arrested.....	55



North-West army loses prestige.....	56
Demoralization of the army	56
Lieven and his detachment.....	57
Lieven forced to join Yudenich army	58
Yudenich moves to Narva.....	59

CHAPTER IV: YUDENICH IN COMMAND

Yudenich's plans for administration of Petrograd	60
The army is small.....	61
Lack of volunteers.....	61
Political program of the army	62
Attempts to enlist prisoners of war	62
Population does not support North-West army.....	63
Near-sighted policy of army toward the peasants.....	64
Indifference of the population.....	65
British supplies arrive	65
British demand that North-West army advances on Petrograd.....	66
Yudenich makes plans for final advance	67
Final advance begins.....	67
Initial success of advance.....	67
Enthusiasm of the troops.....	68
Bolsheviks bring reinforcements	68
Mistakes of the Whites.....	69
Bolshevik counter-attack	69
North-West army advance checked	69
Retreat begins.....	70

CHAPTER V: AGONY OF THE ARMY

Retreat of North-West army.....	71
Correspondence of Yudenich regarding supplies for Petrograd	71
Why Yudenich army failed.....	72
Misrepresentation about numbers in the army	74
Trotsky brings overwhelming numbers	75
Manner of retreat of the army	75
Estonians refuse entrance to army and refugees	76
Abuses by Estonians	77
Estonians begin to disarm army.....	77
Sickness among refugees	78
Efforts of Estonians to disband army.....	78
White soldiers resent White treatment.....	79



Efforts to alleviate sufferings of army	81
A liquidation committee is formed	82
Yudenich asks American Red Cross for aid	82
Estonians conclude peace treaty	83
Efforts to transfer army	83
Yudenich relinquishes command of army	84
Desertions to the Reds	85
Yudenich is kidnapped.....	86
Characterizations of Yudenich.....	87
North-West army ends its existence	87
Yudenich rescued.....	88
Yudenich departs to Paris	89
Work of Liquidation Commission	89
Members of the army scatter.....	90

CHAPTER VII: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF GENERAL YUDENICH—FIRST PERIOD

Diplomatic situation in the Baltic	91
German policy in the Baltic	92
Soviet policy in the Baltic.....	93
Situation in Finland.....	93
German origin of the North-West army.....	94
Political situation in Baltic upon arrival of Allies	94
Courses open to the Allies	95
British squadron arrived in the Baltic	95
White Russian political philosophy	96
White Russian attitude toward minorities.....	97
Allies help new Baltic states	97
Bolshevik: propaganda in Latvia and Estonia	98
Unreliability of Latvian and Estonian troops.....	98
Origin of the Iron Division	99
White Russian detachments in Latvia.....	100
White Russians are disappointed in the Allies.....	100
Estonia fears White army.....	101
Allies' faith in Yudenich.....	102
Yudenich reluctant to take command	102
Yudenich attempts to get Finnish aid.....	103
Uncompromising attitude of Admiral Kolchak	104
Distrust of Russia by the new Baltic nations	106



CHAPTER VII: AVALOV-BERMONDT

Ancestry of Prince Avalov	107
Avalov's early career	107
Avalov's German sympathies	108
Avalov secures German aid	108
Quarrels among the several Russian detachments in Latvia.....	109
Germans are ordered to evacuate the Baltic	109
Relations between Avalov and Allies	110
Avalov hinders Yudenich's war efforts	110
Yudenich demands that Avalov joins his army	111
Composition of Avalov's detachment	112
Avalov's political aims	112
Allies forbid discussion of politics	113
Avalov attacks Riga	114
Avalov declared a traitor.....	114
Avalov detachment reluctant to fight Letts.....	115
Avalov explains his behavior.....	116
End of Avalov detachment.....	116
Effect of Avalov's adventures	117

CHAPTER VIII: THE NORTH-WEST GOVERNMENT

North-West army in need.....	118
Allies distrust reactionary tendency of Yudenich army.....	119
Hostility of Estonians.....	120
Organization of North-West government	121
Yudenich advisers.....	121
Meeting at Revel	122
Yudenich complains of Estonian	123
Yudenich recognizes Estonian government.....	123
Further demands of Estonia	124
Yudenich dislikes North-West government.....	124
Activity of North-West government	125
Yudenich is unhappy over situation.....	125
White Russian evaluation of British attitude	126
British Supplies arrive.....	127
British urge Yudenich to advance.....	127



CHAPTER IX: THE LAST PHASE—OCTOBER 1919 TO FEBRUARY 1920

Happy relations with the United States.....129
Food is supplied by America129
American Red Cross sends supplies to North-West army130
American supplies arrive too late131
Yudenich thanks American Red Cross131
Yudenich applies to Y.M.C.A. for aid132
Americans decorated by Yudenich132
Americana quarrel about decorations133
Unfavorable description of Yudenich by Major Davis.....134
British refuse planes to Yudenich135
Estonians appropriate Yudenich’s rolling stock136
Estonians conclude armistice with Soviet Union.....137
British order all supplies to be given to Estonians.....137
French government is friendly to Yudenich army138

CONCLUSION:.....139

BIBLIOGRAPHY:.....150



Introduction

The period of Russian history known as the Russian Civil War, which comprises the years 1917 to 1923¹, is of great significance and interest. Yet the events of those years are the least well known of any in Russian history since the Revolution. A great many books have been written about the February and October Revolutions and still more about the Soviet regime and the five Year Plans of Stalin, but very little has been done on how and why the Bolshevik party gained power and, particularly, on how it has managed to retain that power. Yet the importance of this period cannot be denied. Several times it seemed that the fate of the Bolshevik regime has hung in the balance.

There were several White armies in different parts of Russia who struggled to wrest the control on Russia from Lenin and Trotsky and their party. The main ones were: the Siberian army of Admiral Kolchak; the Southern army of Generals Kornilov, Denikin, and Wrangel (in that order); the Northern army led by General Miller; and the North-West army led by General Yudenich. The last named army has fared the worst with the historians. While a diligent

¹ While the Soviet government claims that the Civil war ended in 1920, yet organized resistance to the regime ended only in the fall of 1923, with the evacuation of Vladivostok.



student of history might find mention of Kolchak, Denikin and Miller, it is doubtful that he would find any mention of General Yudenich and his army. Yet they were important. Not only did this army manage twice to get within sight of the largest city in Russia, Petrograd, but it was closely related to the struggle of the new Baltic nations against the Bolsheviks. It was organized on the territory of Estonia, and for several months was part of the Estonian army. This phase of its activity - its relations with the Baltic nations - is of utmost interest and retains that interest to the present day. Its significance lies in the fact that the driving force in the Baltic, at this period, was Great Britain. Her activities are of interest to the diplomat as well as to the historian. Especially is this true today when it seems the fate of the United States to try, at least, to disentangle the growing problems of the world.

While this work attempts to be a history of the Yudenich army from its beginning to its end, its chief interest is in the relations of this army with the Baltic countries and the Allies, especially Great Britain. The author believes that these relations have not only historical interest but present day significance as well. The military operations, on the other hand, are of no great interest to anybody - not even to the military man - since they took place on a small scale compared to operations of modern armies.



The aims of this work are two: first, to throw light on the policy of Great Britain in the Baltic, and to consider conditions existing there at the time under consideration; and second, to explain the reasons for the failure of the Yudenich army.

This study is based mainly on the Yudenich Archives and on such memoirs and personal reminiscences as have been available to the author. The early history of Russia and the historical references to the Baltic are based on the works of the most reliably accepted historians of the period.

The Yudenich Archives, so frequently quoted, are now in the possession of the Hoover Library for War, Revolution and Peace, at Stanford University. They arrived there from the Baltic in their original state and consist of one-hundred and fifty volumes. They consist of reports, letters, memoranda, staff reports, telephonograms, battle orders, minutes of meetings, conferences, and so on. They are in typewritten form and in long hand. Many are in pencil, apparently hastily scribbled. For the most part, they are written in Russian, but some are in English, French or German, and a very few in Estonian or Finnish. They cover the period from December 1918 to March 1920. They furnish good material for the historians of the Yudenich army, since they cover the military, diplomatic, and internal relations of that army. Of especial interest are the reports of the Yudenich representatives in the different capitals of the world. They also give a fairly clear insight of the events of the period as they appeared to the White Russian.

Page 4 The author has avoided comment on Soviet Russia. Information on that subject is very meager. Books published in the Soviet Union are unreliable and published chiefly for propaganda purposes. They, therefore, can be handled by the historian only with many reservations. Books written by Whites outside of Russia are also partisan. In most cases, these books were written under stress of emotion, as the authors themselves usually admit. They too, then, must be most carefully weighed and sifted. Yet these books do furnish some valuable information, if only to show the point of view of participants in these events.

The Yudenich Archives also contain several volumes of reports of its agents in Russia and other intelligence material, but until such time as these documents can be verified by research in Russia itself, they are of little historical value.



Chapter I

Beginnings of the Yudenich Army

After the triumph of the Bolshevik party in Russia, many Russians, particularly officers of the old Imperial army began to look about for means to overthrow the regime which had deprived them of all they had loved and held sacred - their country, their homes, and their beloved regiments. Thrown out of their familiar occupation and deprived of their livelihood, these men were desperate. Some gave up all hope of a better future, of reestablishing their fortunes, and so began to speculate as to how they could now feed themselves and their families.¹ Others had only one desire - to destroy the Bolsheviks, and for this they were willing to fight and die if necessary. Besides the officers and other groups who comprised the anti-Bolshevik faction were the capitalists who had lost their property, the landed nobility, who had lost their estates, and the dispossessed (by the Bolsheviks) liberals who had counted themselves the leaders of the masses. The officers were the most important and active group; the others only talked and waited.²

The average Russian officer considered the German his enemy but when large numbers of these officers were caught in the Russian

1 A. P. Rodzianko, *Vospominania O Sevenoi Armii*, (Berlin, 1921), p. 6.

2 G. Kirdetsov, *U Vorot Petrograda* (1919-1920). (Berlin. 1921), pp. 24-28.



territories occupied by the Germans, and came into contact with the German army, the opinion of many changed. The Germans were courteous and even kind. This was in contrast to the treatment meted out to them by the Bolsheviks, and the democratic groups before the Bolshevik Revolution, and it made a strong impression on many of the Russian officers.³

There is much evidence to prove that, in the period between the signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the final collapse of the German armies, the German High Command planned to make an end of the Bolsheviks by invading Russia—capturing Petrograd and Moscow and reestablishing the Russian monarchy in some form.⁴ This monarchy was, of course, to be friendly to Germany.⁵ But this was not to be a gesture of love. They planned, according to Prince Avalov, (an officer of the old Russian army) to annex the Baltic provinces of Russia, to make Poland a kingdom under the protectorate of Germany, and also to make Georgia an independent state (presumably to control the Baku oil fields). Such an offer was made to Rotmister (Captain) von Rosenberg, an officer of the Imperial Guard regiment, in October 1918 by the representative of the German High Command.⁶

3 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

4 Prince P. Avalov, *V Borbe S Bolshevismom*, p. 59. Also V.A. Von der Goltz, *Meine Sendung in Finnland und Baltikum*, (Munich 1921), pp. 20. 21.

5 Avalov, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 59, 71.



The German High Command did not, however, wish to invade Russia with German troops alone. This would look too much like a foreign invasion and, as such, would be resented by the Russian population. The plan called for the participation of Russian troops also. Therefore a Russian army under the control of the Germans was to be organized.⁷ The German High command planned to deal in this enterprise only with Russian Monarchists, and preferably pro-Germans. It was not hard to find such people in the Baltic at the time. First, there were the German Balts, about six hundred families of aristocrats who had lived for two hundred years in Russian Baltic provinces, yet had never considered themselves fully Russian. Many of these people occupied high posts in the Russian army and bureaucracy and were trusted servants of the Tsar. Still the majority of them felt themselves Germans. They spoke German as well, or quite often better than Russian. The allegiance they felt was a personal one—to the monarch—not to the Nation.⁸ Some of them considered themselves fully Russian (like the Wrangel family), but these were a small minority. Many of these families had relatives in Germany, and during the war, their loyalty to Russia was questioned more than once by press and the public in general. These people, therefore, welcomed

⁷ *Yudenich Archives*, (A collection of documents of the Yudenich army (North-West) at the Hoover Library of War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, California), LXI Report from Colonel *Kruzeinshtein* to General Yudenich about the organization of the North-West army, January 11, 1919

⁸ Rosenberg of the Nazi party came from this group



the German army with open arms and any plans for the aggrandizement of Germany, and particularly for the annexation of the Russian Baltic provinces to Germany, were received with enthusiasm. These German Balts are important because so many of them served in the Russian Imperial army and some of them later played an important part in the Yudenich army.

The second group on which the Germans could depend was the Russian officers. As stated above, these men hated the Bolsheviks; they also hated the democratic leaders of Russia, and now they were beginning to change their opinion regarding their recent enemies. Besides the slogan of most of the Russian anti-Bolshevik groups at that time was “with the devil himself—if against the Bolsheviks”. Therefore, when the German High Command proposed to form a White army of former Russian officers and soldiers, many responded.

The actual conferences about the formation of the army began on October 10, 1918 in the city of Pskov. On the German side, as representatives of the High Command, were Major von Kleist, Major Treskow, Ober-Lieutenant von Gammerstein, and Lieutenant Niman. The Russians were represented by Captain (Rotmister) Gershelman, Captain Taranovsky, and Linde.⁹ While the German officers definitely represented the German High command, it is not clear whom the Russians represented. One is safe in assuming that they were working for themselves. One can also see from their names

⁹ Avalov, *op. cit.*, pp. 68, 69.



that all of them except one, Captain Taranovsky, were of German blood. After a few days, the contracting parties drew up a document stating the conditions for the formation of the Russian army in the Baltic. The contents of this document follows:

CONDITIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN THE BALTIC—THE ARMY TO HAVE THE NAME OF NORTHERN ARMY

1. The Russian volunteer Northern Army with the agreement of the Imperial German Government and with the help of the German High Command in the east begins its formation 10 October 1918.
2. The districts where the Army will be organized will be those portions of the following provinces now occupied by the Germans—Gubernii, Pskov and Vitebsk, with the cities of Pskov, Ostrov, Uzhorak, Rejitsa, Dvinsk.
3. The organization of the Army will take place in the above region under the protection of German troops.
4. The Army will be restricted to volunteers from: a. local Russian officers and volunteers, b. same in other occupied Russian districts. c. prisoners of war now in Germany by a special commission of Russians to be sent to Germany for this purpose.
5. The Commander of the Army, who shall be given dictatorial powers, will be appointed - a Russian, popular, with fighting experience, preferably with the consent of Generals Yudenich, Gurko or Keller.
6. Money is furnished by the German Government as a loan to the Russian state through the German High Command.



7. Army equipment—tools, uniforms, food and technical supplies are furnished by the German Government through the German High Command to the Russian High Command, and uniforms and arms- furnished will be of Russian patterns if possible. All this will be furnished in amounts large enough to equip not less than an army corps of two infantry divisions according to German Army regulations. Also a separate brigade of cavalry with sufficient artillery and auxiliary units, engineers, etc.
 8. The Army, after its organization, takes an oath of allegiance to the legitimate Russian Tsar and the Russian State.
 9. The Army must be organized in two and one-half months, after which it must be ready for combat.
- After the Army is ready, the German troops retreat to a new line and turn over the old one to the Russians.
11. A month before their evacuation the Germans, civil and military authorities, turn over the control of affairs to the Russian authorities.
 12. With the Army, remain for liaison, three German officers, one of whom is of the General Staff.
 13. In case of advance, the German troops do not participate in the suppression of Bolshevism. but just follow the Russian Army to maintain order.
 14. After occupation of Petrograd a military dictatorship will be proclaimed, the dictator to be the Commander of the North Army.
 15. The aims of the Army are: a. the defense of the above mentioned regions; b. Advance in order to capture Petrograd and the overthrow of the Bolshevik government; Re-establishment of order in all Russia and support of the legitimate Russian government.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 70,71.



At first, the command of the new Army, which was to be known as the “*Severnaia Armia*” (North. Army) was offered to the Russian General Maliavin, but when he refused, the command was given to General Vandam who accepted, and Maliavin became the chief of Staff. ¹¹

At the same time, an offer was made to give the command of the new formation to General Count Keller, hero of World War I, as a cavalry commander. He resided at this time at Kiev. Count Keller was agreeable to the idea and General Denikin also favored it, but while the negotiations were still going on he was killed in Kiev by Bolsheviks who re-occupied the city after the collapse of Germany. ¹³

The choice of Vandam was an unfortunate one. He drank a great deal and was, in general, a weak and vacillating man. His officers hated him and refused to serve under him. After a few weeks he resigned and returned to Riga, the city from which he had come. He was replaced by a certain Colonel von Neff, and Captain von Rosenberg was made the Chief of Staff. ¹⁴ At first, Captain Rosenberg was the head recruiting officer. As soon as the agreement with the

11 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI, A report of 11 January 1919 from Colonel Kruzeinshtein to Yudenich about the beginning of the North-West Army.

12 *Ibid.*, LXI.

13 Avalov, *op. cit.*, p. 76

14 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI.



Germans was signed, recruiting offices were opened in Pskov, Riga and other cities of the Baltic.¹⁵ At the outset, the recruiting went briskly, and soon about five thousand officers and men were signed up. But from the beginning, the Germans did not keep their promises too well so far as supplies and money were concerned.¹⁶ The recruiting, while brisk, was very haphazard. There was no screening of any kind, and so many undesirable elements, including many Bolshevik agents were accepted into the army.

Early in October, Pskov was visited by General Rodzianko, and what he saw was to him a pitiable sight. On the streets walked groups of soldiers and officers shabbily clad in dirty and torn clothing. Their appearance was most disreputable, bearing no resemblance to military men. When Rodzianko went to headquarters he found confusion. Nobody could give him any information about anything.¹⁷ What would have been the results of this enterprise, if it had been allowed to go on unmolested, it is hard to say. But one was never to find out, for on November 11, Germany surrendered and Revolution broke out in Germany,.. The German army rapidly went to pieces. The German soldier had now only one desire and that was to go home as soon as possible and this desire was put into execution without delay.¹⁸

15 *Ibid.*, LXI.

16 *Ibid.*, LXI.

17 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 6. 18 *Ibid.*, LXI, p. 7



After the German Revolution the German troops began to abandon the Baltic and depart for home. Discipline was practically non-existent and the German officers lost all control over their men.¹⁹

This was a hard blow for the young army. All financial help was now stopped by the Germans. As Pskov was almost on the exact line of demarcation between the Soviet and German zones the army was exposed to the Bolshevik attacks as soon as the Germans retreated. The Russian officers in charge of the organization of the army wanted, from the first, to make as its base a city farther to the West (at Mitau) rather than the exposed city of Pskov but the Germans would not agree to this.²⁰

It must be remembered that Pskov, while geographically part of the Baltic, had always been considered Russian territory even by the most chauvinistically inclined patriots of the Baltic nations. Pskov was and is an ancient Russian city. Its population was Russian of the most ancient stock. So, since no foreign group claimed the city, the Germans allowed the army to be organized there. From the first there was trouble in the new army. Those officers who had taken part in bringing it to life quarreled about its organization. Some, old regular officers, wanted to make it a regular army of regiments, brigades, divisions, etc.,

19 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI, p.9.

20 Avalov, *op. cit.*, p.7



with the old army discipline. Others, led by the Chief of Staff, General Maliavin, wanted it to be a group of loosely knit partisan detachments.^(2 1) Under this scheme anybody was privileged to organize a partisan detachment and command it, at the same time being a part of the army. This plan prevailed so, in spite of later efforts, the army never became a regular army but remained half regular, half partisan.^{2 2}

The young officers were anxious to begin activities against the Bolsheviks. Therefore, before the army was fully formed, raids were organized from the German zone of occupation west of Pskov into Soviet territory. These raids were successful and brought new recruits. In one raid a whole troop of Talab fishermen from the Talab Islands in Lake Peypus joined the raiders and returned with them to Pskov.^{2 3} Later the Talabs were organized into a regiment (Talabsky Polk) and became one of the best units of the army.

From the first, the Germans did not keep their promises to the army, and after the German Revolution all help stopped. They had agreed to furnish it with all necessary clothing and food, not to mention munitions and horses. The first parade of the North Army revealed the fact that half of the soldiers had no shoes and

21 Colonel K. Smirnov, "Nachalo Severo-Zapadnoi Armii", *Bielo Delo*, I (Berlin 1926), p. 124. Colonel Smirnov was a battery commander in the army from the first day.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 124. 23 *Ibid.*, p. 123.



that most of their clothing was in tatters.

On November 2, 1918, a Red army partisan detachment deserted the Bolsheviks and joined the North army at Pskov. It was commanded by former cavalry captain of the Imperial army, one Bulak-Balakhovich. The detachment consisted of one hundred and twenty wild looking men and two cannons.²⁵ Bulak-Balakhovich (to be known hereafter as Balakhovich) promised at the time of his negotiations with the leaders of the army, that he would bring over, with him, five hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry but he did not keep his promise. The first one-hundred and twenty men were all that ever joined him from the Red side.

Captain Balakhovich, from the start, played an important but not always commendable role in the army. General Rodzianko, who knew him well, had a low opinion of him. He appears to have considered him vain, boastful, unreliable and cowardly.²⁷ Balakhovich was a bandit, pure and simple. He loved to plunder and seems to have had a sadistic pleasure in hanging people.²⁸ From the start,

24 *Ibid.*, p. 129.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 130.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 130.

27 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

28 V. Gorn, *Yudenich Pod Petrogradom* (Is Bielikh Memuarov) (Leningrad, 1927), p. 24.



he began to misbehave. He took a dislike to General Vandam, the first commander of the North army, and staged a kind of palace revolution to get rid of him. In this he succeeded and, on November 29, 1918, Vandam resigned.²⁹

The German High Command, in its agreement with the founders of the North army, promised that the Civil Administration of the Russian territories where the army was being formed would be turned over to the Russians. Unfortunately, upon this occasion as upon many others, the Germans did not keep their promise. This was not of great importance before the time of the German Revolution and the collapse of the Kaiser's armies, but with the demoralization of the German troops it created great confusion and disorder.³⁰

The population of Pskov was, at this time, demoralized and not at all friendly to the army; at best, it was neutral. The merchants did not want to contribute anything to help the army. The intelligencia was afraid of the Bolsheviks and did not dare to act. It also distrusted the officers as monarchists.³¹ The peasants were either friendly to the Bolsheviks or were neutral. They had no faith in the success of the army. When approached by recruiting officers they contended that if they were mobilized into the ranks of the army they would gladly serve but they would not volunteer because they feared the revenge of the Bolsheviks.³²

29 Smirnov, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

30 Avalov, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

31 Smirnov, *op. cit.*, p. 114, 115.

32 *Ibid.*, p.131.



Some of the more prosperous peasants came to General Vandam and asked to be mobilized. He refused, however, on the ground that the army must be made up of volunteers only. An attempt was made to enlist the Russian military prisoners in Germany into the army but this failed because the Germans would not cooperate.³³ With all this indifference and hostility the army was naturally small. At the time of the German collapse and retreat it numbered only about five thousand men and officers.³⁴

The ranks of this army were a strange mixture for men had joined it for a variety of reasons. Many volunteers came from the Soviet side, not only former officers but also peasants and Red army soldiers.³⁵ The frontier between the German zone and Soviet Russia was not heavily guarded in those days. Both sides, German and Reds, were very lax. Every day peasants came from the Soviet side to sell produce in German-held Pskov and went home in the evening.³⁶ It was not difficult for Whites, or anybody else for that matter, to go into Soviet Russia. Many officers on personal business or for affairs of the North army traveled between Pskov and Petrograd.³⁷ What motivated all these men to join the army? The reasons must have been very diverse. There was, of course, the desire for

33 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI, A report of Colonel Kruzeinshtein to General Yudenich on January 4, 1919.

34 *Ibid.*, LXI.

35 Smirnov, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 121.

37 Avalov, *op. cit.*, pp.62, 63.



adventure and plunder; there was a sense of duty to the Old Regime; but, from all accounts, both foreign and Russian, the chief motive was the desire for revenge for personal loss. Particularly was this true of the lower classes or else it is impossible to explain why peasants and, in some cases, even workers joined the North army. And they did join it - in small numbers, it; is true, but they were there just the same.³⁸

It is strange that the peasants were not hostile to the Germans. But they did not seem to be, for while few of them would enlist in the North army, many came to the Germans as delegates from their villages and begged the Germans to occupy their districts. Yet the Germans were not gentle rulers and they requisitioned a great deal of food from the peasants in their zone of occupation.³⁹

Since the German Revolution the German army had been rapidly disintegrating. Rumors had circulated for weeks that the Germans were about to retreat from the Baltic. The German soldier committees were friendly to the Bolsheviks and some sort of mysterious negotiations went on between them which the German officers were unable to prevent.⁴⁰

The Bolshevik High Command had a very good idea of what was

38 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI, Report of Colonel Kruzeinshtein to General Yudenich January 13, 1919.

39 Smirnov, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 133.



taking place in the German camp so they determined to attack. The German generals decided to fight and so informed Colonel von Neff, commander of the North army. The army was supposed to take over positions to the east of Pskov with German troops on both of its flanks. But by this time the German command really had no control over its troops. As the Bolsheviks began their advance, the Germans retreated without informing the army of it. So the army was left alone to face the enemy. This was November 26, 1918.⁴¹ It was only the forty-fifth day of the North army's existence. Many soldiers were untrained, seventy-five percent of them had no overcoats, fifty percent had no shoes. The old Russian rifles, with which the Germans supplied the army, did not have bayonets.⁴²

After the German Revolution the new German government informed the army that they could not expect any more help from Germany.⁴³ In spite of all this the North army fought well and the first Bolshevik attacks were beaten back but, as the Germans retreated without fighting, the Reds occupied Pskov in its rear. As the news of this reached the troops they became demoralized. This was due largely to the fact that the families of many of the soldiers and officers were in Pskov. So, many deserted and attempted to make their way back to their loved ones. Few of them succeeded. Their bodies were later found in the streets by their luckier comrades.⁴⁴

41 Avalov, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

42 Smirnov, *op. cit.*, pp. 138, 139.

43 Avalov, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

44 Smirnov, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-151, 153.



Under these conditions the commander of the army, Colonel von Neff, decided to retreat to the West. Neither he nor any of his subordinates knew where they were going. They only knew they had to retreat in order to save what was left of the army—to save their very lives. During the next two days the remnants of the army were harassed on all sides by bands of Bolsheviks. They fought from dawn to dark every inch of the way. Finally after forty-eight hours of continuous marching and fighting, the army reached the city of Izborsk in Estonia, and comparative safety.

Now, one should turn to events taking place in other parts of the Baltic at this time in the new Republics of Latvia and Estonia. Of the two, Estonia, to whose territory the North army retreated, was the more fortunate. It managed to clear its borders of the Bolshevik troops; but Latvia, except in its westernmost part, was occupied by Bolshevik soldiers. Estonia, while free of the immediate danger, had to go on fighting the Bolshevik soldiers who were making effort to recapture (or as they put it to ‘liberate’ it). Any organized military units, no matter how small, were welcome at this point. So, when Colonel von Neff, as commander in chief of the North army, approached the Estonian government for the purpose of finding a haven for his men and eventually continuing the struggle against the Bolsheviks, it gave a sympathetic ear to his overtures.⁴⁵

45 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI. A report from Colonel Kruzeinshtein to General Yudenich January 11, 1919.



The Estonian government was in a difficult position. Its own army was extremely weak and not too reliable. To the peasants and workers of the Baltic, who were for centuries serfs of the German barons, and at a later date, under their complete economic domination, the slogans of the Bolsheviks must have sounded very pleasant indeed.⁴⁶ The Estonian government and army were only a few weeks old. While politicians may be able to organize a government on short notice, it is not possible for an army to do so. An army must have time and effort expended on it before it can be cemented into an effective fighting machine.

While the Bolshevik troops, at this time, were not very formidable, still they were more numerous than the Estonian army, and could be improved as time went on. Therefore, from a purely military point of view, the North army was a very welcome addition to the Estonian army. Politically, however, it could be a danger. It was, after all, made up of Russian patriots. It could not be expected that they would applaud the independence of a new state carved out of the Russian State. Who could guarantee that this army, after defeating the Bolsheviks would not turn on Estonia and end its new independence? The Estonian government, therefore feared the North army. It needed its help but at the same time it felt that Estonia needed to be protected from it. After some negotiations, a contract was made between the Estonian

46 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp.13, 14, 15, 24. And Ian Apse, *The Baltic Countries*, p. 12.



army as an autonomous unit under the command of the Estonian Commander in chief, General Laidoner, a former Russian officer. It was to be known as the “North Corps”. The Estonian government promised to supply the North Corps with food, clothing, arms and all necessities. It limited its size to five thousand men and split it into two detachments on two separate sectors of the Estonian-Bolshevik front, one operating in the North from Narva in the direction of Petrograd, and the other in the South in the direction of Pskov.⁴⁷ Now the North army entered the new phase of its life as a part of the Estonian national army.

At this same time interesting events were taking place in neighboring Latvia. This country proclaimed its independence at the same time as Estonia. It had a government of a sort but it was weak and ineffective.⁴⁸ As German troops began to evacuate Latvia by order of the Allied High Command, the Bolshevik troops began to move in. When the Allies saw what was happening they ordered the German troops to stay for a while to give a chance to the new states to organize.⁴⁹ But the German troops were completely demoralized and desired only to go home. The officers lost all control over their men and the once proud regiments of

47 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI. Report to General Yudenich by Colonel Val, Chief of Staff on Yudenich army, February 6, 1919.

48 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 9. And Prince Lieven, “V Yuzhnoi Pribaltike”, *Bieloe Delo*, III, p. 187.



the Kaiser were streaming West as a disorganized mob of armed men. The German army of the period reminded one of the Russian army of late 1917. The retreating soldiers abused their officers and obeyed only their own soldier committees to which they elected the most radical elements. The soldiers were selling to the first bidder - rifles, pistols, machine guns and all kinds of equipment. The only thing they kept was food.⁵⁰ But the Germans did not want to abandon the Baltic completely. They still had hopes of retaining it for Germany. For this reason they began the formulation of a corps of volunteers, which received the name of the “Iron Division”. It was commanded by the German General von der Goltz who returned from Finland to take over the command. A few weeks previously, he had helped the Finnish government, headed by General Mannerheim, to suppress the uprising of Finnish Bolsheviks who were supported by the Russian-Bolshevik government.⁵¹

These German troops did not at this time (November and December 1918) represent any real fighting strength. The men who comprised the Iron Division evinced no desire to fight anybody. Their reasons for enlisting were free food, clothing, and lodging. Later, however, they were molded into an efficient fighting unit and played a great part in driving the Bolsheviks out of Latvia.⁵² —

50 Prince Lieven, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 187.

52 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 14.



The Lett national troops were weak and completely unreliable due to their strong Bolshevik leanings. The only reliable troops were the few companies of Lett Intelligentsia, a weak Russian battalion and a few companies of German Balts.⁵³ In Riga, all these groups quarreled among themselves, and to observers it was clear that Latvia was in a bad way and that Riga would soon fall to the Bolsheviks. Riga itself was the only industrial center of any importance in the Baltic and there were concentrated many workers and other proletarians, for Riga was an important sea port city.

Bolshevik propaganda was making great progress among these people and, in as much as the Germans who held the real power did not do anything to stop it, it was carried on openly. Soon the active Bolsheviks and their sympathizers became so numerous among the lower classes of the population that the Administration began to fear not only the invasion of Bolshevik troops from Russia but also an uprising of the local Bolsheviks.⁵⁴

After the fall of Pskov, November 26, 1918, many runaways from the North army arrived in Riga. Among the first was its Chief of Staff, Captain von Rosenberg and family. These men were now thinking of their own safety and had no desire to return to the army. Colonel Neff asked General Rodzianko to rally the men and send them to the army at Izborsk, but few obeyed their orders. Captain von Rosenberg point blank refused to return to the army, even after direct order of its commander, Colonel Neff.⁵⁵

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 14.

54 *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

55 *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13.



Chapter II

Arrival of the Allies

Now a new force entered the field. The Allies, in the form of the British navy, were approaching the Baltic Sea. On December 10, 1918, rumors spread in Riga that the British navy was coming. The hopes of the anti-Bolsheviks rose, but the British did not give any help and so Riga, and most of the rest of Latvia, was captured by the Bolshevik troops with the able assistance of local sympathizers.¹

With the fall of Riga to the Bolsheviks, a strong nationalistic movement began in Latvia and in January 1919, with the help of the German Iron Division, the Bolsheviks were driven from Riga, and Latvia was liberated.²

With the arrival of the Allies a new phase began in the life of the army. Of course all eyes were turned to them with hope. The Allies (British, French, and American) to the Russian way of thinking, were their friends. Had not Russia fought on their side for three years and lost over 7,000,000 men for the allied cause? It is true that, in the fall of 1917, the Bolsheviks, with Lenin at their head, did make peace with the Central Powers, but the White army had remained loyal to the Allies. They had tried their best to go on with the war. Now, thought they, their loyalty

1 A. P. Rodzianko, *Vospominania O Severnoi Armii*, pp. 14, 15.

2 Ian Apse, *The Baltic States*. (London n.d.) pp. 30, 31.



would surely be rewarded, and the grateful Allies would help them drive the Bolsheviks out of Russia and re-establish a good government. So thought the White Russian, but, unfortunately for them, the Allies took a different view. The Allies were represented mainly by the British navy, British diplomats, and British military missions.

For many months the White Russians were blind to the situation but signs of the aims of Britain were numerous from the start. The first thing that the British and Allies did was to recognize the independence of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland—all new nations carved out of the old Russian Empire. By no stretch of the imagination could this be considered as a friendly act.

From early history, England had been interested in the Baltic and she played a leading role there.³ Her interest was mainly commercial for she bought a considerable amount of food and lumber from that region.⁴ When Russia, under Peter the Great, fought her way to the Baltic littoral and began to build a powerful navy in St. Petersburg and Kronstadt, it was highly distasteful to England who was apprehensive, not only of the disruption of trade, but also of the balance of power in North Europe. Besides, the appearance of any new navy was not to the liking of Britain in any event. Britain had been trying from the start to block Russia

3 Ian Apse, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

4 Hugo Vitols, *La Mer Baltique et les Etat Baltes* (Paris, 1935), p. 271.



in the Baltic. In 1719 and 1720 England sent her navy to the Baltic to lend a hand to Sweden, but at that time her efforts failed, and Russia succeeded in getting what she was after.⁵

As a matter of fact, with the exception of a few short periods when England was threatened from another source, she was hostile to Russia from 1700 to 1949. This hostility increased when Russia expanded to the shores of the Black Sea and into the Balkans, and later to the warm waters of the Pacific Ocean at Port Arthur. As Russia extended her boundaries into Central Asia almost to the borders of India, England was in perpetual fear that the next step would find Russia actually invading India itself. All through these years England maintained an army of 200,000 men for just such an emergency. Anything that would weaken Russia would be grist to the British mill. Plans to drive Russia from the Baltic and to form a cordon sanitaire from the Baltic to the Caspian were openly discussed in Finland and Estonia—nations which had been recognized by England with such unseemly speed. Therefore it was, to say the least, naive for the White Russians to believe that Britain had come to the Baltic as their friend. Of course the Russians appealed to Britain for help. British representatives answered neither yea nor no to those appeals. The diplomats were on the cold and distant side, while the military tended to be

5 A. Kersnovsky, *Istoria Russkoi Armii* (Belgrade 1934), p. 39.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 488.

7 C. Kirdetsov, *U Vorot Petrograda*, pp. 49, 52.



friendly. The British diplomats did not want Russia to be strong and so worked hard to build the new Baltic nations—Estonia, Latvia and Finland.⁸

For quite a while the arrival of the British did not affect greatly the North army, now known as the North Corps. It fought against the Bolsheviks along side the Estonian troops, holding back the Reds, and so giving the new Estonian state a chance to organize and grow stronger.

The temporary commander of the army was now Colonel Dzerojinsky. The North Corps at this time (January 1919) consisted of mounted detachments of Colonel Bibilov, Talabski fishermen, Lieutenant-Captain Danilov, partisan detachments of Lieutenant-Colonel Balakhovich and a few other minor detachments. The total strength was between 2500 and 5000.⁹ It is hard to give the exact strength of the North Corps at any time because it varied from day to day. Many deserted and many joined every day. The Red army, being made up of mobilized soldiers, deserted in considerable numbers to the Whites.¹⁰

Now, a new and important figure joined the army, General A. P. Rodzianko. He joined at the end of February, and soon became its field commander and was with it to its final defeat.

8 Prince Lieven, “V Yuzhnoi Pribaltike” *Bieloe Delo*, III, pp. 187, 188.

9 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

10 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI. Report to Yudenich by Colonel Val, Chief of Staff, February 6, 1919.



General A. P. Rodzianko was a Russian aristocrat, born in 1879, an important landlord and a very rich man. He was educated at the Pageskii Korpus (Corps of Pages), the most aristocratic military academy in Russia. To enter this institution one had to be a son of a general or a nobleman of three generations. After graduation in 1899 he entered one of the elite regiments of the cavalry of the Guards of the Tsar.¹¹ He went to war with this regiment. He distinguished himself at the front and during the Revolution he commanded the best brigade of the 17th Cavalry division near Riga.

On January 3, 1918, General N. N. Yudenich arrived in Finland and began his efforts to organize an army to drive the Bolsheviks out of Petrograd.¹² On June 20, 1919, Admiral Kolchak, who headed the White government at Omsk in Siberia and who held the title of the “Supreme Head of all Russia” appointed Yudenich Commander in chief of all Russian (White Russian) forces in the Baltic with dictatorial powers.⁽¹³⁾

It is pertinent to consider the background of General Yudenich. So many calumnies were hurled at him, and so much derogatory criticism aimed in his direction that the true man was completely obscured.

11 S. Panchulidtsev, *Istoria Kavaleriargardov, LV* (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 373, 374.

12 G. Kirdetsov, *U Vorot Petrograda* (1919-1920). Berlin, 1921. pp.24-28

13 *Yudenich Archives*, (A collection of documents of the Yudenich army (North-West) at the Hoover Library of War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, California), LXIII, Kolchak to Yudenich June 20, 1919

14 *General of Infanterii Nickolai Nikolaevlch Yudenich Pidisiatiletnemu Yubileiu Izdanie Parizhkago Yubileinago Komiteta*, (Paris 1931), p. 6.



Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich was born in 1862. He was graduated from the Alexandrovsky Military Academy in Moscow in 1881. Immediately upon graduation he joined the Imperial Guards, Litovsky regiment, as a second lieutenant. Three years later, after completing his required term of duty, he entered the Nicolai General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg. After four years of hard study he was graduated and was appointed to the staff of the 14th Army Corps. Later he was transferred to Turkestan. There he distinguished himself during expeditions into Central Asia and Pamir.¹⁴

After twenty one years of service he was promoted to the rank of colonel and appointed commander of the 18th Turkestan sharp shooters regiment. This regiment, with Yudenich in command, took part in the Russian-Japanese War 1904-05. Again, Yudenich greatly distinguished himself. For a time he was commander of the brigade of which his regiment was a part. During the battle of Mukden he and his regiment covered the retreat. Many times he led his regiment into bayonet charges against the attacking Japanese, wielding a rifle himself and taking a personal part in the hand-to-hand fighting. For his bravery and ability in the Russian-Japanese War, Yudenich was rewarded with the sword of St. George, and was promoted to the rank of major-general.¹⁵

After the war, Yudenich was assigned to the Caucasus. He was there when World War I broke out. This was his opportunity to demonstrate his agility as a military man and a general. The war with Turkey began October 20, 1914. Yudenich was the Chief of Staff of the Separate Caucasian Army.¹⁶ The Commander in Chief was Count Vorontsov who was also the viceroy of the entire Caucasus. Vorontsov's adviser in military matters, General Mishlaevski, was the actual commander.¹⁷

15 A. Kersnovsky, *Istoria Russkoi Armii* (Belgrade 1934), II p. 487.

16 *General of Infanterii. Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich ... op. cit.* pp. 12, 14, 15, 28, 29.

17 E.V. Maslovski, *Mirovaia Voina na Kavkazkom Fronte 1914-1917*, (Paris, 1938). pp. 73, 77.



Facing the Caucasian army was the Turkish army. This army was much larger than the Russian army, and was made up of first line troops with many German and Austrian officers in command.¹

⁸ The Russian High Command, realizing the inadequacy of the Caucasian army, gave it a purely passive task—that of the defense of the Caucasian border—and gave it permission to evacuate all the territory up to the main range of the Caucasus if necessary.¹⁹

The ambitious commander of all Turkish Troops, Enver Pasha, decided to take advantage of the situation on the Caucasian front and destroy, with one blow, the weak Russian Army. The Turks were assisted by German staff officers.

The Turkish plan was audacious and brilliant. It was to contain the Russians in front by equal numbers of troops and envelop their right flank and rear and so surround and annihilate them.²⁰ The relative strength in this battle was 150,000 Turks against 50,000 Russians.²¹ At first, all went well for the Turks. Their troops got into the rear of the Russian army and cut its line of retreat. The commander of the army, Mishlaevsky, thinking all was lost, gave an order to the troops to make their way to the rear as best they could and he himself departed in haste to Tiflis. The individual corps commanders also decided to retreat—in reality, a “sauve qui peut”. Enver Pasha was already celebrating his victory when all this was changed by one man.²²

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 32-45.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32.

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 89, 90.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 131.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 128, 129.



General Yudenich was with General Mishlaevaky at this critical moment. When his chief ran away he remained and decided to fight. He was of junior rank to other generals, but he nonetheless assumed command and all responsibility. He browbeat the other generals into obeying him, and inspired his troops with his own determination to fight.

As a result, instead of a disastrous defeat, there ensued a brilliant victory. Fifty-five thousand Russians surrounded by 150,000 Turks not only defeated, but actually annihilated them. Out of the entire Turkish army, only 12,400 men were left to protect the mighty Turkish fortress of Erzerum.

After this victory Yudenich was promoted to the rank of full general, decorated with the Cross of St. George fourth class and appointed commander of the Caucasian Army.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 109-133. For the Turkish losses Maslovsky uses the Russian reports of Turkish prisoners and the dead bodies counted on the battle field; and also Commandant M. Larcher, *La Guerre Turque dans la Guerre Mondiale*, p. 389.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 137.



The Turks made desperate efforts to rebuild their shattered armies and in the summer of 1915, made another attempt to destroy the Russians, but again they were defeated by General Yudenich, and for this he earned the Cross of St. George third class.²⁵ In the winter of 1915-16, Yudenich was to win his most important victory—the Turkish High Command was again making plans to defeat the Russians. On December 21, 1916, the struggle of the Gallipoli Peninsula came to an end. All the might of England and France had not been able to defeat the Turks, and the Allied armies evacuated Gallipoli after suffering heavy losses.

Yudenich knew that the Turks planned to transfer a large number of victory-flushed troops from Gallipoli and make an end of his enemy. So he decided to attack rather than wait. In this way the enemy had no time to bring up reinforcements. Plans were made, in great secrecy, to attack the Turks by the end of December.²⁶

At this point the situation in the Caucasus changed. The ailing Count Vorontzov, who had had complete confidence in Yudenich and had give him free rein, was now replaced by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Now, Yudenich had to ask permission of the Grand Duke before he could act. After everything was ready he went to Tiflis and talked the Grand Duke into giving his permission to attack.²⁷

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 167-97.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 231-233.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 243-245



December 28, 1916, the battle began and by January 6, 1916, what remained of the Turks sought refuge behind the forts of Erzerum.²⁸ This victory was the only bright spot in the dismal picture of the war in 1915 for the Allies. Russian armies had just ended their long retreat in the West and had suffered tremendous losses. Their morale was low. The Allies had suffered a bad defeat in Gallipoli and had been forced to evacuate the Peninsula. On the Western Front in France the stalemate continued. In short, the Central Powers had the upper hand everywhere. Only the Caucasian army, commanded by General Yudenich, was victorious.

After this victory Yudenich wanted to storm Erzerum, taking advantage of the disorganization of the defeated Turks, but when he approached the Grand Duke Nikolai for permission to undertake the storm he was strictly forbidden to consider such a project. Instead, he was ordered to select a suitable position in the rear and withdraw his troops thither. The Grand Duke was happy over the victory which raised the morale of the Allies, but he felt that a possible defeat might wipe out all good effects of the recently won victory. Besides, all military experts, both Russian and foreign, considered Erzerum impregnable except by siege. Even in summer it would be considered foolhardy, but in the midst of winter, the plan was unthinkable. All the experts agreed on this point.

²⁹

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.255.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 256.



With a heavy heart, Yudenich decided to obey orders. He sent Colonel Maslovski, his assistant, to select positions for his troops. But when Maslovski arrived at the front he saw the disorganization and confusion of the enemy, and the high morale of the Russian troops, and became convinced that to stop the retreat now would be a crime. He felt that this situation should be taken advantage of and that Erzerum could be captured. Instead of obeying orders, then, he reconnoitered the fortifications of Erzerum and returned to the Army Headquarters and reported to Yudenich his deep conviction of the feasibility of the attack.³⁰

Yudenich, now that he knew how things were, did not take long to make up his mind. He decided to make a final attempt to wrest permission for the storming from the Grand Duke Nikolai. Instead of wiring his commander, he called his headquarters by 'phone. Maslovski, who was an eye witness recounts the dramatic scene thus:

Yudenich called to the 'phone General Bolkhovitinow and ordered him to call the palace at once and report to the Grand Duke his urgent request to countermand his order to retreat to the Koprikey position and permit him (Yudenich) to storm Erzerum. pointing to the desirability and feasibility under the new existing conditions. Yudenich said that he would wait at the 'phone for the answer. At first the Grand Duke refused the request and demanded that his original order be executed, but after a new request of General Yudenich—a very insistent request—which followed immediately, the Grand Duke gave the desired permission, but with the stipulation that Yudenich himself, assume all responsibility for consequences in case of failure. General Yudenich answered briefly that he would assume all responsibility.³¹

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 258, 259.

31 *Ibid.*, pp. 259, 260.



Again Maslovski says:

General Yudenich clearly realized the importance of the decision that he was taking upon himself. It is not hard to imagine the bad effect on the morale of the country and the army that a failure would produce. This is why the decision of Yudenich to storm Erzerum, assuming all responsibility for consequences, was an act of heroism of the highest order and one which should be especially noted in history.³²

It one looks at the map of the terrain, one easily sees the tremendous difficulties that Yudenich's army had to face. The whole country is a mass of mountain chains, gullies and canyons. The average altitude of the valleys is eight thousand feet and mountain chains average ten and eleven thousand feet. In winter, the cold is extreme. The snow is very deep in places on exposed plateaus, five and six feet without drifts. Blizzards are frequent. It is little wonder that Erzerum was considered by everybody to be impregnable.

In spite of all this, the storming began in the evening of January 29, 1916 and at daybreak February 3, the Russian troops entered Erzerum. The impossible had happened. The booty was tremendous. The Turkish troop practically ceased to exist, and never thereafter could the Turks seriously threaten the Russian army.³³ The victory seemed so incredible that even the Tzar of Russia, when he received the report of the capture of Erzerum, thought that some misunderstanding had occurred and demanded confirmation.³⁴ Yudenich was now again decorated for his victory and was given the Cross of St. George second class.³⁵

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 275-300.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 275-300.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 300.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 301.



It took time for the Turks to recover from the staggering defeats inflicted by Yudenich, but the Turkish High Command decided to make another effort to defeat the Russians. Gallipoli victors were brought to the Caucasian front and another attack began. As usual, however, the Turks were defeated. The Russian Caucasian army then, by 1917, had no important enemy. It was ready for any eventuality.³⁶

Then came the Revolution. Yudenich was dismissed as a reactionary and was returned to Petrograd and later he made his way to Sweden.³⁷

In characterizing General Yudenich, his subordinate Maslovski wrote:

General Yudenich was an active man who had high moral courage, a wide breadth of military viewpoint, ability at correct evaluation of a situation and a determination to obtain his objective.. When once he made a decision he never wavered. He was full of the will to victory.

And General Kvinitatze wrote of him:

The main force or General Yudenich's character is "his moral influence, his moral pressure and his general superiority over everybody."³⁸

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 410, 411.

37 *General of Infanterii Nickolai Nikolaevioh Yudenich k Pidisaiaitiletnemu Yubileiu Izdanie Parizhskago Yubileinago Komiteta, op. cit.*, p. 9.

38 Maslovski, *op. cit.*, p. 418.



Such then was the man who was called, in June 1919, to lead the White army against Petrograd, a man who had never lost a battle. It is little wonder that everybody expected great things of him.

It seems that at first Yudenich planned to enlist the help of Finland for the drive against Petrograd.³⁹ Until he was appointed as commander in chief of the Russian forces in Northwestern Russia, Yudenich was busy with this plan to the exclusion of all else. He had reason to have high hope for his plan, inasmuch as the head of the Finnish state and Commander in chief of the Finnish Army was General Mannerheim, a former Russian general, whose wife was a Russian. Mannerheim's sympathies toward the Russians were well known. Unfortunately, Yudenich failed, and Finland did not move a finger to help him or his army.

In the meantime, the North army was fighting as a part of the Estonian army Its commander was Dzerozhinsky, and Rodzianko commanded the Southern group. But soon talk began in the ranks of the army to the effect that Rodzianko ought to be the commander. Such talk was surely not unpleasant to Rodzianko's ears. Since Colonel Dzerozhinsky was only a temporary commander, the majority of officers wanted to see him (Rodzianko) in command. The Estonian Commander in Chief General Laidoner, is said to have stated that he also favored Rodzianko because he trusted him and felt sure that while he was in command, Estonia need have no fear that the North army would turn its arms against her.⁴⁰ It is not quite clear why General Laidoner could not have appointed Rodzianko as commander of the North army, or North Corps as it was then known, inasmuch as it was under his direct command. Rumors circulating in the army explain it on the ground that Laidoner hesitated to appoint him because there was much opposition to him in the Russian liberal groups in Estonia and Latvia. Yudenich was also opposed to this appointment but he was powerless to act since it was before he was appointed Commander in Chief by Kolchak.⁴¹

39 Kirdetsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-99.

40 A. P. Rodzianko, *Vospominania O Severnoi Armii*, (Berlin, 1921) p. 27.

41 *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 31.



After more squabbling, quarrels, recriminations and insinuations, Rodzianko took over the command of the North Corps in April 1919. But for a time, Dzerozhinsky remained in nominal command of the army in Revel, while Rodzianko was commanding at the front. It was most unfortunate that there was always a certain amount of quarreling about who should command. At no time was there one commander, but always two or three, and all quarreling. All this did not help the cause. Kruzeinshtein, a colonel in the old Imperial Army, was appointed Chief of staff.⁴²

In April, Yudenich communicated to the army that Britain had promised help in the way of supplies and munitions. Yudenich seems still to have had faith in the British. He must have remembered how many Russian lives had been lost in the war. Yudenich himself, as commander in the Caucasus, was ordered to advance to relieve the pressure on the British from the Turks. The whole detachment in Persia had to be organized out of the meager resources of the Caucasian army, for the sole purpose of helping the British in Mesopotamia. All this would naturally cause Yudenich to expect help in return. For this reason, it was decided to assume the offensive. The army with the permission of the Estonian High Command, was concentrated near Narva and the date for the offensive was set for May 12, 1919.⁴³

42 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 31-36.



Chapter III

The Spring Offensive

This work is not primarily concerned with the military operations of the Yudenich army as such, but a brief summary is necessary to get a clear picture of the situation.

The Civil War in Russia, and of Yudenich's army in particular, does not resemble wars between well organized armies where huge columns of smartly uniformed and well drilled troops led by generals, fought similar columns of the enemy in battles of short duration; or where long lines of trenches, from sea to sea, held by millions of troops faced similar millions; all protected from above by hundreds of fighting planes. Here all was different. Small detachments of troops occupied long tracts of territory. There were no continued lines and no columns. A group of a few hundred men held a village. This group faced another group who held another village. Then perhaps, from ten to fifty miles away the situation was duplicated. Yudenich's army of at most 20,000 (usually less than 10,000) men, held a front of over one hundred miles. The Red troops, while usually more numerous were also few compared to the standards of regular armies.² Neither of these armies had well organized supply lines or bases. Particularly was this true of the Yudenich army. This army, a few

1 *Yudenich Archives*, IV. 2 *Ibid.*, IV



thousand strong had no base, no dependable source of supplies, or even its own territory. Until the summer of 1919, it was a part of the Estonian army, taking its orders from the commander of the Estonian army.³

The plan of advance of the North Corps was to attack first in the southern and southeastern direction with the aim of capturing the small town of Gdov and to threaten Luga. This aim was intended to be a diversion to force the Red army to concentrate all its reserves at the threatened points. After the capture of Gdov, a small detachment was to be left in the direction of Luga to contain the Reds there. The rest of the. Army was to concentrate rapidly on the Narova river and advanced to the city of Yamburg. After the capture of the latter, it was to act according to circumstances. Such was the plan.⁴

The advance actually began at three A.M. on May 13, 1919. At first all went well. Numerous enemy prisoners were captured and much booty, including several guns and machine guns. The advance was progressing smoothly until May 19, when the army had to stop, due to the exhaustion of the troops.⁵

In this short period the northern group had made rapid progress. The southern group, under Bulak-Balakhovich, had captured Gdov, the southeastern group had defeated the Reds and, having completed its

3 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 37. 4 *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 38. 5 *Yudenich Archives*, IV, Staff report of Rodzianko May 13, 1919



mission in this region, it moved north and united with the main group which was operating against Yamburg. The two groups now concentrated and captured Yamburg which the Reds hastily evacuated. Not stopping at Yamburg, the troops went on as far as their strength was able to carry them. The advance stopped a few miles east of Yamburg.⁶

In this short period, six days, the army captured fifteen guns, many prisoners and other war booty, several locomotives, besides 500 railroad cars loaded with flour.

This was all very well, but it was clear that, due to the shortage of men and supplies. The army had shot its bolt, for the moment at least. Even now it was fighting on territory that was indisputably Russian.

Rodzianko complained that he could not utilize the great number of volunteers who presented themselves, because of the lack of officers.⁷ Yet one should not give too much credence to such statements, because, at the same time he had in his army, whole battalions of officers who were serving as privates.⁸

Due to his successes, Rodzianko apparently now felt justified in demanding that the command of the army be handed over to him. Therefore, when he arrived at the city of Narva, the headquarters of the army, he demanded that the command be given exclusively to him. Colonel Dzerozhinsky had gone to Revel, so Rodzianko in his absence,

⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, Staff report of Rodzianko May 19, 1919. ⁷ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 53. ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.



in the order of the day, proclaimed himself in April 1919, the sole commander of the Army. Dzerozhinsky made no protest.⁹ Now Rodzianko was happy. He was the head man but alas, not for long. As stated before, Yudenich officially proclaimed himself Commander in Chief on June 28, 1919.

After Balakhovich captured Gdov the Estonian troops began their advance on Pskov and took it from weak Bolshevik detachments on May 16. A day or so later the troops of Balakhovich also entered Pskov. Immediately the Russians and Estonians began to quarrel. They accused each other of all manner of crimes and excesses against the population.¹⁰

The financial situation of the army was really its weakest spot.¹¹ The Germans, before their collapse and Revolution, promised to furnish money and they did, to a limited extent. Out of 100,000,000 marks promised, 4,000,000 actually materialized. Even this help ended with the German Revolution.¹² The Estonians furnished some food and munitions but no money. The army was without funds and Rodzianko was in desperate need of money. Among other things he had to pay wages to railroad workers who were repairing a bridge which had been blown up by the retreating Bolsheviks near Yamburg. He had to use 10,000 rubles

9 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 53.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 55. Also Kirdetzov, *op. cit.*, pp.255-271.

12 *Yudenich Archives*, LXI, Report to Yudenich from Colonel Kruzeinshtein.



of Kerensky money captured .from the Bolsheviks.¹³ The only place where money could be had was from Kolchak who was fortunate enough to possess some of the gold reserves of Imperial Russia. Yudenich appealed to Kolchak for money. He was supported by prominent Russians outside or Russia, headed by the famous former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tsar, Sazonov.¹⁴ For some reason Kolchak was slow in sending the money. On May 27, Rodzianko wired Yudenich asking his permission to issue paper money of the type issued by the provisional Government of Kerensky.¹⁵ Yudenich flatly refused the request; then later Rodzianko ordered General Kruzeinshtein to print paper for the army. After the money was put into circulation Yudenich approved of it. This money became known as “Rodziansky” (Rodzianko money). Later Yudenich ordered it to be replaced by his own issue of money and that became known as “Yudenki” (Yudenich money).¹⁶ Finally, in July 1919, Kolchak furnished 100,000 English pounds to Yudenich, which he deposited in a London bank.¹⁷

13 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

14 *Yudenich Archives*, LXIII, Letter of Sazonov to minister of foreign affairs of Admiral Kolchak in Omsk April 2, 1919.

15 *Ibid.*, XI

16 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 61. Rodzianko does not state the exact amount of money printed.

17 Kirdetzov, *op. cit.*, p. 145.



Yudenich was not now the official Commander in Chief, but negotiations about the matter were going on with the Kolchak government. Since Kolchak was in Siberia—6,000 miles distant—the negotiations were of necessity slow. In an official letter of May 24, 1919, Yudenich informed Kolchak that he recognized him as Supreme Head of Russia and also that he, Yudenich had organized for his own assistance a political council to assist him in political and international affairs and in the administration of the conquered territories, and also of Petrograd when that city should be captured. This group was made up of liberal Russian leaders, Kadets, and right wing socialists in Finland and Estonia, and of two generals. They were the following: V. D.. Kuzmin-Karavaev, C. G. Lianozov, A. V. Kartashev, General M. N. Suvorov, and General Kondzerovsky.¹

8

Rodzianko was forced to take orders from Yudenich, not because he was officially his commander, which in fact he was not, but because Yudenich had a great deal of prestige and was favored by the British. The British had announced, through their military mission, that they would give help to the North army only through General Yudenich.¹⁹

From the first, there was an unfortunate antipathy between Yudenich and Rodzianko and this quarrel greatly hurt the cause of Yudenich and his army. Rodzianko complained bitterly. Things

18 *Yudenich Archives*, LXIII. Letter from Yudenich to Kolchak May 24, 1919.

19 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 61

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 59-63 and also *Ibid.*, p 126.



got to such a pass that Sazonov had to wire to Rodzianko asking him to behave himself because the Allies were worried about the squabbles between him and Yudenich, and on that account were delaying the sending of supplies to the army.²¹ Again, General Golovin, Yudenich's representative in Paris and London complained that Rodzianko made constant attempts to negotiate directly with the Allies. He asked that all negotiations be transacted through Yudenich to save confusion.²² Yudenich, on his side, made several attempts to get rid of Rodzianko. First he took command of the whole army from Rodzianko and appointed him his assistant. This was done after the final advance had begun in October. Rodzianko protested vigorously that an assistant was just a figurehead. After bitter quarrels, Yudenich allowed him to command one detachment of the army. During the retreat, Yudenich deprived Rodzianko of all command and later sent him, on a trumped up pretext, to London to get rid of him.²³ Such a situation was naturally detrimental to the army.

As the North Corps entered Russian territory it began to feel more independent of the Estonians. Now quarrels began to arise between the Allies. As stated above, the trouble began at Pskov and spread out to the whole front and rear. This caused the Estonian Commander in Chief, General Laidoner, to eliminate the North Corps from the Estonian Army. He informed Rodzianko of his decision.

21 *Yudenich Archives*, LXIII. A wire to Rodzianko from Sazonov January 10, 1919.

22 *Ibid.*, LXIII. A report from Golovin to Yudenich June 28, 1919.

23 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 103, 107, 122.



From now on, the Russians were on their own, and the Estonian government refused to supply further the Russians.

After the break with the Estonians, Rodzianko, in an order of the day, June 19, announced that the army was now independent and that its name henceforth was to be North Army instead of North Corps.²⁴ Soon after, however, at the request of the Allies, the name was again changed to North-West Army. Under this name it was known to the end of its existence.²⁵

For several weeks the situation at the front was without much change except for an interesting incident in connection with the surrender of the Fort Krasna Gorka to the North-West army.²⁶

This fort had been built by the Tsar's government many years before as an additional defense of St. Petersburg from the sea. The surrender could have been of great significance to Yudenich. Unfortunately, due to adverse circumstances, it was no help. After the North-West army had captured Yamburg and had advanced to within fifty miles of Petrograd its left flank approached to within a few miles of Krasnaia Gorka. The garrison of Krasna Gorka sent word that it wanted to go to the side of the Whites. This happened on June 15, 1919. All seemed well indeed.²⁷

Now, Krasnaia Gorka faces Kronstadt and it could even shell it

24 *Ibid.*, .pp. 50, 52, 53, 58.

25 *Yudenich Archives*, XCVII, Order of the day by A. P. Rodzianko June 19, 1919.

26 *Ibid.*, XXCVIII. Report of June 17, 1919 to Rodzianko from his Chief of Staff.

27 *Ibid.*, IV. Report of the staff of the North-West army June 16, 1919.



at long gun range. With its falling into the hands of the Whites, they would have had a secure point very close to Petrograd. And, inasmuch as rumors were numerous that, in Kronstadt the sentiment was, in the main, anti-Bolshevik, it could have been hoped that Kronstadt itself would go over to the whites. This would have sealed the fate of Petrograd.²⁸

The garrison of Kronstadt offered to surrender to the British navy.²⁹ Yudenich appealed to the British Admiral for immediate help, but the British did not move. Instead of the British, the Bolshevik navy appeared and began to shell the fort.

On the land side, in the meantime, the closest unit to Krasnaia Gorka, was the Ingermanland detachment. This was not really a part of the Rodzianko army but was a detachment sent by the Estonians to cooperate with the North-West army. When Rodzianko began his advance in May, the Estonian High Command promised to support his left flank by landing a detachment in the rear of the enemy—the Ingermanlands were this detachment. Instead of obeying, or at least cooperating with Rodzianko, these troops began to act as the army of the independent Ingermanland Republic.

This so-called nation, the “Ingermanlands”, is situated on the narrow strip of land between the eastern border of Estonia and

28 A. Gefner, “Vospominania Kuriera”, Archiv Russkoi Revolutzii, X (Berlin 1923), p. 143.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 121.



Petrograd. The territory is sparsely populated by a mixed group of Russians and some Finnish tribes akin to both the Estonians and the Finns. The total population is less than 300,000. It had not a single city. The Estonian government was promoting this new republic for reasons of its own. The Ingermanlands' detachment, being the closest, accepted the surrender of the garrison of Krasnaia Gorka. There they committed all sorts of atrocities, including the putting to death of three hundred Communists, plundering the fort and robbing the garrison. Then as the Reds advanced, they ran away.³⁰ Rodzianko, in disgust at their conduct ordered his subordinate, Captain Staluzza to disarm and disband the Ingermanland detachment. This he did in short order. On June 24 he reported to Rodzianko that the job was done.³¹

After the spring advance the North-West army stood still for several weeks. This does not mean that there was no fighting. Some fighting went on every day and the army suffered considerable losses, but nothing of real importance transpired. The reasons for this inactivity were not far to seek. The North-West army was short of everything—food, clothing and munitions. No further help was forthcoming from the Estonians, since after all, their territory was now freed from the Bolsheviks.

30 *Yudenich Archives*, LXXVII, Report of Krasnaia Gorka garrison June 20, 1919.

31 *Ibid.*, LXXVII.



All hopes were now, therefore, centered on the Allies, primarily the British. The advance itself had undertaken because the Allies had promised help in the form of munitions and supplies of all kinds. But little help came. Only the United States furnished food, as they had agreed. As soon as the army had achieved some success and had captured Yamburg, various Allied commissions and missions visited the front. They all congratulated Rodzianko and his assistants on their victory and again said they would send help. But they remained only promises. The American Red Cross, on the other hand, appalled by what it saw, offered food. Rodzianko gladly accepted lard and flour.³² This American food not only kept the army from starving but helped the hungry population too, Rodzianko shared it with the people of the occupied territories.³³

It seems that the Bolsheviks did not expect any danger from the North-West army before it began its advances. They were busy defeating the armies of Admiral Kolchak in the East. But the rapid advance of the North-West army made them apprehensive. Trotsky began to bring reserves to the Red troops defending Petrograd.³⁴ By the middle of June, the North-West army was in retreat. June 8, Yudenich wired Kolchak that the army had retreated twenty-five miles, that the morale was low and that hope of capturing Petrograd was fading. He further

32 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 52.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

34 *Yudenich Archives*, I, Staff report of the Yudenich army June 4, 1919.



added that without armed help from Finland, Petrograd could not be captured.³⁵

The surrender of Krasnaia Gorka did not help the North-West army. The Bolsheviks were already advancing and the exhausted troops of Rodzianko could not hold them back. Krasnaia Gorka garrison, demoralized by the excesses of the Ingermanland detachment, and lack of expected help from the British Navy and also by the shelling of the Red warships abandoned the fort as the Reds were advancing and retreated with the rest of the army.

In June the army was in a bad way. The reinforced Reds were attacking and gaining ground. The army was small and not increasing. A detailed report of the North-West army's strength as of June 4, lists less than 20,000 men in the ranks.³⁷ While it is undoubtedly true that many Red army soldiers deserted to the Whites—sometimes in units of several hundred men—it is also true that White desertions to the enemy were numerous, especially during retreats.³⁸ On the whole, the North-West army increased in numbers when it advanced and grew smaller when it retreated. The great majority of deserters from the Red army were those mobilized peasants who did not care one way or the other who won. Their real desire was to get home, and it this

35 *Ibid.*, LXIII.

36 *Ibid.*, IV, Report from the staff of the army June 16, 1919.

37 *Ibid.*, IV, Staff report of the fighting troops of the army, June 14, 1919.

38 *Ibid.*, IV, Staff report of military operations June 9, 1919.



was not possible, then they went to the side which had the better rations at the time.³⁹ Although the North-West army was created and kept going by officers of the old Russian army, the desire to fight was not at all general among them. Rodzianko lamented that about 8,000 officers resided in Finland and refused to join the army and also that many more who lived in Revel, Riga, and other cities of Estonia and Latvia refused to heed requests, and even orders, to join. On June 18, 1919, Rodzianko issued an order that all officers in the Baltic who refused to join the army should take off their uniforms.⁴⁰

All through June the North-West army was desperately resisting the advance of the reinforced Red troops. It had to retreat in places but still it held Yamburg and Pskov—the two main Russian cities that it controlled. It was short of everything. Munitions were getting low, clothing was in tatters and the promised supplies of the Allies had not arrived.⁴¹ Rodzianko wired Yudenich and Gough, head of the British mission, informing them that, due to lack of shells and the complete absence of reserves, he was laying down all responsibility and requested to know immediately the latest date of arrival of the required supplies.⁴²

39 *Ibid.*, VI, North-West army intelligence report June 30, 1919.

40 *Ibid.*, XCVII, Army order of the day, June 18, 1919. Also Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p.5.

41 *Ibid.*, VIII, Report of General Hilberg July 11, 1919.

42 *Ibid.*, XXCVIII, Wire of Rodzianko to Yudenich and Sir Hubert Gough July 1, 1919.



The troops fought for weeks with little or no rest. July 4, Rodzianko again wired to Yudenich that the situation was desperate and that immediate help was imperative.⁴³ The population was not on the side of the army except the wealthier peasants who owned their own farms. Out of this group exclusively was formed the detachment of Lieutenant Danilov, which detachment fought with distinction all through the life of the North-West army, but the great majority of peasants were either indifferent or actually hostile.⁴⁴

The organization and the supply of the army were also, in part, responsible for the hostility of the population. A large part of the army was made up, not of regular troops but of partisans (guerrillas).

These detachments did not have military discipline or organization. They owed their first allegiance to their leader who got them together and led them. These detachments, though often brave in battle and useful to the army, were impossible to control.

As the army was short of everything, it could not furnish them with adequate supplies. They, therefore, developed the habit of taking whatever they needed from the population. As usual, at first this was only such things as food and clothing but later, along with these bare necessities were included watches, diamond rings and other such plunder. Furthermore, since the majority of the members of the partisans were from the local population, when

43 *Ibid.*, LXI. 44 F. Zuron, "Danilovi" *Bielo Delo II* (1926), pp. 158-196.



they occupied new districts they set out to even up old scores and grudges. They executed many innocent people on the pretext that they were Communists, when actually they were only their personal enemies.⁴⁵ The regular troops, while much better behaved, were also guilty of excesses.

Again, lack of supplies drove them to it.⁴⁶ The administration of the occupied districts also left much to be desired. Persons of very indifferent qualifications were often appointed as administrators. Again one finds atrocities and excesses committed on the population. Inexperience, greed, malice, revenge explain, in part, this situation.⁴⁷ As a result, the population which had welcomed the troops of the North-West army with flowers and flags now turned against them and sped their departure with stone and bullets.⁴⁸

Of the several partisan detachments, the most prominent were those of Lieutenant Danilov and of Bulak-Balakhovich. The latter started his career in the North-West army as a lieutenant, and by June 1919 he had become a major general. Rodzianko had promoted him several times in the hope that it might improve his behavior. There is not much to be said about Danilov and his troops. Danilov was a brave officer who rose from the ranks during World War I. He

45 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

46 *Yudenich Archives*, XLCII, Report of the North-West army military representative in Estonia says that officers on leave bragged about the booty they got in their raids in Russia January 4, 1919. Also, G. Kirdetzev, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

47 G. Kirdetzev, *op. cit.*, pp. 187, 188.

48 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p.38



was decorated for bravery several times by the Tsar. His record shows that during the life of the North-West army he was a good soldier and his men on the whole behaved themselves. Not so, however, with Balakhovich and his followers. According to all accounts, they were bandits, pure and simple. They plundered, murdered, raped and in general, committed most of the known crimes. The ill-fated city of Pskov and its environs were subjected to all manner of indignities at the hands of these men. Whatever is controversial in the history of the North-West army, the story of Balakhovich does not come in that category. All accounts, Red and White, liberal and conservative, Russian and foreign, agree that he and his men behaved like fiends in human form.⁴⁹

Rodzianko and Yudenich kept Balakhovich in command because he was popular with his men.⁵⁰ But finally even the most lenient commander could stand it no longer, it seemed, for Yudenich, with complete agreement of Rodzianko ordered the arrest of Balakhovich.⁵¹ This took place, at Pskov August 24, 1919. Unfortunately, Balakhovich escaped the next day and caused much trouble.

In the meantime, Yudenich kept quarreling with Rodzianko. While he confirmed his appointment after he became Commander in Chief, still

49 Many sources could be quoted, e.g. Kirdetzov, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-271. And Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 678, 84, 87, 88.

50 Kirdetzov, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

51 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, Appendix p. 148. Order of Balakhovich's arrest. Also *Ibid.*, p. 88.



he didn't like the man.⁵² All these troubles hurt the White cause. The quarrels among the leaders brought confusion in the command of the army and therefore to the troops in the field as well. This situation became generally known and well-wishers tended to lose some of their enthusiasm. The army lost prestige and considerable confidence among the Russian population.

Conditions at the front were also bad. Trotsky brought reinforcements to the Seventh Red army and it assumed the offensive in June. As stated above, the North-West army had to retreat step by step. All through June and July there was fighting with the advancing Red troops and on the whole, it was unfavorable to the North-West army. August 4. Yamburg had to be evacuated and the army retreated almost to the border of Estonia. Only Pskov was in the hands of the White Russians, but even this was lost at the end of August, and the army was back where it had started.⁵³

As usual, after a defeat, everyone tried to blame somebody else. Rodzianko blamed the Estonians, particularly for the fall of Pskov, and he also blamed General Yudenich. Yudenich blamed Rodzianko and also the Estonians; the Estonians blamed the Whites. Out of all this, one thing was clear at least: the army was completely exhausted, munitions were at an end, soldiers were in rags, morale was low and the promised Allied help was not forthcoming.⁵⁴

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105. Also *Yudenich Archives*, XIV, Telephone conversation between Rodzianko and Kruzeinshtein July 4, 1919.

53 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 89.

54 *Yudenich Archives*, VIII, A wire from General Zilberg to Yudenich July 11, 1919. Also a report by General Arsenev to Yudenich July 13, 1919. Also LXI, A wire to Yudenich from Rodzianko July 4, 1919.



The ranks of the army during the retreat were greatly reduced, from about 20,000 to 10,000 in the latter part of July.⁵⁵ On July 20[?], the Prince Lieven detachment, 4,000 strong, arrived from Libau and thus increased the size of the army somewhat. The staff report of July 30 gives the strength of the North-West army as 14,000 bayonets, 500 sabers, and 46 guns.⁵⁶

The detachment which now arrived was led by Prince Lieven. He was a Balt, German aristocrat from Baltic, descendant Teutonic Knights. He had served in the old Russian army in the most aristocratic regiment of the Cavalry of the Guards (Kavalergard). At the time of the Russian Revolution he was a captain (Rotmister). When the old army fell apart he remained in Riga. When, in December of 1918, Riga was on the verge of falling to the Red troops, he made his way to Libau and there, at the suggestion of the German military, began to organize his detachment.⁵⁷ He did not have much luck in getting volunteers. All told, his detachment did not quite reach 4,000 men. Lieven planned to recruit among the few Russians in Latvia but his main hopes were for the Russian prisoners of war in Germany. Unfortunately, these men were completely demoralized and desired only to go home.⁵⁸ About 15,000 prisoners of war were willing to join him but first the Germans,

55 *Ibid.*, V, Staff report of the strength of the army July 22, 1919.

56 *Ibid.*, V, July 30, 1919.

57 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 16.

58 Prince Lieven, "Memoirs" *Bieloe Delo*, III, pp. 191, 192.



and then later the British, did not want such strong Russian forces in Latvia and so they were not permitted to have them.⁵⁹ Lieven's detachment saw some fighting at the time of the liberation of Latvia from the Reds. After that they stayed quietly in a little village not far from Mitau. Lieven was wounded in this fighting. When the North-West army was being hard pressed by the Reds, Yudenich and Rodzianko demanded that Lieven, with his troops, join the army. Lieven was very reluctant to do this but did not want to disobey orders. He took his time in executing them.⁶⁰ Finally, Yudenich and Rodzianko appealed to the British, and the latter ordered Lieven to march his troops to Libau for embarkation on ships for the trip to Narva.⁶¹ After this Lieven had to obey and, as stated above, they arrived, at the end of July in Narva. They joined the North-West army and immediately were sent to the front to help the hard pressed Yudenich troops. In great contrast to Yudenich's troops, who were, theoretically supplied by the British, were Lieven's troops who were supplied by the Germans. Yudenich's men were in rags and were bare footed, while Lieven's troops were well equipped and provided for. They made an impressive picture as they marched down the streets of Narva clad in German uniforms and helmets, and

59 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

60 *Yudenich Archives*, LIX, Lieven letter to Yudenich July 10, 1919. And *Yudenich Archives*, XC, A letter from Lieven to General Kruzeinshtein July 7, 1919.

61 *Ibid.*, XC, Lieven letter to Yudenich July 10, 1919.



wearing German boots. The contrast between the munificence of the Germans and the parsimony of the British was striking.⁶²

In June General Yudenich moved his residence and headquarters from Helsingfors to Narva and established himself and his staff in a building not far from the headquarters of Rodzianko.⁶³ Now, Rodzianko had repeatedly urged Yudenich, for the good of the cause, to leave Finland and join the army at Narva, but as soon as Yudenich came, there was trouble. It was not only that Yudenich and Rodzianko did not see eye to eye, but their assistants also now began to quarrel and, instead of improving the situation, things became steadily worse.⁶⁴

62 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

63 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 70.



Chapter IV

Yudenich in Command

With the arrival of Yudenich in Narva. in June of 1919, began a new period in the life of the North-West army. Yudenich finally took command., and the first British help arrived. Now plans were being made for the capture of Petrograd and the final destruction of the Bolsheviks.

It is an easy matter to make plans and dream dreams of future triumphs, but it is frequently quite unprofitable. This seems to be exactly what Yudenich and his staff were doing instead of taking care of the needs at hand. As early as June 1919, Yudenich sent his plan for the administration of Petrograd to Kolchak in a formal report. This report shows Yudenich to be a thorough reactionary, for in it he planned for a dictatorship.¹ Innumerable plans were made by Yudenich regarding what was to be done after the capture of Petrograd. some plans are concerned with administration, but most have to do with how to feed the population.

Yudenich also faced the problem of organizing his army for the advance. Particularly was he worried about its numbers. Even with the addition of Lieven's 4,000 men, the army numbered

¹ *Yudenich Archives*, CVI, Report from Yudenich to Kolchak June 1919.



only 14,000. Yudenich and even the most optimistic members of his staff, realized that with such numbers it would be useless to expect to capture Petrograd. Even if it could be captured it would be impossible to hold it. While according to the Intelligence reports, the Bolshevik troops were not numerous and not of the best quality, yet they could reinforce their troops to many times this number (14,000). After all, they had all of Russia to draw from.

The North-West army had several potential sources of recruits. First, there were the officers of the Old Imperial Army in foreign countries. Of these there were several thousands scattered in the several countries of Europe and America, but by the summer of 1919 this source was exhausted. Those who were willing to join the White forces had already done so. The rest, and of these there were many, refused to move, preferring the safety behind the lines to the dangers of the front. Also, many did not know the aims of the White armies. Due to the demands of the Allies the North-West army could not state its aims, except that it was fighting against the Bolsheviks. What it would do later, what form of government was planned for Russia, all that was a matter strictly forbidden for discussion. In July 1919, Yudenich issued an order specifically forbidding the members of the army to discuss politics in any form.



The motto of the army was to be “Against the Bolsheviks without politics”.² This kept many men from joining the army but since the original order had come from the British, Yudenich had to comply or all help from the British would cease.³

The second source of recruits could have been the Russian war prisoners in Germany. By all accounts, there were at least a million of them, and besides them, there were many prisoners in neighboring countries. In Denmark alone there were 12,000 who had escaped during the War from Germany.⁴ The leaders of the North-West army made great efforts to get hold of at least some of these men. General Miller asked Yudenich not to send any prisoners of war to him because the few he had would not fight and only wished to go home.⁵ The Russian consul in Denmark stated the same thing. It appears that Yudenich was planning to use force to make these men join his army but the Russian consul informed him that “Denmark will not use force to make them join the Yudenich army”.⁶

2 *Ibid.*, XCVII, Order of the day July 16, 1919.

3 *Ibid.*, XXC, A letter from the head of Allied Missions to the commander of the Russian North Corps June 11, 1919.

4 *Ibid.*, LIX, A letter from General Gerua (in Paris) to Yudenich February 18, 1919.

5 *Ibid.*, LIX, A letter from General Miller to Yudenich June 25, 1919.

6 *Ibid.*, LIX, A letter from the Russian consul in Denmark to Yudenich.



The third source of man power for the army was, of course, the occupied Russian territories but this also failed.⁷ The reasons are many and some go deep into early Russian history. The Russian peasants were divided into two groups—the Stolypin Reform property owners, a small minority, and the Mir communal ownership peasants, the great majority. The first group, since they were moderately prosperous, was content. Among them, therefore, Bolshevik propaganda and the division of large estates among the peasants did not make a favorable impression. These men resented the equalization program of the Bolsheviks and feared for their own newly acquired lands. They joined the North-West army in large numbers. Among them were the Danilov brothers and their men, the Talab Island volunteers, and similar groups.⁸ But the great majority of the peasants were very happy at the division of the large estates by Lenin, and their newly acquired wealth. All through the Civil War in Russia the peasants remained sympathetic to Lenin and the Bolshevik party. They were either passive or actively helping the Red army. To the peasants, the Whites did not appear to be liberators from the Bolsheviks but rather only the former land owners who were returning to claim their property. Even if the Bolsheviks did not behave in every way as the peasants

7 Yudenich Archives, XXX, gives an account of Yudenich's effort to mobilize Russians in foreign countries. This also proved unsuccessful.

8 L. F. Zurov, "Danilovi" *Bieloe Delo*, II, pp. 158-196.



wished them to—if they did draft their sons into the Red army and requisition food from them—still to the peasants, the Bolsheviks were more acceptable than were the Whites. Many officers in the Yudenich army were former landlords and rich aristocrats. A study of the names of the leaders makes this quite clear. Rodzianko, the Commander of the army, was an aristocrat of the first magnitude and a rich landlord. Then there were Count Palen, High Prince (Vetlieishi Kniaz) Lieven, Prince Dolgoruki, Baron von Rozenberg, and many other titled names. The army definitely had an upper class character. Yudenich was not a rich man or an aristocrat, but he was a high general under the Tsar.

The Whites did not help matters by their conduct. Balakhovich, for example, plundered and murdered. Individual commanders took supplies from the population. It is true that they felt forced to do this because of the lack of the barest essentials of life among their men. Still, it did not help their cause.⁹ Then too, there are indications that the Whites actually demanded that the peasants return the lands to the “rightful owners”.¹⁰ Such conduct could not but antagonize the peasants. The laboring class was, with few exceptions, behind the Bolsheviks. Only a certain part of the city population, mostly from the intelligentsia, enthusiastically supported the White army. The army

⁹ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

¹⁰ V. Gorn, M. C. Margulin, G. Kirdetsov, N. N. Ivanov, *Yudenich Pod Petrogradom (Leningrad 1927)*, chapter by Gorn, pp. 22, 24.



was met with cheers and flowers when it entered the cities.¹¹ Yet evidence indicates that on the whole, the population was not on the side of the Whites.¹²

The net result of all this was that the army was very small. Many White commentators of events stated, in print, that the population of Russia was on their side. The facts do not bear that out. Out of a population of 2,300,000 in the occupied Territory, the army could not raise as many as 20,000 men. This shows pretty clearly that the people were not on their side.¹³

Finally, after the abandonment of Yamburg and Pskov, the long awaited British supplies arrived, about August 3.¹⁴ The army, now close to the Estonian border, was not pressed any more by the Bolsheviks and had a chance to rest, reorganize, rearm and re-equip with the British supplies. It would seem that the Bolsheviks thought that the White army was destroyed and would not bother them any more. According to the information in White hands, they removed many units from the front of the Yudenich. army.¹⁵

Yudenich was pleased with the recently arrived supplies. He apparently realized, by now, that he would not be able to get more men and he believed that only by superior technical means could they win

11 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p III.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

13 *Yudenich Archives*, XI, A report to Yudenich by the Chief of Staff of the North-West army, *Kruzeinshtein*, May 28, 1919.

14 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 76

15 *Yudenich Archives*, VI, Staff report of North-West army September 1, 1919



against the Bolsheviks.¹⁶ This is a far cry from the situation in the previous spring when General Kondzerovsky estimated that soon the army would be 160,000 strong.¹⁷ Now all that could be gotten together were put in the ranks. But in spite of all its efforts, when the North-West army began its advance, it had in its ranks only 14,048 infantry, 345 cavalry and 44 guns, which is a small number.¹⁸

Rodzianko was reluctant to begin the final advance on Petrograd, but the British emphatically demanded it. He tried to gain time and drag things along until the winter, when serious fighting would be impossible, but after strong pressure from the British, it was decided to attack.¹⁹

Rodzianko was strongly urged to attack, not in the northwest direction, but to the south in the direction of Pskov. Then his plan was to establish a strong base in that Russian city and move west to the Moscow-Petrograd railway. There the railway was to be cut and a strong holding force was to be left against the Red reserves that were sure to come from Moscow. Such a scheme, argued Rodzianko, would protect the right flank and the rear of the army. This line of advance crossed a rich country not devastated by war, where people might be friendlier to the Whites.²⁰

16 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A letter to Sazanov from Yudenich, August 1, 1919.

17 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A letter to Admiral Pilkin from General Kondzerovsky, May 2, 1919.

18 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff report of October 3, 1919.

19 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 93. 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 93.



Rodzianko's plan however, was reversed by Yudenich who ordered, in part, as a result of British pressure, that the attack should begin in the line of the shortest route to Petrograd.²¹ The attack began, then early in the morning; of September 28, 1919, as planned.²² The first step of the advance was to secure the right flank of the army in the direction of Pskov. To accomplish this, the south column of the North-West army was to attack the Bolsheviks in the direction of Pskov, and after forcing them to retreat, turn west toward the village of Strugy-Bielie. There they were to cut the Petrograd-Pskov railroad so that the Bolsheviks would not be able to reinforce the defenders of Petrograd from the Pskov front.²³

The advance proceeded well. In fact, it exceeded all expectations. With the support of three British tanks, by evening it reached the villages of Koritenka, Dubiagy and Bolshoe-Zaozerie, and the Whites were well on their way toward Strugy-Bielie. On October 4, the detachments of the North-West army occupied Strugy-Bielie after overcoming strong Bolshevik resistance. By October 6, the operation was completed. The Whites cut the Petrograd-Pskov railway and inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, capturing many machine guns, two cannons and hundreds of prisoners.²⁴ _____

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 82, 83.

22 *Yudenich Archives*, VI, Staff reports of October 1, and October 3, 1919.

23 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff report September 28, 1919.

24 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff reports October 1, 1919,



October 9, the advance began on the Petrograd front. The enthusiasm of the troops was great. The officers and men attacked bravely and with a will. The success everywhere was great. The Reds were retreating in disorder.²⁵ The advance, it seems, was a complete surprise to the Bolsheviks. Evidently they felt secure from the direction of Estonia, for they removed their best troops from the front and sent them against Denikin, who at this time was at the peak of his success in his march on Moscow.²⁶

Yamburg was captured October 11. The victorious troops kept advancing and on October 15, Krasnoie Selo was captured. October 16, Gatchina and Luga were occupied. This represented an advance of over thirty miles in six days, with continuous fighting.²⁷

The Red resistance in the meantime, was stiffening. Every thing possible was being sent by the Bolshevik High Command from Petrograd to the front, including picked Communist units and Red military school cadets (Kursanty).²⁸

Still, the tired White troops were advancing. On October 20 the old residence of the Tsars, Tsarskoie Selo, and Pavlovsk fell.²⁹ Now the North-West army was in sight of Petrograd. But the men were terribly tired. The supply columns could not reach the

25 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff reports October 1, 1919.

26 *Ibid.*, VI, staff reports October 12, 1919.

27 *Ibid.*, VI, staff reports October 16, 1919.

28 *Borba Za Petrograd* (Petrograd 1920), p. 183.

29 *Yudenich Archives*, VI, Staff report October 21, 1919.



rapidly advancing troops. Food and ammunitions were at an end.³⁰

At the same time, Trotsky was energetically rushing reinforcements to Petrograd over the Moscow-Petrograd railway.³¹ This vital railway was not cut by the Whites, due to the disobedience of the orders give to Colonel Vetrenko. Three times Rodzianko ordered Vetrenko to send troops to cut this railway over which Trotsky was sending troops to bolster the tottering defenses of Petrograd; and three times Vetrenko did not execute them. Finally, when Rodzianko personally tried to move troops to the station of Tosno to cut the railway, it was too late. The Red troops there were too strong.³²

October 20, the Bolsheviks began their counter attacks.³³ For five days the tired troops held and beat off all enemy attacks. But the enemy, with fresh troops, was going into action every day. And the North-West army had no reserves. Day in and day out the same tired troops had to go on fighting. October 25, the Reds reoccupied Tsarskoe Selo and Pavlosk.³⁴ On October 26, the Whites tried to counter attack, supported by tanks. But it was no use. The initiative had passed to the Bolsheviks and the attack failed.³⁵

30 *Ibid.*, Staff report October 21, 1919.

31 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff report October 24, and October 25, 1919.

32 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp.110, 111.

33 *Yudenich Archives*, VI, Staff report October 21, 1919.

34 *Ibid.*, VI. Staff report October 26, 1919.

35 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff report October 27, 1919.



By now due to the rapid advance, the poor roads and inefficiency of the supply department, the soldiers were without bread, and the guns were without munitions. On October 26, the soldiers had not received bread for two days and the artillery had only three shells per gun.³⁶ The Red pressure was getting stronger and stronger. Attack followed attack. The Whites were losing one town after another. Still they were making desperate efforts to hold. Finally, all hope was lost and on November 6, the general retreat began.³⁷

36 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

37 *Yudenich Archives*, VI, Staff report November 6, 1919.



Chapter V

Agony of the Army

The final desperate effort had failed and all the hopes of Yudenich, Rodzianko, and their officers and men were shattered. The strongly reinforced Red army was driving back the exhausted remnants of the North-West army.

Why did the advance fail? Certainly not because hopes had not been sufficiently high. On October 16, 1919, Yudenich wired to Admiral Kolchak that the North-West army had defeated the enemy and was “ready to liberate Petrograd.”¹ Not only when the initial successes were gained, but even before the advance began, Yudenich was certain that he would capture Petrograd. A voluminous correspondence went on between Yudenich’s headquarters and his representatives abroad on the problems of the administration of the that city, once it has been captured. As early as January 16, 1919, Yudenich wrote to the American consul in Helsinki about food and supplies for Petrograd.² On Jun. 2, 1919 Sazonov wired to Yudenich that the Hoover Commission was sending eight ships of food to feed Petrograd in case it. should be captured.³ On August 29, a contract was made with the American Relief Administration. By the terms

1 *Yudenich Archives*, XIX.

2 *Ibid.*, CVIV.

3 *Ibid.*, CIV.



of this contract the A. R. A. promised to supply food to feed Petrograd if captured.⁴ In September, Sazonov wired to Yudenich that negotiations were going on in Washington D. C. to bring to Yudenich 200,000 tons of flour for Petrograd. On October 17, Yudenich sent President Wilson the following wire:

My army is approaching Petrograd the liberation of which is expected every hour. In the name of the civil population, dying of hunger, I appeal to you as the first citizen of a great nation with the urgent request to allow the American steamship commanded by Captain Martin at Helsingfors to sail with its food relief cargo to Petrograd.⁶

There were of course many reasons for the failure of the Yudenich army. A few can be listed here. The exhaustion of the troops was a very important factor. Another, was the disobedience of the Commander of the right flank, Colonel Vetrenko. He had been ordered to cut the Moscow-Petrograd railroad at the station Tosno, to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to the Red army. This he failed to do. Rodzianko states that his failure to carry out his order was due to the fact that he did not wish to divert his troops from the main goal—Petrograd.⁷

4 *Ibid.*, CXIX.

5 *Ibid.*, XXV.

6 *Ibid.*, XXV.

7 Rodzianko, *Vospominania O Severnoi Armii*, p. 112.



In fact, it seems that all troop commanders were anxious to enter Petrograd first, and so they drove their tired men on to the coveted goal.⁸

The failure to cut the railroad should not, however, be overstressed, for even if the railroad had been cut, still nothing would have prevented the Red troops from de-training at Tosno, and marching against the right flank and rear of the Yudenich army while it was busy fighting in Petrograd itself. The numbers of the army would not have been increased, and, cut off from its base, it would have been an easy prey to the fresh divisions of Trotsky. The disaster would only have been greater.

Rodzianko attributes the failure to three factors: first, the British failed to give promised support to the left flank; second, that the British tanks (six in number with British crews) did not cooperate; and third, the lack of the promised help from the Estonians.⁹

Another contributory cause was the fact that the rapid advance of the troops and the poor roads made it well nigh impossible to keep the troops properly supplied. During the fighting around Tsarskoi Selo, the soldiers did not have bread for two days and batteries had only three shells per gun.¹⁰ These are all valid reasons, many more could be cited but they do not give a complete explanation.

8 *Ibid.*, pp112, 121.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 115.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 115.



The chief reason, really, came from the people themselves. The population simply did not support the Whites. Not only the laboring class, but also a majority of the peasantry were sympathetic toward the Bolsheviks.¹¹

As stated above, the army was never as large as 20,000 men, yet some contemporaries and observers, and also later commentators, believed it to be much larger. The reasons for this error are simple. First, the leaders tried to represent the army as larger than it was in order to impress the Allies, and second, they misrepresented in order to get more supplies.¹² Individual commanders, in their reports, gave figures, three, four and in extreme cases, even twenty times greater than the actual numbers.¹³ Therefore, on paper, the army was far larger than at the front. This was not done through malice or for personal gain, but merely to help the fighting men. The hope was to increase the allotment of food, clothing and munitions for the units.¹⁴

The offensive in the fall of 1919, was the swansong of the North-West army. Every effort was made. The men were driven to the limit of their endurance. Whatever one thinks of the aims of the

11 A. N. Anishev, *Ocherki Istorii Grazhdanskoi Voini 1917-1920* (Leningrad. 1925).

12 *Yudenich Archives*, CIII, Memorandum submitted to the British War Office in summer 1919 by A. I. Gouckov gives the numbers as 35,000. At the same time the confidential staff report estimated its size as 10,000 men. *Ibid.*, V, July 22, 1919.

13 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 32. 14 *Ibid.*, p. 32.



army, one can hardly fail to admire and respect the tremendous courage of the men who made the supreme effort. They did their best—their unstinted best.

It took a few days for Yudenich and Rodzianko to realize that Trotsky had managed to bring overwhelming forces against them and that they would be forced to retreat. The first attacks of the Red army were repulsed and in places the Whites counterattacked with some success, but the pressure was too great, and the Whites began to lose one city after another.¹⁵

The Reds began their counter-attack October 23. On November 3, the city of Gatchina was lost. The same day the town of Luga also fell.¹⁶ November 6, orders for a general retreat were issued to the army.¹⁷ The army never stopped until it reached the Estonian border on November 23, 1919.¹⁸ The retreat in spite of its rapidity, was not a rout. The North-West army was not leaving any booty to the enemy. The rear guards were holding off the Red troops and were giving a chance for the bulk of the army and the refugees to make their way to the rear.¹⁹ As the army retreated, a great number of

15 *Yudenich Archives*, VI, Staff reports of October 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and November 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

16 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff report November 3.

17 *Ibid.*, VI, Staff report November 6.

18 *Ibid.*, VII, Staff report November 24.

19 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 120



refugees, escaping the wrath of the Bolsheviks, joined in the retreat. When the Yudenich army withdrew to the Estonian border 10,000 refugees were with them.²⁰

As soon as the Whites were thrown back to the border of Estonia the Bolsheviks reduced their forces against them from 50,000 to 13,000 men.²¹ Trotsky surmised that he had nothing further to fear from that direction and, unfortunately for the Whites, he was right.

The retreat, naturally, demoralized the army, for now all hope was gone. For months and months these few thousand men had prepared, hoped and lives only for the liberation of Russia's capital from the Bolsheviks They had made the supreme effort and had failed. Had they been given a chance to rest and recover, it is possible the army might have been reorganized and made again into an effective fighting force, but no chance was given. When the army, with its refugees, its sick and wounded reached the border of Estonia on November 10, it was not allowed to enter that country. For several days the refugees and soldiers had to camp in the cold in front of the barbed wire which was stretched along the Estonian border.²² When Yudenich appealed to the Commander in Chief of the Estonian army, the latter replied that he could not grant permission

20 *Yudenich Archives*, CXXXII, A wire from Yudenich to the Russian Ambassador in Washington D, C. February 4, 1920.

21 *Ibid.*, II, Intelligence report November 8-13, 1919.

22 *Ibid.*, XXVI, A report by Rodzianko November 20, 1919.



to the army and refugees to enter the country and he doubted that such permission could possibly be obtained.²³ But actually, on November 18, the Estonians permitted part of the troop and all wagon trains as well as the refugees to cross into Estonia. They were forbidden, however, to enter inhabited villages or towns, thus forcing them to camp under the open skies.²⁴

By the end of November cold weather had set in. The thermometer fell to twenty below zero centigrade and yet women and children, wounded and sick, were forced to live out of doors. These unfortunate people were short of everything. Food was very scarce, warm clothing non-existent. There were not even enough tools (shovels and axes) to build the most primitive shelters.²⁵ The Estonians were not helpful. They were conducting peace negotiations with the Bolshevik government and had, it seems, a strong desire to put an end to the Yudenich army as soon as possible. They did all they could to this end, going so far as to prevent food supplies from the United States from reaching the army.²⁶

The situation in November was this. Part of the North-West army was on the right bank of the Narova river (Estonian border). This part was still fighting the Reds defending the city of Narva with the Estonian troops. The southern detachments, which were

23 *Ibid.*, XI, A letter from General Laidoner to Yudenich November 11, 1919.

24 *Ibid.*, XI, A letter from Krutzenshtein to Maliavin November 18, 1919.

25 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

26 *Yudenich Archives*, XXVIII, A letter by General Glazenap February 13, 1919.



78 retreating from Gdov were being disarmed by the Estonians.²⁷ The wounded, sick and refugees were, all through November, still under the open skies, hungry and cold. Such a situation could not long endure. A terrible typhoid epidemic broke out among these people. On November 20, Rodzianko begged Yudenich to do something—anything to aid the soldiers and the refugees who were now dying in great numbers. He also appealed to the Estonians with the same request. He asked for permission to take these miserable followers to some populated center where they could at least be given some shelter and food.²⁸ It would seem that, as far as the Estonians were concerned, the North-West army had done its job. It had saved Estonian independence from the Bolsheviks. Now all they appeared to be interested in was the liquidation of this army as soon as possible. The army and Yudenich now became a nuisance. The Estonian government's negotiations for peace with Bolshevik Russia led to the first signing of the Armistice of January 2, 1920.²⁹ Peace between Bolshevik Russia and Estonia was signed January 28, 1920.

The Yudenich army was defeated. The defeated are always guilty—Vae Victis. The story of the treatment of the White Russians by the Estonians during the period from November 1919 to February of 1920 is a dark page in history. Of course the

27 *Ibid.*, XI. A report to Yudenich by General Dzerozhinsky November 23, 1919.

28 *Ibid.*, XVII.

29 *Ibid.*, XIII, A wire from Yudenich to Kolchak January 2, 1920



interests of the Estonians were quite divergent from those of the White Russians. The Estonians were attempting to establish their independence after many years of oppression. For the first time they were emerging as an independent nation. This probably accounts for the cruel treatment meted out by the Estonians to the members of the White army and their horde of refugee followers.

On November 30, the Estonian government announced to the Allies that they would disarm the Yudenich army. In a lengthy and bitter document they gave their reasons. The chief reason given was that the Yudenich army hated Estonia, and the Estonian government felt that it must do this for its own protection.³⁰

Whatever the sentiments of the army were before its defeat, it left no room for doubt a few weeks after its retreat to the Estonian territory. The soldiers who deserted to the Bolsheviks' side in December and January left behind notes asking that those who remained should not think that they had turned Bolshevik, but that they were departing only to get even with the Estonians for the cruelties perpetuated on them by the Estonian people, army and government.³¹ Of all the Allies, only France protested to the Estonian government and demanded that something be done to alleviate the sufferings of the unhappy White Russians.

30 *Ibid.*, XII.

31 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

32 *Yudenich Archives*, XII, A note by French insistence from the Allied High Command to the Estonian government December 5, 1919



Here are the facts: December 1, 1919, the Estonians arrested Russian soldiers and robbed them. Not only did they take away their arms and equipment but their personal belongings as well.³³

Yudenich was informed by Glazenap that conditions in the North-West army were terrible, sickness and insanity prevailed. He adds, "Help is only being promised Idle talk must stop. If England, France and America cannot help, and Estonia does not want to, please declare it straight away."³⁴

General Glazenap discusses the care of the sick of the North-West army and especially stresses lack of cooperation on the part of the Estonians.

He wrote:

I don't know the reason but the Estonian authorities have resolved not to let pass to Narva any flour or bacon. Of course the imminent result will be starvation, which, in fact has already begun. Near the vans of flour which were to be sent to Narva, sentinels were posted and despite all our solicitations and those of the American Red Cross, the sending off was not permitted.

In fact, our orders are not executed. The Estonian general, officers, and nearly any soldier is meddling and giving orders canceling our orders. Such a way of acting cannot produce good results.

My deep conviction is that that this will continue as long as the command of the North-West army shall be in their hands. Personally, I have the impression that this work is propaganda To show and underline the want of vitality of the White organizations and the absence of democracy in them and to organize hate against the Russians.³⁵

33 *Ibid.*, LVII.

34 *Ibid.*, XXVIII, Letter to Yudenich from General Glaznap, December 2, 1919.

35 *Ibid.*, XXVIII



Even after the North-West army ceased to exist as an organized unit, the attitude of the Estonians was very unfriendly towards the former members of the army. Mistreatments and insults were commonplace. Officers and men were peremptorily ordered out of Revel. The destitute men were not even allowed to seek work. The Estonian government demanded that all supplies still in the hands of the North-West army be relinquished at once. In the city of Narva, where the greatest number of Russians was concentrated, conditions were at their worst.³⁶

A terrible epidemic broke out in the army and among the refugees. Desperate efforts, on the part of individuals and of Russian organizations, were made to help these people. Having no means of their own, they appealed to every authority they could think of.³⁷ General Krasnov, head of the Don Cossacks in 1918, sent a desperate appeal to the head of the American mission, A. Gade. He described the serious state of affairs, with typhoid fever, Spanish influenza, and spotted fever rampant everywhere. There was no medicine and there were no nurses or doctors. Fifty percent of the doctors themselves were ill.³⁸ This message was sent on January 17. On January 19, he sent a message to the American Red Cross asking aid for the same

36 *Ibid.*, CXIII, Staff reports of February 11 and February 22, 1920.

37 *Ibid.*, CXXXII, A wire from General Glazenap to the Russian Ambassador in Washington D. C.

38 *Ibid.*, XLVII.



reason.³⁹ Then on February 4, General Glazenap wired to the Russian ambassador In Washington D. C. describing conditions in the army as follows: Practically all are sick with typhoid. Conditions terrible beyond description. Thousands dying. Estonians treat them terribly. Would not even transmit telegrams.⁴⁰ General Yudenich also made efforts to get aid. On January 27, he had written a letter to the Allied mission in the Baltic, stating that he “had no money, that there were 20,000 men sick with typhoid in the army. These men have been loyal to the Allies and deserve help.”⁴¹

In January 1920 when all hope of future existence for the army was gone, a liquidating commission was formed to wind up the affairs of the army.⁴² This commission made efforts to take care of the sick and wounded. It asked the Estonian Red Cross to care for them but the Estonians refused. They again applied to the Allies. Finally, on February 16, 1920, Colonel Wilson of the British mission, and M. Rapan of the American Red Cross mission, issued an ultimatum to the Estonian Red Cross to take care of the Russian sick and wounded within three days.⁴³ In a letter of January 11, 1920, Yudenich asked the American Red Cross to take all the army’s sick and wounded under its protection.⁴⁴

39 *Ibid.*, XLVII.

40 *Ibid.*, CXXXII.

41 *Ibid.*, XLVIII.

42 *Ibid.*, CXIII, Order of General Yudenich January 10, 1920.

43 *Ibid.*, CXIII, Protocols of the liquidation commission February 16, 1920.

44 *Ibid.*, XXXIII.



At first, after the defeat of the army, its leaders and friends had hopes that it would be possible to reorganize it, increase its size and then make another attempt. To wrest control of Russia, and Petrograd in particular, from the Bolsheviks. But when it became clear that the Estonian's only desire was to get rid of the army as soon as possible, plans were made to transfer the army to another front and continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks from there.⁴⁵

Any lingering hope that the Estonians might have a change of heart and give some aid was shattered when the Estonians concluded an Armistice with the Bolsheviks and later a peace treaty (January 28, 1920). Yudenich immediately; upon hearing of the Armistice, wired Admiral Kolchak about this and suggested that it would be desirable to transfer the army to some other front if possible.⁴⁶

Yudenich himself, and also his entourage and his agents in Europe, wasted a great deal of paper and ink in efforts to transfer the North-West army to some other front. All his efforts failed. At first, the plans were made to transfer the army to the North front—Archangelsk or Murmansk, and some officers actually made their way there.⁴⁷ But this did not work out. Then, attempts were made to transfer the army to the south to General Denikin but this too, was without avail.⁴⁸

45 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, Appendix, Memorandum to the Supreme Allied Council from the Estonian Republic, December 16, 1919. pp. 156-161.

46 *Yudenich Archives*, XIII, A wire from Yudenich to Kolchak January 2, 1920.

47 *Ibid.*, CXIII, February 19, 1919.

48 *Ibid.*, CXXXII, January 6, 1920.



These plans would have been difficult of execution at best, but for the Russians they were well nigh impossible. Neither Yudenich nor any of his friends had either money or ships. The Allies, it seems, were reluctant to furnish the tonnage that would be required to transport the army by way of the long sea voyage either to Archangelsk or the Black Sea. Then there are indications also that the Estonians put some obstacles in the way of releasing the army from Estonia as a unit.⁴⁹ When all these plans failed, Yudenich set up, in January 1920, a commission to liquidate the army and turned over the command of the army to General Glazenap.⁵⁰

Among the men of the army, conditions remained bad. Morale was low and sickness and starvation were decimating the ranks. Both officers and men were dispirited and despondent. All this is easily understood. These men had made an almost superhuman effort and then, when they were within sight of their goal, they were defeated and forced to give up all their gains. Worse still, at the end their retreat, there awaited them - not rest - but hunger, sickness and abuse. Under such conditions even the best trained and seasoned troops would be expected to go to pieces. But these were not veterans, only groups of volunteers hastily thrown together. While the retreat lasted they held together, hoping probably to

49 *Ibid.*, XIII, A wire from General Gerua to Sablin January 20, 1920.

50 *Yudenich Archives*, XXVI, Order of General Yudenich, January 22, 1920.



recoup their fortunes and try again, but when they saw the hostile attitude of the, Estonians, the indifference of the Allies and realized that there was no hope, their morale collapsed. There were many desertions. Conditions became so bad that. General Glazenap urged Yudenich to ask permission of General Finnisson (an Estonian general) to remove the troops from the front as they were melting away.⁵¹ After the Yudenich army retreated to the Estonian border there was some fighting until the Estonians signed the Armistice with the Bolsheviks in January of 1920. Some units of the army took part in this fighting on the Narva front.⁵²

The British mission reported, about the same time, that many Russians were going over to the Reds and that they, the mission, did not blame them in light of the cruel treatment they had received at the hands of the Estonians. They added that the protests of the Allied representatives did not help much.⁵³ But not all were deserting. Those who remained were in an ugly mood ready for any trouble and determined to do something for themselves. On January 8, 1920, General Glazenap reported to Yudenich that there was discontent and trouble in the army and that the

51 *Ibid.*, XI, Report of General Glazenap to Yudenich on December 1919.

52 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

53 *Yudenich Archives*, XIII, A British mission in the Baltic report of December (no exact date given).



men were getting very restless. He blamed this general discontent on propaganda, Which according to him, was coming from three sources - the Estonians, the Bolsheviks and the White Russians. He said it was aimed at the command of the army, particularly at Yudenich.⁵⁴ While propaganda undoubtedly played a part, it is none the less true that defeated soldiers usually blame their commander for their troubles. With few exceptions, such has been the case at all times. In this case the bitterness against Yudenich led to the affair of his arrest and kidnapping carried out by Balakhovich and his henchmen.

To try to understand the strange affair of the kidnapping of General Yudenich, one needs to remember that the evaluation of the worth of the General in the eyes of the Russian public varied from time to time according to the fortunes of the moment. When things were going well he was a great hero; when things were going badly he was worse than useless.

When Yudenich took command of the North-West army he was to all, a glorious symbol of greatness. He was “the general who never lost a battle”, the “hero of Erzerum, etc. Great things were expected of him. All members of the army seemed to believe that, with Yudenich leading them they, could not fail. Rodzianko says that the “great glory of Yudenich impressed everybody”, including

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, XIII.



himself.⁵⁵ But on personal contact with him, Rodzianko was disappointed. Yudenich turns out to be, not the dashing hero, but a “fat old man”, slow of movement and strange of action. He listened to what his subordinates had to say but he never gave an answer, never made a decision, never gave an order.⁵⁶ After the first personal contact, Rodzianko claims that Yudenich’s prestige began to diminish until it finally disappeared altogether.⁵⁷

Another writer of the same period, who concerns himself with the same events, G. Kirdetzov, is also far from complimentary. He considers Yudenich a sloppy old man devoid of any talent or even the ability to think clearly.” He further dubs him a “weak man completely controlled by those about him, usually men of low moral standing who work not for the cause, but only to line their own pockets.”⁵⁸ Not a single writer, Russian or foreign, Red or White, has any praise for Yudenich at the time of his defeat. Yet this is the same man who had been victorious in all battles in World War I and who had received the highest possible praise from all who knew him then. Now, in time of defeat, the army blamed him for all its woes. Feeling was very bitter against him.

On January 22, 1920, Yudenich announced in an order that the North-West army had terminated its existence as of that date

⁵⁶ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 63. ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 63, 69, 75. 83, 85, etc.

⁵⁸ G..Kirdetzov, *U Vorot Petrograda*, pp. 183-201, 236-255.



and that a liquidating commission had been appointed to wind up its affairs and give as much help as possible to the former army members.

On January 28, a group of armed men came to the hotel in Revel (Tallinn) where Yudenich resided and demanded to see the General. They looked most threatening, so the adjutants of Yudenich called the police and the men departed for the time being. Later in the day, however, towards evening, these same men appeared again, went to the room that Yudenich occupied and, on threat of death, demanded that Yudenich follow them. These persons were Bulak-Balakhovich and his body guard. They took Yudenich to the railroad, put him on a train and started south. Adjutants of Yudenich, as soon as they had recovered from their stupefaction and fright, informed the Estonian authorities and the British mission of what had happened. The British and Estonians sent an armored train in pursuit. This train overtook the train on which Balakhovich was kidnapping the General and forced it to stop and surrender. There, in fear of his life, Yudenich was rescued and taken back to Revel where he took refuge with the British mission.⁶⁰

At this point the dispirited members of the North-West army had the questionable pleasure of contemplating the situation of their commander hiding from his troops behind the backs of

59 *Yudenich Archives*, XLVII.

60 *Ibid.*, XVI, Memorandum about Yudenich's arrest and kidnapping by Balakhovich, signed by General Glazenap (no date).



foreigners. After this, Yudenich took very little part in the affairs of the army and on February 24, 1920, he departed from Estonia and went to France where he settled in Paris. ⁶¹

The Liquidation Committee had its hand full. It had to demobilize and take care of an army of 10,000 men plus 15,000 sick, wounded and refugees. One can assume that by January these numbers were less. Many soldiers and even officers deserted and many of the sick and wounded died, due to lack of care. But one can safely assume that, all told there were about 15,000 men at the time of the liquidation. These men were penniless, poorly clothed and had no resources of any kind. They had to be fed and clothed and some work had to be found for them. Estonians were hostile and could not be expected to offer much help.

Something had to be done. First of all, the immediate needs of the men had to be satisfied, and there was no money with which to do it. On January 27, 1920, Yudenich wrote to the Allied commission for the Baltic that he had been financed by Kolchak but now all his funds were exhausted. ⁶³ Food was the greatest need. General Krasnov, by order from Yudenich, asked the American Red Cross to send a representative to the Liquidation commission to learn the needs of the army. ⁶⁴ In January 1920, the American Red Cross supplies began to arrive and the army was saved from death by starvation. ⁶⁵

61 *Ibid.*, CXIII Order of Yudenich February 24, 1920 announces his departure.

62 *Ibid.*, XI, Last report of the strength of the army December 23, 1919.

63 *Ibid.*, XLVIII.

64 *Ibid.*, XXVI, Letter of Krasnov to the American Red Cross January 22, 1920.

65 *Ibid.*, XIII, A wire from Sablin in London to General Glazenap January 1920.



After the immediate needs were satisfied, the Liquidation Commission busied itself with finding work for the destitute members of the army. It was no easy task in Estonia, for it is a small country with very little industry and manufacturing. Still, work was found for some. For the rest, the Commission made an effort to find work in other countries of Europe. Any work in any country was welcome. The Commission's efforts were moderately successful.⁶⁷ Many officers and men managed to find work for themselves; some joined the French Foreign Legion;⁶⁸ others were scattered to the far corners of the globe and today are to be found in many countries of the world.

So ended the Yudenich army. By the summer of 1920, it was just a memory. Yudenich was in Paris and Rodzianko was writing his memoirs in Berlin.

While the army was in existence, a North-West government to act in conjunction with the army was formed, but inasmuch as this government did not have any influence on the affairs of the army and as its formation and life are closely related to the relations of Yudenich and his army with the Allies and the Baltic countries, it will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, CXIII, Protocol of Liquidation Commission February 11, 1920. Also February 3, 1920.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, CXIX, Protocol of Liquidating Commission January 28, 1920.



Chapter VI

Foreign Relations of General Yudenich-First Period

The foreign relations of the Yudenich army are of importance because that army was organized, and did its fighting at a very significant period of Russian history. The years 1916 to 1920 were vital ones in the Baltic and it was there that the Yudenich army was operating. New nations appeared; new governments were created and recreated. In the matter of weeks, three new independent nations were born – Latvia, Estonia and Finland. And Lithuania was reborn. Inasmuch as these new nations were making their bid for independence many conflicts arose and many different interests were affected.

The Baltic littoral had played an important part. in the trade of Europe since a very early date.¹ The nations which were interested in the affairs of the Baltic besides the new nations, were: Russia, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, and, to a lesser degree, Denmark. Russia was in the throes of the Revolution; Denmark and Sweden were too weak to play an independent role. The main actors, therefore, were Germany and Britain – in that order. From 1917 to the end of 1918 the German Empire was the

¹ Ian Apse, *The Baltic States*, p. 9.



undisputed mistress of the Baltic. With the collapse of Germany, England assumed the main role in shaping the affairs of the region. Germany herself had been a Baltic nation, and England had long had commercial interests there.²

When Imperial Russia collapsed, in 1917, very divergent forces began to work. The Germans were now in control in the South Baltic and planned to entrench themselves permanently for the purpose either of annexing this land to Germany or creating a puppet state or states, out of them. From the German point of view the former Russian possessions in the Baltic would be a good base of operations against Russia in the future.⁴

The German minority in the Baltic, consisting of German landlords (Barons), and also of the German town people was favorable to such a plan and they were glad to cooperate with the German authorities.⁵ But the great majority of the population was solidly against the Germans and their schemes.⁶ This majority, the Letts and Estonians, was planning and working for their independence which they had been denied for centuries. They were

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ M. S. Bach, *Desiat Let Kapitalisticheskogo Okruzhnena, S.S.S.R.*, Moscow 1928, pp. 6, 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.



therefore antagonistic to both Germany and Russia.

The new government of Bolshevick Russia, while proclaiming its pacific intentions, was busy with propaganda in the Baltic, but could not accomplish anything because of the lack of any organized army and also because of the German occupation of the land.

But in Finland it was a different. There the Finns were in a desperate struggle against the invading Bolshevick mobs and their local friends. Under the leadership of Mannerheim and with the help of several brigades of German veterans, they succeeded in driving the invaders out and pacifying the country (1918). From then on Finland was busy organizing her new government and rebuilding her economic life. One of the results of the Bolshevick activities in Finland was the great hatred that the Finns developed for the Russians. The Finns had never cared too much for the Russians but now they disliked them even more than ever and with no discrimination between White and Reds.⁷

When the Germans, in 1917, occupied the Baltic as a result of the collapse of the old Russian army, they treated these old army officers who remained in the occupied zone with great consideration, and by such tactics, they won many of them to their side. Many others of these officers changed their attitude toward the Germans from that of sullen resentment to one of indifference.

⁷ G. Kirdetsov, *U Vorot Petrograda*, p. 48-59.



Of course many of the officers who remained behind the German lines were native German Balts, as mentioned previously, and many of them were very happy to welcome their “blood brothers”.⁸ These facts help to explain why the Germans, as late as 1918, gave permission to organize the troops which later became known as the North-West army.

The North-West army then had its start as a German sponsored and German supplied organization. This is important to bear in mind to understand future events which affected the fate of Yudenich and his army.

The North-West army was in process of formation when the German collapse came. The bulk of the army retreated to Estonia, but many refugees, mainly officers of German descent, made their way to Riga (Latvia) and later, when Riga was occupied by the Bolsheviks, to Libau, Mitau, and other cities of Western Latvia.⁹

The Allies, represented by the British navy, arrived at Libau and Riga after the Armistice and found in the Baltic a very complicated situation. In Finland, only, affairs were in some sort of order. Finland was free and independent with a national government, a treasury and an army. The Bolsheviks did not dare to attack her, and Finland was very happy to remain neutral.

⁸ *Yudenich Archives*, LXI, A report of the Pskov army by military engineer, Colonel Bron, December 11, 1918.

⁹ P. Avalov, *V Borbe S Bolshevismom*, p. 113.



But in the South, across the Gulf of Finland affairs were in a flux. Latvia and Estonia had proclaimed their independence, but their existence was very precarious. As the German troops were retreating west, by allied orders, the Bolsheviks were moving in. The new governments did not have means at their disposal to stop them.¹⁰

The Bolsheviks overran Eastern Latvia while Estonia was fighting with her back to the wall. The little detachment known later as the North-West army was fighting with the Estonians. Rapid decisions had to be made by the Allied representatives and commanders if the Baltic was to be saved from the Bolsheviks.

Two courses were open to the Allies. One was to treat Russia as its ally, respect and protect the integrity of its territory, and help the Whites drive the Bolsheviks out. (In 1918 the Allies themselves had proclaimed the Bolsheviks their enemy and the usurpers of power in Russia). The second course open to the Allies was to recognize the new states which were in process of being formed and, by all possible means, to strengthen and protect them until such time as they would be strong enough to stand on their own feet. By doing this they would, of course, be dismembering the territory of their former ally-of that ally who had sacrificed over 7,000,000 men on the altar of the Allied victory. The Allies chose the second course.

The British squadron under the command of Admiral Sinclair, arrived at Libau on December 9, 1918. The Russian White leaders tried to get in touch with it immediately. General Rodzianko,

¹⁰ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 9



when informed about the arrival of the British naval ships at Libau. proceeded there at once.¹¹

The White Russians were very happy. They still looked upon Great Britain as their all. It never occurred to them. that Britain, with the tacit consent of the rest of the Allies would busy herself with the task of organizing independent republics out of the territory of Russia. From their point of view, all of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland were just parts of Russia. It was not a matter of holding chauvinistic ideas but, to them Russia was 'Russia one and indivisible'. After all, they had been born and educated to the idea that Warsaw and Vladivostok, Helsingfors and Sevastopol, Samarkhand and Archangelsk were "Russia" and, according to all history books available to them, a state could lose territory only when defeated in war. Now the Allies had won the war. Russia was one of the Allies. Therefore, Russia had won the war also. A victorious nation does not give up her territory unless with its own consent. It is true that Russia had not done much toward the winning of the war since October 27, 1917, and the Bolshevik government made a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk, but the government which was set up at this point was not considered to be the true Russian government. The Bolsheviks were usurpers

11 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 13.



and bandits who had been sent by Germany in a sealed car to destroy Russia. But the Whites had had nothing to do with it; they were fighting it. The Allies also had proclaimed it as an enemy government and had sent troops against it.¹² They, the White Russians, were loyal to the Allied cause and now, thought they, the Allies had come to restore order in Russia and drive the Bolsheviks (their common enemy) out.

As far as the minorities were concerned, the White Russians had nothing against them. But this was neither the time nor the place to decide their fate. When the Bolsheviks were driven away, a constitutional assembly (Uchreditelnoie Sobranie) freely elected by all Russia, would decide the fate of the country. If then it decided to grant independence to all the minorities it would be satisfactory to the White Russians but not until then. Such were the ideas of White Russians in general and even of the majority of non-Bolshevik socialists.¹³

As soon as the Allied naval ships entered the Baltic, their diplomatic representatives busied themselves organizing the new states of Latvia and Estonia.¹⁴ If the new nations were to be saved from the Bolsheviks, something had to be done, and that quickly.

12 To Murmansk, Archangelsk, and Vladivostok.

13 The reader may pick up any book written by any non-Bolshevik Russian outside of Russia about this period and within five years of the Russian Civil War, and he will find ample evidence of all this.

14 *Yudenich Archives*, XIX, General staff "Diary of Current Events".



The intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie of the two countries were solidly in favor of independence and a democratic form of government based on the models of England and the United States. But the peasantry and the industrial proletariat of the cities were very sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, and among them the Bolshevik propaganda agents found ready listeners. Riga was full of Bolshevik agents who almost openly conducted propaganda on the streets¹⁵

The official dates for the independence and formation of the new states were as follows: for Latvia, November 18, 1918; and for Estonia, February 24, 1919. Under the best of circumstances it takes time to organize a state and an army. But in these cases, conditions were far from favorable. The two governments were handicapped by lack of money and by the Bolshevik sympathies entertained by great numbers of lower classes of the population. Particularly was this true in Latvia. No dependence could be placed on the Latvian troops except for a few battalions of the intelligentsia.¹⁶

⁶ The Latvian battalions formed during 1915-1916 by the order of the Tsar were the mainstay of the Soviet rule during the first years of the Bolshevik government, and they were fanatical Bolsheviks.

¹⁷

¹⁵ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 14.

¹⁷ A. Kersnovsky, *History of the Russian Army*, IV, p. 909.



When the Allies arrived. they ordered the German troops to evacuate the Baltic countries at once, but inasmuch as the Reds moved in as soon as the Germans retreated, the order was reversed and the Germans were ordered to hold the Baltic. ¹⁸

Unfortunately the German troops went to pieces; due to the Revolution, and were streaming back home. refusing to obey the orders of their officers. Then the plan was formed to organize volunteer German troops. The victor over the Bolsheviks in Finland, General von der Goltz, took over the task. This group of German volunteers was named. the “Iron Division”. ¹⁹

In all probability, these men enlisted in the Iron Division, not so much for patriotic reasons, as for food. clothing, shelter and promised land. The Latvian government had promised that, as soon as they had finished their task (that of driving the Bolsheviks out), they were to receive an allotment of land from the Latvian government. ²⁰

The German government secretly supported these “volunteer” German troops, hoping to retain a foothold in the Baltic. ²¹ Realizing that sooner or later the Allies would order the Germans out of the Baltic, the German military circles received very

18 Prince Lieven, “V Yuzhnoi Pribaltike 1919”, *Bieloe Delo*, III, p. 187.

19 *Ibid.*, p.187.

20 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 14. Also Prince Avalov, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

21 Vitols, Hugo *La Mer Baltique et Les Etats Baltes*. p. 82



favorably the request of several German Balts, former officers of the Imperial Russian Army, to permit them to form White armies on the territory of Latvia. The aim of these detachments was to fight the Bolsheviks in Russia after they had completed their organization and training. The most important of these efforts were those of Prince Lieven, Colonel Virgolich and Prince Avalov Bermond. Prince Lieven's detachment, as stated above, after some bickering, joined the Yudenich army. Virgolich's detachment never had over 600 men, and never really amounted to anything. Avalov and his men, however, played an important role, vitally affecting the fortunes of the Yudenich army.²²

The little North-West army as stated before, was a part of the Estonian army, fighting to drive the Red troops from Estonia. As such it was a welcome addition to the new and weak Estonian troops. To the Russians, however, such a situation was anomalous and they hoped soon to be on their own. They immediately appealed to the British for help. But their disappointment knew no bounds when they saw that the British and the Allies in general busied themselves primarily, not with giving help to them, but to the Estonians.²³ The North-West army, until July 1919 depended, for all its supplies and money, upon the Estonians. The Allies gave

22 Prince Avalov, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-161.

23 *Yudenich Archives*, XIX, Staff report, 'Diary of Current Events.'



all the help to the Estonians who in turn gave to the North-West army only as much as they saw fit. the Estonians were also afraid of the North-West army but, at the same time, they needed its help to fight the Bolsheviks. They, therefore, tried to limit the size of the army to 3,500 men. They also refused to give her bases in Estonia.²⁵

When Yudenich was planning his advance on Petrograd, General Laidoner, the commander of the Estonian armed forces, wrote to him asking to “regulate relations with Estonia,” (meaning presumably recognition) before he made any further plans.²⁶

To the Estonians mind the White armies were the national armies and as such, not to be trusted. It was clear to anyone that, to nationally minded Russians, Estonia was just a part of Russia. Therefore, from the start, there was resentment on the part of the Russians, and suspicion and distrust on the side of the Estonians. Such a situation was unfortunate and boded ill for the future.

The Allies were working hard to build up Latvia and Estonia and they were suspicious of the North-West army because it had its start under the Germans and with German help. Also they no doubt assumed that the army was pro-German since so many of the

24 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A letter from General Yudenich to Sazonov, and Scherbachev in Paris, May 27, 1919.

25 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A letter from General Yudenich to Kolchak, 1919.

26 *Ibid.*, CI, A letter from General Laidoner to Yudenich February 22, 1919.



officers had German names and were Baltic Germans. They might well have figured that “blood is thicker than water.” In this calculation they were correct.

Alvin Devereux, writing for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, inquired concerning the aims of the North-West army and attempted to find out whether it had received assistance from anyone besides the Allies.²⁷

The only Russian general present in the Baltic whom the Allies trusted completely, it seems, was General Yudenich. At the conference in the middle of June in Revel, called by General Gough, the head of the British mission, to smooth out the friction that had arisen among the Allies, Estonia, and the Yudenich army, he was presented with a declaration by General March, also of the British mission. This declaration stated that all supplies or help of any kind given by the Allies to the army were being given to General Yudenich personally. Furthermore, the army should be grateful to the Estonian government and nation for its help, and for the permission to organize the army on its territory.²⁸

Yudenich was very anxious to get Allied help and to bring his army to a point where it could begin its advance with some hope of success. But he was reluctant to assume responsibility for the army—that is, to take command officially—until he had some assurance of that success.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, LXXXVIII, May 2, 1919.

²⁸ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 55.



On May 24, 1919, Yudenich wrote to Admiral Kolchak stating that all supplies and money for the army came from the Estonian government and therefore the army was controlled by Estonia. He asked for money in or to be independent of the Estonians. He said that the Estonians feared the army and did not want it to increase in numbers. He ended the letter by saying that, unless he could get some money from Kolchak he could not assume, officially, the command of the North-West army or be responsible for it.²⁹

Estonian hostility and Allied indifference gave Yudenich good reason to worry. He knew that his army was very weak. The problem of how to increase it was never satisfactorily solved. He was forever turning everywhere in search of a solution to his troubles.

From the first, Yudenich had hoped to interest Finland in lending a hand. in the liberation of Petrograd. As a good general he knew that the attack on Petrograd would have much greater chance of success if undertaken from two fronts simultaneously - from Narva on the south shore of the Gulf of Finland - and from Finland on the north shore across the Karelian Isthmus. For this purpose he approached the Finnish government again and again with plans for cooperation.³⁰ General Yudenich wrote letter after

29 *Yudenich Archives*, LXIII.

30 *Ibid.*, CII, A letter from General Yudenich to Sazonov in Paris, February 20, 1919.



letter to the Finnish Government asking for help. He also frequently complained of the mistreatment of Russians by the Finns. All these efforts failed and Yudenich and his army did not get any help from Finland. While yet in Finland, before moving his headquarters to Narva, Yudenich planned to create Russian detachments on Finnish soil, using them either for an attack on Petrograd across the Finnish border or transporting them across the Gulf of Finland to join the rest of the army in Estonia. At first he had high hopes, but soon he realized that he had failed.³¹

Yudenich gradually came to understand that Finland and the other new nations would not cooperate with him. It was, of course, the fear of the new nations that they might lose their newly gained independence.

In a wire on May 24, 1919, Admiral Kolchak compliments General Yudenich on his policy of "One indivisible Russia."³² Yudenich finally came to see that he could never succeed without the good will of these new nations. Admiral Kolchak, however stood firm, and his uncompromising attitude ruined whatever chances Yudenich had with the Finns and Estonians Yudenich was not a free agent. He was appointed by Admiral Kolchak and, as a good soldier, he took his orders from him.

31 *Ibid.*, CII, A letter from Yudenich to Sazonov, February 20, 1919.

32 *Ibid.*, LXIII.



On May 24 Kolchak informed Yudenich that, while he agreed that Finnish help was very desirable, still he would not guarantee Finnish independence—that only the Constituent Assembly of all Russia could do that.³³ He went further, on June 21, and informed Yudenich, through Sazonov, that he would recognize no state formed on the territory of Russia.³⁴

General Yudenich fully comprehend the gravity of the situation and begged Kolchak to change his uncompromising attitude. Kolchak, in far away Siberia, would not listen. On July 8, Yudenich wrote to Kolchak that Finnish help was desperately needed. To get it one should promise the Finns independence and an advantageous treaty, in short, grant them all their national aspirations. Otherwise Finland “will not help.” Kolchak remained adamant.³⁵ Mannerheim, the Finnish military commander and former Russian officer, would have been more than glad to help the Russians but he could not act without the permission of the Finnish government.³⁷

It is doubtful whether, even if Yudenich had acted against the orders of Kolchak and had recognized at this time, the independence of Finland, it would have helped. The Finns knew that Kolchak and the majority of the Russian White leaders were opposed to their independence. A recognition accorded under

33 *Ibid.*, LXUI,

34 *Ibid.*, CIV.

35 *Ibid.*, LXIII.

36 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A letter from Yudenich to Kolchak July 9, 1919.

37 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A letter from Kolchak to Yudenich May 24, 1919.



duress by a subordinate was not very reassuring. Anyway, they probably argued, what would stop the triumphant national Russia from repossessing all the small countries that had broken away from it at a time when she was weak? This was a very real danger in the eyes of the new nations which had been carved out of the territory of the old. Russian Empire.

The situation in Estonia was the same. Estonians insisted on the recognition of their independence and the Russians would not agree. All Kolchak would agree to was autonomy. The Estonians, Letts, and Finns were afraid of the bad faith of the Russians. To them it seemed that a Bolshevik Russia, without national aspirations, would be much to be preferred.³⁹

Soon the Russian. Themselves gave proof of their real intentions toward the Baltic nations, in the person of Avalov-Bermond, and his troops. This episode, which caused untold damage to the White Russians in the Baltic, will be taken up in the next chapter.

38 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A report on the situation in the Baltic from the chief of the department of foreign relations of the Yudenich army, July 20, 1919.



Chapter VII

Avalov-Bermond

Avalov-Bermond was one of those shady characters which revolutions frequently bring forth and who play important roles for a short period and then vanish from the scene. Who he was and what was his real background are difficult to determine even to the present day. People who knew him when he was an active figure in the Baltic, in the year 1919, believed him to be a German Balt of not too noble an ancestry. (1)

According to his own story, he was born in Tiflis in 1884. His father, again following his own account, was Prince M. A. Avalov, and his mother was born Princess Kugushev. His mother married a second time, a Mr. Bermond, and as a consequence, Avalov became known as Bermond. During the war he took his father's name again.

He fought in the Russo-Japanese war and was wounded seven times. Later he was commissioned an officer and fought in World War I during which he was wounded four times. He was decorated many times and claims to have been promoted to the rank of colonel before the Revolution.²

1 Information in the possession of the author. 2 Prince P. Avalov, *V Borbe s Bolshevismom*, p. 436



All this makes a good story. but a difficult one to believe. Seven wounds in little over a year in the Russo-Japanese war taxes the credulity of the most gullible.³

Avalov's German sympathies were pronounced and he did not make any secret of them. His whole orientation was pro-German. He wanted to work only with Germans and took a hostile attitude toward the Allies.⁴ When the North-West army was being organized, with the help of the German High Command, he took an active part in it, but did not participate in any fighting.⁵

As soon as World War I ended and the Allies arrived, Avalov lost interest in the Yudenich army and went to Berlin to get help from the German government to organize his own army out of Russian war prisoners in Germany. The German government, after some hesitation, agreed to help Avalov and he returned in a few weeks to Mitau with several hundred Russian volunteers and his pockets full of German marks.⁶

Instead of cooperating with Yudenich or Prince Lieven, who had a detachment of troops which already had seen some fighting, Avalov began to organize his own "Army" with himself Commander in chief.

3 Therefore, Avalov is not too reliable a witness and can be trusted only when his account can be verified by other sources. But, inasmuch as he was generally known to be pro-German, his adverse criticism of the Germans can be given some credence.

4 Avalov, *op. cit.*, Preface 5 *Ibid.*, Preface 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 118-148.



On June 12, 1919, Avalov arrived at Mitau and went directly to Visit General von der Goltz, commander of the Iron Division, and from that moment on he remained in closest cooperation with the Iron Division and its commander.⁷ Officially Avalov was under the command of General Yudenich, but actually he was a law unto himself. Besides Avalov's detachment in Latvia there were several others which were also part German and part Russian. These several detachments were well armed and equipped by the Germans. If these commanders, instead of quarreling among themselves and refusing to obey orders, had cooperated with General Yudenich, these troops would have been a most welcome addition to the Yudenich army. But they quarreled with the Letts as well as among themselves and therefore the situation was most discouraging.⁸

After Riga was liberated from the Bolsheviks, with the help of the Iron Division, the Allies had no more use for it—or any armed German for that matter—in the Baltic, and so ordered them to return to Germany.

The date for the final evacuation of the Germans was set for August 20, 1919, with the threat that, in case of refusal, Germany should be blockaded.⁹ The German government, officially at least, hastened to obey and gave orders to von der Goltz

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

⁸ *Yudenich Archives*, XI, A letter to A. I. Gouohkov from General Biskupsky (Yudenich's agent in Latvia), August 8, 1919.

⁹ Avalov, *op. cit.*, p. 156.



to evacuate his troops and move back to Germany. Von der Goltz refused, however, and so the Allies closed the border between Latvia and Germany, thus cutting the Germans and Avalov off from all supplies.

In September of 1919, Avalov made certain requests of the Allies. They were: ¹ to reopen the frontier, and ² to permit the passage of supplies to his army from Germany. He inquired also whether or not the Allies would supply him with food. To all of these requests he received a negative reply from the Allies. ¹⁰ The Germans could not hold out in the Baltic long with their supplies cut off and on October 8, General von der Goltz departed with those of the German troops who wished to go. The rest were incorporated into Avalov's army. ¹¹

In the meantime, Avalov was acting very strangely, as if he were an independent potentate. He was not only ignoring all of Yudenich's orders, but he was actually hindering the general's war efforts. On July 1, Yudenich complained, by wire, to the British mission, to General Dessino of the British mission, and also to General Denikin, that Avalov had refused to obey his orders. ¹² On August 30, he again made the same complaint

10 *Yudenich Archives*, XXVIII.

11 *Ibid.*, XXXIX, Report by Baklanov October 8, 1919.

12 *Ibid.*, LIX.



to Denikin.¹³ On this same date Colonel Kushelevsky reported to General Yudenich from Narva that 190 officers and 811 privates who were going from Poland to the North-West army through Latvia, were forcibly detained by Avalov and. incorporated in his own army and forbidden to leave under penalty of death.¹⁴

On September 12 ,Yudenich sent a letter to the head of the British mission in Helsingfors asking permission to ship Russian officers from Poland by sea, because “it they attempted to travel by land, Avalov would intercept them and. forcibly incorporate them into his own army.”¹⁵

Yudenich, who at this time was feverishly preparing for the final advance on Petrograd, needed every man he could get. He also wanted to stop Avalov’s foolish behavior in Latvia, where he was not only taking the German side but was also quarreling with the Latvian government. Therefore, on August 19, 1919, he sent him an order commanding Avalov to join the Yudenich army. He also required him to purge his detachment of its German element. Avalov ignores this order and continued merrily on his way.¹⁶ Some who visited Avalov’s detachment in Mitau, reported that half or more of his army were Germans

13 *Ibid.*, LIX.

14 *Ibid.*, XXVIII.

15 *Ibid.*, XXVIII.

16 *Ibid.*, LXIII.



who did not understand a word of Russian.¹⁷ A detachment of supposedly Russian soldiers who could speak no Russian presented a strange situation.

In September 1919, Avalov sent two officers to General Denikin, offering his allegiance, with the proviso that Denikin would let Avalov do as he saw fit and would not order him to join Denikin's army. Denikin refused.¹⁸

It is no wonder that General Denikin would not have anything to do with Avalov who was, intentionally or not, doing everything to antagonize the British on whom Denikin depended for his supplies. Avalov was not only pro-German, but he was in closest contact with the German army. He refused to recognize the independence of Latvia, Estonia and Finland and proclaimed everywhere his allegiance to autocratic principles and to the Romanov dynasty and announced, publicly to all who would listen that his only aim was to reestablish absolute monarchy in Russia.¹⁹ Inasmuch as these were the very things that the Allies disapproved of, Avalov was definitely *persona non grata* with the Allies.

17 In possession of the author.

18 Colonel F. and Lieutenant M. (compilers) "Doklad Denikinu o Zapadnom Fronte i Armii Avalova Bermonta 15 Oktiabria 1919", *Belii Archiv I* (Berlin, 1926), p. 101.

19 Avalov, *op. cit.*, Preface.



It may seem strange, but the documents prove beyond a doubt that the Allies felt very strongly on the subject of “no discussion of politics.” They demanded that no politics be discussed in the army, that the Whites fight the Reds without any political platform. In short, in a political Civil War, politics were barred.

On June 11, 1919, the head of the Allied mission sent the following letter to the commander of the North-West army:

As head of the Allied Military Mission to the Baltic States, I wish you ¹ to put down with a firm hand any form of reprisals of inhuman treatment of prisoners or of excesses of any kind in the field; ² to prevent the introduction of politics into the areas occupied by your troops and in this connection, to silence the efforts of certain demagogues of Pskov district and elsewhere; ³ to remember that General Yudenich is in my special confidence as having refused to have any connection whatsoever with Germany, and that the arms and food and other assistance which you are receiving from the Allies are sent to you at the special request of General Yudenich; and ⁴ to remember, with gratitude, the enormous assistance already received from the Estonian government, and to work in the closest and friendliest manner with that Government which is also receiving the assistance of the Allies and Associated Powers. Revel June 11, 1919. ²⁰

It is appropriate to add here that all the help that the Estonian government gave to Yudenich in the way of military supplies were the Russian munitions, guns and cannons that the

20 *Yudenich Archives*, LXXXVIII.



Estonian government appropriated from the old Russian army depots which happened to be on the territory of the new Republic when it announced its independence.²¹ It would seem that Yudenich had thought that he also had some claim to this equipment.

August 4, 1919, General Gough, the head of the British mission, sent a long letter to General Yudenich in which he stated that “In the future, Russia will be democratic”, and that “Monarchists and reactionaries will not be allowed in the Yudenich army”. All that Yudenich and Rodzianko could do after that was to issue an order (August 20), to their troops forbidding all discussion of politics. The motto was - “Against the Bolsheviks, without politics”.²²

Evidently not satisfied with all the damage he had already done to the White cause, Avalov now made his final grand gesture before fading from the picture. He attacked, and almost succeeded in capturing Riga, the capital of Latvia.

Before this happened, however, General Yudenich, exasperated by Avalov’s conduct in general and especially by his refusal to obey Yudenich’s order of the day (October 9, 1919), declared Avalov a traitor and ordered officers and men to cease obeying Avalov and to join the North-West army.²³ It was at this point

21 *Ibid.*, LXXXVIII.

22 *Ibid.*, XCVII.

23 *Ibid.*, XXV.



that Avalov, ignoring the order, instead began his war on Latvia. Avalov's own explanation of what happened is that it was not he who attacked, but rather the Letts.²⁴

Now Avalov was launched on his great adventure. At first all went well for him. The weak Latvian detachments were defeated and Avalov's troops occupied the suburb of Riga Torenberg, October 10. But here his progress was blocked by the artillery fire of Allied warships which had been rushed to the rescue of Riga and the new Republic of Latvia. A detachment of Avalov's army was wiped out by the fire of the French and British cruisers and destroyers. His troops, who were very reluctant to fight the Letts in the first place, now became demoralized and all progress ceased. The German half of his army consisted, in great measure, of men whose chief reasons for enlistment were free food and lodgings. They did not really want to fight anybody. Only former members of the Prussian Guards showed any enthusiasm for war. The Russians who had come to fight the Bolsheviks were annoyed and surprised when ordered to fight the Letts and showed very little ardor.

After he was checked, Avalov issued a proclamation in which he announced that he did not recognize the independence of

²⁴ Avalov, *op cit.*, p. 217.



Latvia and also that he was forced by circumstances into the action.²⁵

On October 13, he sent a wire to Yudenich explaining his behavior. He stated that he attacked the Letts in order that he might not place himself in the position into which Yudenich and his army was, namely, with a hostile nation at his back and with no secure bases. He further said that he did not believe that Yudenich's orders declaring him (Avalov) a traitor were really Yudenich's true sentiments but rather the orders from the Allies which Yudenich had been obliged to obey.²⁶

Avalov, after his repulse from Riga, remained inactive for about a month and then the Letts reorganized their forces and counter-attacked. The demoralized troops of Avalov could not withstand the new pressure and began to retreat. The retreat rapidly turned into a rout and the whole army streamed toward the German border—a mass of fugitives.

Avalov ran the first and the fastest. Rather, he took a train and abandoned his army. His soldiers, enraged at such a show of cowardice, tried to intercept him, but he managed to avoid them and arrived, safe and sound, in Berlin.²⁷

25 *Yudenich Archives*, XXXIX, Reports of Lieutenant Baklanov {Yudenich's representative in Riga) to General Yudenich, from October 8 to November 18, 1919.

26 *Ibid.*, XXXVII.

27 *Ibid.*, XXXIX.



His army, after his desertion, disintegrated. This was the end of Avalov and his adventures. It is a rather insignificant episode in itself, but it is important because of the damage it caused Yudenich and all the White Russians in the Baltic.

Avalov's behavior created considerable resentment among the Letts and Estonians, against all Russians. Now even the most pro-Russian elements of Latvia and Estonia changed their attitude from one of friendship and trust to one of hostility, resentment and distrust. Now no matter how earnestly General Yudenich proclaimed his friendship toward the new nations of the Baltic, he was not believed. Now the idea that the White Russians planned to destroy the new nations as soon as they had defeated the Bolsheviks, was firmly implanted in the minds of the Letts, the Estonians, and worst of all, the Allies. The White Russians had no friends in the Baltic and so any further efforts were foredoomed to failure. It is this that gives the adventures of Avalov historical significance.²⁸

28 *Ibid.*, XXXIX.



Chapter VIII

The North-West Government

The North-West army was in great need. The country in which it was operating was poor; even the native population was on the verge of starvation. The soldiers quite often shared their meager rations with the people.¹ Besides food, the army was in desperate need of clothing. Arms and munitions were lacking.² Money also a vital necessity. Men had to be paid. Families of officers and men had to be taken care of. Civil administration had to be supported. All this took money. The army had no resources of its own because it had its base on foreign soil. As soon, therefore, as the British navy and the Allied mission arrived, the army applied to them for aid.

But General Marsh, the representative of the British mission, told Yudenich that Britain would not lend any money to the Whites.³ The British took the view that a considerable amount of reactionary influence had infiltrated into the army and therefore they hesitated to aid it. On July 18, General Yudenich received the

1 Rodzianko, *Vospominania o Severo Zapadnoi Armii*, pp 51-52.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 33

3 *Ibid.*, LXII, Memorandum of General March to Yudenich, June 21, 1919.



following communique from General March:

In reference following report dated 16 July, I request that you will carefully watch for any such reactionary tendencies, and check them immediately. A report of Estonian staff on military situation on 4 July, transmitted by the Estonian representative here, states that Russian Northern Corps have established old laws of Tsarist regime in liberated districts and that this is not approved by population.⁴

One wonders what government or laws Yudenich, or any of these men, for that matter, could have introduced other than Tsarist laws and government. After all, that was all they knew. The British, on the other hand, felt that the North-West army was not putting forth its best efforts but was depending too much on outside aid. The feeling is expressed in the following communique:

The telephonogram communicated by you to me today (June 21) was to the effect that the Russian North Corps is in such urgent need of money and munitions that it may have to retire to Estonia. I have already informed you that a ship loaded with full military store for 10,000 men will arrive in Revel about 21 June, for the North Corps and that I have telegraphed to England for money. The necessity for the North Corps to retire is not obvious to me, as the pressure of the Bolshevik forces is not sufficient for such retirement. I have no choice but to believe that any such retirement will be due to quite other causes, and I therefore, ask you to take urgent steps and I suggest, in your own person to place the Northern Corps in a better state of efficiency, both in a military sense, and in a political sense with relation to their reported tactless treatment of Ingermanlanders and their own continued bad relations with the Estonian government and further, that you will eliminate any trace of German or pro-German tendencies in the Corps.

⁴ *Ibid.*, LXIII.120



The Corps and the districts occupied by it are now supplied. With food and have since my arrival received a supply of rifles and several million rounds. I am disappointed that, having received help from the Allies, in this way, Russian troops should not put themselves in the position of requiring the Allies to give them more and more assistance while they themselves are standing still and quarreling among themselves and with their neighbors. I trust you will be able to settle these matters and restore the hope and belief of the Allies in the efficiency of the Northern Corps and the wisdom of its command.⁵

By June 1919, the Estonians, fairly secure in the position of their new state, after the North-West army's spring advance, were also creating all kinds of difficulties for the army. They acted in such a hostile manner that the Russians had the impression that the Estonians were determined to liquidate the army or at least to make it fail in its task.⁶

June 28, 1919, the Estonians refused to give any more shells to the Yudenich army.⁷ On June 30, General Rodzianko wired to General Gough complaining that the Estonian government prevented Russian officers from joining the army by refusing to grant them transit visas across Estonia.⁸ Rodzianko also wired the British Military Mission that Estonians had plundered everything in Pskov.

When Red Russian destroyers surrendered to the British

⁵ *Ibid.*, LXI, Letter to General Yudenich from the British Military Mission at Helsingfors, June 21, 1919.

⁶ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 53.

⁷ *Yudenich Archives*, VIII, A letter from the Estonian High Command to General Rodzianko, June 28, 1919.

⁸ *Ibid.*, XC.



they were immediately turned over to the Estonian government to form the nucleus of the new Estonian navy.⁹ When in April, the Red Russian ships on lake Peipus surrendered to the White Russian troops of Rodzianko, the Estonians confiscated them and did not return them in spite of all the protests of the Russians.¹⁰

The climax in British-Russian relations was the organization of the North-West government by Yudenich. It is necessary here to take a backward look at the situation. General Yudenich had, from the start, surrounded himself, not only by his staff, but also by a group of close advisers who were civilians of some considerable repute in old Russia. Among them were E. I. Kedrin, .I. V. Gessan, D. E. Lianoson, A. V. Kartashev, and a few others.¹¹ This group was, according to Kirdetsov, mildly liberal. The left wing consisted of right wing socialists, in the center were Kadets, and on the right were a few members of the Oktobrists. Some of these people were capitalists, manufacturers, for the most part. Others were professional men—lawyers, doctors and professors. Such people were known in old Russia as “Molders of public opinion “ (Obshestvennie Deiately).¹² They were men

9 Gefter, “Vospominania”, *Archiv Russkoi Revolutsii*, X, p. 143.

10 Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 42, 43.

11 Kirdetsov, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 28, 29.



who wielded some influence on public thought. They made speeches, wrote articles in newspapers and magazines, and in general presumed to attempt to mold public thinking.¹³

Besides these men General Yudenich was advised on policy by the generals on his staff, men who can safely be assumed to have been of the conservative stripe. These advisers formed a group which was known as “The political council of the Commander in Chief” (Politicheskoe Sovieshchanie pri Glavnokomanduiushchem).¹⁴

Out of this group of people, those who resided in Helsingfors were invited on August 19, 1919, to come to Revel. The representative of the British mission, General Maroh, called the following to the residence of the British mission: D. E. Lianozov, M. M. Suvorov, A. V. Kartashev, B. D. Kuzmin-Karavaev, M. S. Morgulis, K. S. *Kruzeinshtein*, K. S. Alexandrov, V. L. Gorn, and M. M. Filippio. He told them, without any warning, to form a government to govern the territories occupied, and to be occupied, by the Yudenich army. After the government was formed it was to recognize, immediately, Estonia as an independent nation. All this was to be done in just forty minutes—or all British and Allied help would cease at once. The assembled group,

¹³ The inclusion of capitalists in this liberal group should not surprise the reader. Many Russian capitalists were in the left wing groups. Savva Morozov, the great textile manufacturer, gave millions to the Revolution. So, also did the very rich Riabushinsky family. Another important manufacturer, Konovalov, was Vice-Premier under Kerensky. There were many others.

¹⁴ Kirdetsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-236.



in complete stupefaction did as ordered and, forty minutes later, the North-West government was born.¹⁵

On August 11, 1919, these same persons were called back by General March and ordered, now as a duly constituted government, to sign a declaration recognizing Estonia as an independent nation and promising to establish a democratic government in Russia. They signed. So was formed the short lived North-West government. Yudenich was its Minister of War and Lianozov its Prime Minister.¹⁶

It the. purpose of the formation of the North-West government was to check the reactionary tendencies of the leaders of the army and to improve relations with the Baltic nations, it failed; for the Estonians, Letts, and Finns remained just as hostile and suspicious of the Russians as before. The Estonians continued to annoy the North-West army. On August 18, Yudenich complained to the Allied mission that the Estonians were hindering the arrival of supplies of bacon, flour and firewood.¹⁷

On August 12, 1919, General Yudenich formally recognized the Estonian government. The Estonians, of course, officially expressed great joy and gratitude but, as stated above, this official joy did not improve matters.¹⁸ It seems that the Estonians were

15 *Yudenich Archives*, CVI, August 10, 1919. A document.

16 *Ibid.*, CVI, August 11, 1919. A document.

17 *Ibid.*, LXIII.

18 *Ibid.*, LXXXII. Diary of Events. Staff reports August 12, 1919.



demanding more. Recognition by General Yudenich was not enough. Now they demanded recognition by the Paris Conference. On August 16, General Kruzeinshtein wrote to Yudenich informing him that General Laidoner had told him that if the Estonian independence was not recognized immediately, not only by General Yudenich but by the Paris Conference, Estonian troops would retire to their own borders—abandoning the North-West army to its fate.¹⁹ On the same date, the Estonian government informed General March that it could not cooperate with the North-West army until its independence was recognized by the Allies.²⁰

To Yudenich personally, the formation of the North-West government was an unpleasant surprise. Until this happened, he was the dictator appointed by Kolchak and responsible for his actions to Kolchak alone. At this point Kolchak, being over 6,000 miles away in Siberia, could not interfere much in local affairs even if he had wanted to. Now, however, with the North-West government close at hand, Yudenich's power was considerably curtailed. He had to consult the government, if only for the record, on all affairs of administration and policy.²¹ It is easy to understand that anyone used to having absolute power will relinquish it

19 *Ibid.*, XCIV, August 16, 1919.

20 *Ibid.*, XCIV, Communique of the Estonian government to General March.

21 Kirdetsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 227, 236.



only after a mighty struggle. Yudenich hated the North-West government and its members from the start.²² His attitude and sentiments toward the government that was forced upon him was well illustrated by the fact that he never bothered to inform his troops officially of its existence.²³

The seat of the government was in Revel. It issued a few orders and some decrees as well as several very democratic and patriotic proclamations to the population. But its actual influence was insignificant.

The British gave an order to the newly formed government to issue a proclamation to the Russian people guaranteeing them a democratic form of government and an assurance of equal rights to all. This proclamation also stated that the old Tsarist regime would never be reestablished.²⁴ Inasmuch, as this proclamation was issued under duress, its sincerity was open to question.

In August Yudenich attempted to negotiate a loan with Poland, but the loan did not materialize.²⁵ He was in difficulties again. His relations with the British were not happy. He felt that they were exercising to strict a control over him.²⁶

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 238, 239.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 349.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 222.

25 *Yudenich Archives*, LXIII, Letters of Yudenich to his representative in Poland, August 20, 1919.

26 *Ibid.*, LXII, Letter from Yudenich to Kolchak. August 28, 1919.



His situation was really a pitiable one. On one side, he was faced by unruly subordinates; on the other, by hostile Estonia and the dictatorial British mission. The British mission showed every evidence of friendliness to Estonia and, at the same time, showed clear evidences of contempt for the Russians.²⁷ Yet he had to be friendly to the Mission for the very existence of the North-West army depended upon its good will.

It would seem that the White Russians had only one friend in Britain. Winston Churchill. A series of reports from London by Yudenich's representative there. General Gerua, give an interesting account of how the situation looked to the White Russians in Britain. July 20, 1919, Gerua reports that only Churchill was friendly and willing to help but that the rest of the government was cold to White Russian aspirations. He felt that the pressure of the Labour party was very strong, and that they were unsympathetic toward the idea of giving help to the Whites. So he was of the opinion that no more help would be given.²⁸

The August 4th report states that the Labour party was exercising strong pressure to keep the government from interfering

27 Kirdetsov, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

28 *Yudenich Archives*, LXIII.



in Russian affairs and that the government itself was greatly concerned about the future form of the Russian government, desiring it to be democratic.²⁹ On September 19, 1919, it was reported that the British government feared German influences in the army and also that a plan to reestablish Tsarism in Russia had many adherents among the generals and officers in the army.³⁰

September 20, 1919, Gerua reported by wire that Churchill in his capacity of Secretary of State for War and for Air, was sending 20 field pieces, 12 howitzers, 4 six-inch field pieces, three tanks and 20,000 rifles with munitions for the army.³¹

By September of 1919, then, the British supplies began to arrive. Russians were, of course, overjoyed. On September 8, six British tanks arrived but since no equipment to set up the machine guns was included, the tanks could not be used until extra parts were sent from England.³²

After the arrival of these supplies, the British began to urge General Yudenich to advance. On September 20, Britmis (military head of the British Mission in Helsingfors) wrote to his aid in Revel:

29 *Ibid.*, XL.

30 *Ibid.*, XL.

31 *Ibid.*, XL.

32 *Ibid.*, LXIII, Staff report September 8, 1919.



When is Yudenich going to advance? Does he not realize that we have given him all the material that we intend to give him? Border states may conclude peace on the quiet and disarm his force.³³

Then, on September 22, Britmis wrote to Yudenich that he must begin his advance direct against Petrograd.³⁴

All of this urging and the knowledge that no more supplies would be forthcoming and also that Estonia might conclude peace with Russia at any moment, forced Yudenich's hand and so the final advance began. General Yudenich was forced to gamble everything on one throw.

33 *Ibid.*, XXVIII.

34 *Ibid.*, XXVIII.



Chapter IX

The Last Phase—October 1919 to February 1920

On the whole, the relations between the White Russians and the Allies were not especially happy ones. An exception to this, however, is to be found in their relations with the United States government and its representatives. The army was grateful for the supplies that were sent and it was particularly thankful that when the American representative promised something that the promise was kept. The leaders of the army had only praise for the Americans. On Easter, when Captain Gade, the United States representative, arrived he made a very good impression on the Russians. when he saw the terrible state of the Russian troops he marveled that they had been able to fight and win any battles.¹ The only commission which gave real help to the army was the American. Seeing the desperate situation, the Americans offered to supply the army with flour and lard and, on the designated day, the food arrived.² The Americans made a real

1 Rodzianko, *Vospominania O Severnoi Armii*, p. 33.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 52.



effort to make arrangements that would suit the Russians. When the Russians requested the Hoover organization to give supplies directly to the army instead of to the Estonians for the distribution to the army. it agreed. On June 27, 1919, Sazonov wired from Paris that “from now on food will be delivered directly to the Yudenich army.”³

During the entire life of the North-West army the relations with the Americans were cordial. In September of 1919, the head of the American mission in Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Lieutenant-Colonel Dowley, informed General Rodzianko that the Americans appreciated the work of the army. He asked only that troops he told that the food they ate came from the United States. He also asked them to have faith in the Allies.⁴

On August 18, the American government proposed to supply the North-West army with old American army uniforms.⁵ In September, the representatives of the American Red cross, Captain Robertson and Captain Polast, arrived at Narva and brought with them desperately needed supplies. The Russians were happy and

3 *Yudenich Archives*, LXV, A wire from Sazanov to Yudenich June 27, 1919.

4 *Ibid.*, XXCVIII. September 9, 1919.

5 *Ibid.*, LXIII, A letter from Sazonov in Paris to Yudenich August 18, 1919.



most grateful.⁶ In October Yudenich applied for supplies to the United States government,⁷ and these supplies arrived at Revel in twenty-three American ships on November 10.⁸ Later that same month the Russian Ambassador at Washington, Bakhmeteev told Yudenich. that the United States was planning to send him additional arms and munitions. But now it was too late.⁹ Unfortunately for the North-West army much of the American help arrived too late—in November and December when the army was defeated and in process of disintegration and disbandment. At this point, American help could only alleviate the sufferings of the survivors. It was none the less very welcome to the starving troops and the refugees on the Estonian border. Yudenich was grateful for this generous help and sent his thanks to the American Red Cross.¹⁰

6 *Ibid.*, LXIII, Staff report to Yudenich September 12, 1919.

7 *Ibid.*, CXIX, A letter to Bakhmeteev, Russian Ambassador in Washington, October 16, 1919.

8 *Ibid.*, XXV. A wire from Gulevich to Yudenich November 10, 1919.

9 *Ibid.*, A wire from Bakhmeteev to Yudenich November 16, 1919.

10 *Ibid.*, A letter to the American Red Cross Mission signed by Kondirev, November 7, 1919.



Yudenich still made efforts to obtain help. In December, he appealed to the Y. M.C. A. for aid for the refugee women and children who were in desperate plight due largely to the attitude of the Estonian government.¹¹

Now it seems that Yudenich, full of gratitude to the Americana, was desirous of showing his appreciation to them. Under the circumstances, however, the only thing he could do was to give them Russian decorations. According to a strict interpretation of the statutes of the Russian empire, Yudenich had no more right to bestow Russian decorations than the most obscure peasant. But under the stress of circumstances, a few technicalities were overlooked and the Americans were decorated with a lavish hand. And the recipients were most appreciative. On December 20, 1919, the American Red Cross Commission wrote a letter to Yudenich thanking him for all the decorations he had given its members.¹² Colonel Grooms, Chief of the Baltic Mission of the American Relief Administration, in a personal letter thanked Yudenich for the great honor of receiving the Order of Saint Vladimir fourth class.¹³

11 *Ibid.*, XXXII. A. letter from Yudenich to the Y. M. C. A., December 10, 1919.

12 *Ibid.*, XXXII.

13 *Ibid.*, XXV, A. letter from Colonel Grooms to General Yudenich, August 5, 1919.



But all was not smooth sailing. It seems that some members of the American missions were overlooked and also, that some junior members had received decorations of a higher grade than their superiors.¹⁴ There was ill feeling and quarreling among the Americans and protests and resentment against General Yudenich.

This unfortunate state of affairs may explain the statements made by Major Davis in a speech given in Paris at the meeting of the American Red Cross officials on December 10, 1919,

General Yudenich is a man five feet two inches in height, weighing about 280 pounds; body shaped like a coupe, with unnoticeable legs, smooth head, and one of those mustaches that seem to away around on the cheek. I don't mean to describe the man as a caricature—he is a man that looks just like that, and the poor man is sorry because he has a tremendous responsibility and tremendous disappointments. General Yudenich started out from his head- quarters to go along the road to Petrograd. The British were with him, and the British said, “You must proceed with one leg on land and one on water; we will be the water leg”. So he proceeded on a narrow front. There was no opposition to block him. Six British tanks, operated by young British boys, accompanied him, with his six tanks and his offensive troops going along the road and his own Russian troops Walking along beside the road.. So you see they proceeded on a. very narrow front toward. Petro- grad. I am sorry you are smiling at these military maneuvers.

14 *Ibid.*, XXVI, A report to General Yudenich by General Kruzeinshtein, November 26, 1919.



I want to tell you that all his transport drivers are women. There was a woman eighty years old - I don't want to do her an injustice - she was eighty years old and drove a droskey behind the tanks.

They were right near the suburbs of Petro- grad when two regiments, made up of volunteers and students, attacked them. These Bolsheviks were told that the tanks were made out of sheeting, so they came to pull the sheeting off the lumber and get the 'critters' inside, and so the slaughter was appalling.

Yudenich retreated, not because of any pressure against the front, but because he came with all his baggage - his men had all their households right with them. . . .¹⁵

This account is full of gross misrepresentations. Major Davis, for example, speaks of the amount of "baggage" carried by the army and its followers. One can only wonder how these men, destitute and in rags, by the testimony of the Americans themselves, could have acquired much baggage. Even if they had plundered the population they could not have gotten anything. The people in this section were poor peasants. There were no cities of any size and the countryside had been laid bare long ago by the see-sawing of the Red, Estonian and White troops in the previous fighting. In spite of this one unfavorable comment, all evidence points to very pleasant relations between the Yudenich army and the Americans.

15 From the Archives of the American Red Cross, supplied by Dr. H.H. Fisher



The relations, however, between the British and the White Russians were far less happy. For instance, there was an issue over airplanes. General Yudenich had begged the British to supply him with all possible technical help. Realizing that only with technical superiority could he win a decisive victory over the Bolsheviks, he was most eager to obtain tanks and airplanes. He did get a few tanks, most of them defective, but he received no airplanes. The explanation given was that, in the fall and winter, planes could not operate in the Baltic. Yet the British had urged and even demanded that General Yudenich attack in the late fall. Yudenich sent a desperate wire to British Military Mission on this subject. A quotation follows:

Have received communication that aeroplanes for North-West army have been stopped. England's reason for questioning possibility winter action not clear. Declare that aeroplanes can work in winter. During war with Germans aero- planes worked all the year around. Earnestly request your assistance for their speedy expedition. ¹⁶

Instead of the requested aid,. Yudenich received the following telegram which indicates that the British would send him no more help:

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, XXVIII, A wire from General Yudenich to General Hocking, November 7, 1919.



Owing to considerable efforts in the past in all parts of Russia, our resources in material are much reduced. For this reason it is now impossible for H. M. government to support more than one Russian theatre, and their policy is to concentrate on South Russia where our commitments, past and present are very extensive. Therefore unless some inter-Allied agreement is reached, whereby burden of supporting anti-Bolshevik forces is more equally distributed, H. M. government will be able to provide nothing further for the Baltic beyond content of ships referred to paragraph one above. It is hoped that the whole Russian question will be shortly discussed by the Council of Five.

17

The North-West army was still having trouble with the Estonians. They hindered the Russians in every possible fashion, including stealing the army rolling stock. The following memo illustrates the point:

As it appears that the Estonians direct the rolling stock belonging to the North- West army to places very difficult to find out, I request you to order to get for the Russian commission Colonels Milgounoff and Daykoff the permit to go everywhere where Russian rolling stock is deposited. I request you as well to give similar orders to your officer working between Narva and Taps.

17 *Ibid.*, XXVIII, (Copy of War Office Telegram September 9, 1919.

18 *Ibid.*, XXVIII, III, Memorandum from Chief of Chancery Russian Military Mission in Estonia to Major Wilson, British Military Mission,. December 11, 1919.



Again, on October 16, 1919, *Kruzeinshtein* reported to Yudenich that the Estonian government had arrested his messenger to Admiral Kolchak and that many other Russians were being arrested and insulted by the Estonians.¹⁹

As early as November 3, Yudenich wired Kolchak, Denikin and Sazonov that the Estonian government would make peace with Bolshevik Russia and would disarm the North-West army. He therefore begged them to save the army.²⁰

The blow finally fell on January 3, 1920. On that date the Estonians concluded an armistice with the Soviet Union.²¹ Now all hopes were gone. General Yudenich and his army had nothing left to hope for. When the army was being disbanded, the British made their final gesture to the North-West army by the following message:

In accordance with instructions received by me from my Government on 21 November 1919, all British property, whatsoever or wheresoever it may be, under the control of the late North-West Russian government or army, is handed over to the Estonian government as from 21 November 1919.²²

19 *Ibid.*, XXV.

20 *Ibid.*, XI.

21 *Ibid.*, XI, A wire from General Gerua to Sablin in London.

22 *Ibid.*, XXVIII, A communique to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Estonia by Lieutenant-Colonel, British Military Mission.



The French made some friendly efforts to help General Yudenich and his army. On October 29, 1919, Colonel Hurstel, Chief of the French Mission in Estonia, offered the use of French destroyers to Yudenich to move troops and supplies.²³ Furthermore, on November 20, Sazonov wired to Yudenich that the French were protesting against the disarming of the Yudenich army by the Estonians. They attempted to get the British to join them in this protest, but England refused.²⁴ The French government, however, through the Allied High Council demanded that the Estonian government treat the Yudenich army with a degree of decency.²⁵

So ends the tragic story of the Yudenich army.

²³ *Ibid.*, XXV, A letter from Colonel Hurstel, Chief of the French Mission in Estonia, to Yudenich on October 29, 1919.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, XXVI.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, XII, A note from the Allied High Council to Estonia, December 5, 1919.



Conclusion

Why did General Yudenich and the North-West army fail, and what conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing events? The causes for the failure of Yudenich are many and varied. One cause surely is to be found in the background and the character of Yudenich himself.

All indications are that Yudenich was a brilliant general—firm, resourceful and of great personal integrity and moral courage. His conduct during the Russian-Japanese war, and even more particularly during World War I, testify to this beyond doubt. But why did he fail so miserably as the head of the North-West army? It would seem that the reason might be found in his previous life and background.

Yudenich was a product of the old Imperial army. He was trained, as were all other Russian officers, in the gospel of blind allegiance and obedience to the Tsar. He did not concern himself overmuch, if at all, over the questions of forms and theories of government. Russia and the Tsar were to him one and indivisible, and to them he owed his loyalty. From childhood he had been taught to love and revere the Tsar.



Later, in the military academy and in the army, this devotion was only strengthened.

Revolution was naturally then a terrific shock to him. It shattered all his ideals and aspirations. The new ideas meant nothing to him. Socialism, communism, republicanism, democracy, were just foreign terms which it is doubtful he understood completely.

One must not forget the personal equation. Yudenich was a full general under the Tsar. For his services, the Tsar loaded him with honors and decorations. From a humble beginning as a second lieutenant he became one of the foremost generals of the Russian army. With the Revolution, he lost everything. Not only did he lose his rank, his position, and all his honors, but he became a hunted fugitive—an enemy of the people—who had to flee Russia for his very life.

Under these circumstances Yudenich must have had only one idea in his mind the reestablishment of the monarchy. Only a reestablished monarchy could bring Russia back to the familiar pattern that he knew and loved so well and that had been so good to him. With the Tsar back in power, he would be no longer a fugitive but a famous general once more. So, one may fairly safely assume that, to Yudenich, the struggle against the Bolsheviks was a struggle to reestablish monarchy in Russia.



Unfortunately for Yudenich things were not congenial for his plans. First of all, he was thrown out of his usual atmosphere of a well organized state and army. He was used to receiving and obeying orders and he was also accustomed to giving orders and having them obeyed. Now there was no state and no army. The state had to be won back by an army which had first to be organized. It is one thing to command a well disciplined and organized army and quite another to create one. He faced a difficult situation by anybody's standards.

The Baltic of 1918-1919 was a troublesome place in which to operate. Even a skilled diplomat would have found it a serious problem, and Yudenich was not a diplomat. His talents as a general were of relatively little value in the situation in which he found himself. On the one hand, were the new states of Estonia, Latvia and Finland, and on the other hand, were the Allies. The new states clamored for recognition and were most suspicious of any Russian national groups. To allay their fears one would have had to recognize their independence immediately and unreservedly. This Yudenich could not bring himself to do. It was several months before he recognized them. By that time it was too late. The seed of suspicion had been sown and were bringing forth



fruit. Since Yudenich's recognition had come late and under the pressure of Britain, it was received with distrust by the Baltic states. To make matters worse, Admiral Kolchak, the nominal Head of all White Russians, took the uncompromising attitude of the "One and indivisible Russia," refusing to recognize any new state formed out of the territory of old Russia. This point of view, taken by some national Russian groups, quite naturally caused many in the Baltic nations to fear that even if they were able to win a grudging recognition of independence now, they might lose it as soon as Russia became strong again.

So, from the very beginning, the good will and cooperation of Latvia, Estonia, and Finland were lacking. And this was of tremendous importance, for only on the territory of these states could the North-West army be organized and have its bases for the struggle against the Bolsheviks. As unqualified friends, the Allies, especially the British, left much to be desired. This was a genuine surprise to the White Russians. The Allies' chief interest throughout lay in creating and supporting the new states, rather than giving aid to the White Russians. When the White Russians realized this, they were completely nonplused. Just how to proceed under these circumstances was not clear to them. It was



not only that the Allies promised much and gave little and late, but the Allies themselves made strict demands for White Russian aid. They demanded that the Whites recognize the new states and also they required a promise that the Tsar's regime would not be reestablished and that Russia, when liberated from the Bolsheviks, should be made into a democratic republic.

All this was a difficult business, for the White Russians were by no means unanimous in their political thinking. They all agreed on just one thing—their hatred of the Bolsheviks and their desire to drive them out of Russia. Beyond this one article of faith, there was no unanimity among them. They ranged from socialist to extreme reactionary in their views. The different groups quarreled and bickered among themselves, and all ran to Yudenich insisting that he adopt their pet political platform.. And what is worse, they even took their quarrels and complaints about each other to the Allied representatives and intrigued against one another.

In this state of affairs Yudenich was completely lost. Most of the time he really did nothing to solve the problem. At this time the accusation was made against him that he was “weak, vacillating and stupid.” It would have taken a political genius to have made his way successfully through this set of



conditions and General Yudenich was no political genius. He was only an honest and good soldier who found it difficult to hide his own political views and who was completely at a loss as to what to make out of this confusing situation.

The character of Yudenich's army was another contributory cause of its failure. It was by no means the well organized and obedient army that he was accustomed to. It was made up of all kinds of men, poorly drilled and inadequately trained. Even the old Imperial officers whom Yudenich had known in 1916 had been demoralized by the years of revolution. They had forgotten much of their old discipline and had become unruly and disobedient. Many of them wished to be in command and resented the fact that they had to obey. Rodzianko, van Neff, Vetrenko, Lieven, Avalov and the rest were anxious to glorify themselves. It would seem that they all dreamed of being the "man on the white horse" themselves, receiving the acclaim of the grateful and jubilant populace. One of the minor reasons for the failure of the last advance was the desire of each commander to be the first to enter Petrograd. With such subordinates, Yudenich could never be sure that his orders would be obeyed and properly executed. The senior officers, with Rodzianko at their head, were most of the time in open



rebellion. It was only the prestige of the name Yudenich and the admonitions and threats of the British that kept them in some kind of subordination. Even at that, they questioned or protested most of his orders.

As if that were not enough they quarreled among themselves and neglected their duty. Others, like Balakhovich, were bandits who robbed and plundered at the slightest provocation. It is little wonder, under such conditions, that this man who had been a brilliant general in World War I now appeared to be only a “stupid, fat, old man.”

The whole problem of insufficient supplies furnishes another explanation for the failure of the North-West army. There was a general lack of bases, food, arms, munitions and time. On this subject the Allies, especially Great Britain, must bear a great share of the responsibility, because Great Britain assumed the task of supplying the Yudenich army. There can be no doubt that the British representatives, when they came to the Baltic, made generous promises to the White Russians and to Yudenich in particular. Very few of these promises were kept.

The question arises whether Britain was sincere in making these promises to General Yudenich. Did she really desire to end the power of the Bolsheviki? The answer would



seem to be a definite 'No'. One concludes this because Britain had means at her disposal to feed and arm the Yudenich army magnificently and yet that army was in rags—hungry and ill armed. On the other hand, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were almost overwhelmed with British supplies. The powerful British navy, in the Baltic, disregarded all the frantic appeals of Yudenich and did not move to help him. By this inaction they opened the left flank of his army to attack by the Red army and navy.

One may ask why did they help Yudenich at all. The answer is clear - to give a chance for Latvia and Estonia to create and organize their own governments and armies. For the same reason, it retained the German troops in Latvia until that country was able to defend itself successfully. Yudenich and his army were playing the same role in Estonia. As soon as Latvia became strong, German troops were ordered out. As soon, likewise, as Estonia became strong, Yudenich and his army also became superfluous. Forced to advance by urging and threats, and abandoned in the advance, the Yudenich army was disbanded and dispersed as soon as the inevitable collapse came to pass. It had performed its task; now it was no longer needed and so it was liquidated. Soon afterward, Latvia and Estonia signed peace with the Bolsheviks.



But the hostility of the new Baltic states, the hesitation of Britain, and the inefficiency of Yudenich himself would not have prevented his victory if the Russian people had backed him up or had been whole-heartedly on his side. But this, the most decisive factor, was not present. The Russian people did not support Yudenich.

Yudenich did not receive the support of the Russian people for two reasons: first, the land and factory reforms of the Bolsheviks; and second, the lack of a definite program on the part of Yudenich himself. The Bolsheviks fulfilled the generations old aspiration at the Russian peasant by giving them land. To the peasants, the Yudenich army, particularly its leaders, represented the old regime and they feared that its members would come back and take the newly acquired land away from them. Many stupid and cruel deeds of the Whites served to bolster up the Bolshevik propaganda and tended to confirm this belief. The Bolsheviks were themselves cruel and obnoxious but the peasant, none the less, felt certain that under their rule they would retain their land. and this was their chief concern.

The workers supported the regime because, from poorly paid and oft mistreated laborers, they now became the possessors of all the industrial wealth of Russia. They had



risen from the lower classes to the place where they now became the dictators and leaders of the nation.

For the most part, the upper classes - the nobility, capitalists, the professional people, the white collar workers - the middle classes, and the few prosperous peasants who owned their own land (as a result of the Stolypin reforms), were on the side of Yudenich, but they constituted the hopeless minority of the predominately agricultural Russia.

The second reason, the lack of political program on the part of Yudenich, was caused by the dissension among the Whites themselves and the attitude of the Allies. Yudenich had in his army, as stated above, men of all political stripes, who could not agree among themselves. Naturally then, they could not produce a united political program. They could not promise the population anything because they could not agree on what would be a good thing for the populace to have. Yudenich himself, had he had the chance, would in all probability have proclaimed the return of the Tsar, but he was prevented from such a course by the disagreements among his followers and by a strict prohibition on the part of the Allies.

The result was a sort of compromise—there was no program at all. It was only announced that the army was fighting “against the Bolsheviks and for the Constitutional



Assembly” (*Uchreditelnoie Sobranie*). Such slogans, of course, meant nothing to the great majority of the people. It is not enough to tell people what one is fighting against. There must always be something to fight for. No such thing was given them in this war against the expertly united machine known as the Bolshevik party.

One may conclude from a study of the history of the Yudenich army, that one cannot fight ideas with bullets alone. A civil war is usually a war of ideas—a war of words—and therefore, the side with the most appealing slogans may very well win the fight.

One may also conclude that to attempt to wrest a country from revolutionists with the use of foreign aid is hopeless. It might succeed in a really small country such as Finland or Hungary, but not in a great country such as Russia. A small country can be overrun by the invaders but a really large country cannot. Actually, the presence of Allied aid furnished excellent propaganda for the Bolsheviks, making Yudenich and his army seem ‘servants of foreign capitalists’ who had come to enslave Russia. As an aid to Yudenich, therefore; their value is doubtful.

These would seem to be the conclusions that one could reasonably draw from the study of the history of the Yudenich army.



Bibliography

I. Primary Sources

Great Britain Foreign Office. Correspondence between His Majesty Government and the Soviet Government respecting the relations between the two governments. London, 1923.

League of Free Nations Association, New York. Russian-American relations, March 1917-March 1920, Documents and papers. (Compiled and edited by Cumming and Walter W. Pettit). New York, 1920.

Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Estonia. Lettre de la Delegation Esthonienne adressee a M. le Presidant de la Conference de la Paix faite par le gouvernement des Soviets. Paris, 1919.

Yudenich Archives. A collection of documents of the North-West Army of General Yudenich, including his own private correspondence. 150 manila covered volumes consisting of letters, staff reports, battle orders, telegrams, telephonograms, memoranda, minutes of meetings. (These are to be found in the Hoover Library of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University).

II. Memoirs

Birkin, V. N. *Memoirs 1904-1905.* Berlin, 1929.

Brusilov, Aleksiei A. *Moi Vospominania* (My Reminiscences). Moscow, 1922.

Kokovtsov, Vladimir N. *Out of My Past.* London, 1935.

Nazhivin, Ivan F. *Zapiski o Revoliutsii* (Memoirs of the Revolution). Vienna, 1921.

Nabokav, Konstantin D. *Ispytania Diplomata* (Trials of a Diplomat). Stockholm, 1921.

Noulens, Joseph. *Mon Ambassade en Russie Sovietique, 1917-1919* (My Ambassadorship in Soviet Russia 1917-1919). Paris, 1923.



Oberuchev, K. M. *Ofitseri v Russkoi Revoliutsii* (Officers in the Russian Revolution). U. S. A., No date.

Paliei, Olga V. (Karnovioh). *Memories of Russia 1916-1919*. London, 1924.

Popov, K. *Vospominania Kavkazskago Grenadera 1914-1920*. (Memoirs of a Caucasian Grenadier 1914-1920). Belgrade, 1925.

Rodzianko, A.. P. *Vospominania. O Severo-Zapadnoi Armii*. (Memoirs of the North-West Army. Berlin, 1921.

Sorokin, Pitirim A. *Leaves from a Russian Diary*. New York, 1924.

Vertsinskii, Eduard A. *God Revoliutsii, Vospominania Ofitsera Generalnago Shtaba*. (A Year of Revolution, Memoirs of a General Staff Officer). Tallin, 1929.

Vinning, L. *Held by the Bolsheviks, Diary of a British Officer*. London, 1924.

Vrangel, Nikolai E. Baron. *Vospominania*. (Memoirs). Berlin, 1924.

III. Secondary Sources

Aleksandrovich, V. K. *Poznaniu Kharaktera Grazhdanskoi Voini*. (An Interpretation of the Civil War). Belgrade, 1920.

Alekseev, V. *Octiabr i Grazhdanskaia Voina*. (October and the Civil War). Voronrezh, 1932.

Aleksinskii, Grigorii. *Du Tsarisme au Communisme*. (From Tsarism to Communism). Paris, 1923.

Alinin, K. *Tche-ka. The Story of the Bolshevik Extraordinary Commission*. London. 1920.

Allen, W. E. D. *The Ukraine-a History*. Cambridge, 1941.

Anishev, A. N. *Ooherki Istorii Grazhdanakoi Voini*. (Civil War Sketches). Leningrad, 1925.



Antonov-Qvseenko, V. G. *Zapiski o Grazhdanskoi Voine*. (History of the Civil War). Moscow, 1922.

Apse, Ian. *The Baltic Countries*. London, No date.

Arnoldi, G. M. *Armia i Revoliutsia*. (The Army and the Revolution). Petrograd, 1917.

Arnot, Robert Page. *A Short History of the Russian Revolution from 1905 to the Present Day*. London, 1937.

Avalov, P. V. *Borbe s Bolshevizmom*. (Struggle Against Bolshevism). Hamburg, 1925.

Bach, M. G. *Desiat Let Kapitlischiteskago Okrujenia S.S.S.R.* (Ten Years of Encirclement of U.S.S.R.) Moscow, 1928.

Basseches, Nikolaus. *The Unknown Army*. New York, 1943.

Batsell, W. R. *Soviet Rule in Russia*. New York, 1929.

Bezobrazov, Pavel V. *O Snosheniakh Rossii s Frantsii*. (Relations Between France and Russia). Moscow, 1892.

Bukharin, Nikolai J. *Klassovia Borba i Revoliutsia v Rossii*. (Class Struggle and Revolution in Russia). Petrograd, 1919.

Borodin, Nikolai A. *Ideali i Deistvitelnost*. (Ideals and Realities). Berlin, 1930.

Brasol, Boris L. *The World at the Crossroads*. Boston, 1921.

Brianchaninov, Nikolai. *Histoire de Russie*. (History of Russia). Paris, 1929.

Bryant, Louise. *Six Red Months in Russia*. New York, 1918.

Buchanan, Meriel. *Petrograd the City of Trouble 1914-1918*. London, 1918.

Buchanan, Meriel. *The Dissolution of an Empire*. London, 1932.

Buchanan, Sir George William. *My Mission to Russia and Other Memories*. London. 1927.



Bullard, Arthur. *The Russian Pendulum*. New York, 1919.

Chamberlin, W. H. *The Russian Revolution 1917-21*. New York, 1935.

Chirol, Sir Valentine. *Germany and the Fear of Russia*. London, 1914.

Churchill, Rogers Platt. *The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907*. Cedar Rapid, Iowa, 1939.

Coates, William Peyton. *Six Centuries of Russo-Polish Relations*. London, 1948.

Coates, William Peyton. *Russia, Finland and the Baltic*. London, 1940.

Dean, Mrs. Vera (Michelis). *Soviet Russia 1919-1933*. Boston, 1933.

Demartial, Georges. *La Guerre de 1914, L'evangile du Quai D'Orsay*. (The War of 1914, The Bible of Quai D'Orsay). Paris, 1920.

Denikin, A. I. *The Russian Turmoil*. London, No date.

Ferdonnet, Paul Joseph. *La Preface de la Guerre*. (Preface to the War). Paris, 1937.

Ganetskii, Iakov S. *Angliskii Imperializm i S.S.S.R.* (British Imperialism and the U.S.S.R.). Moscow, 1927.

Gedar, L. *Antisovetskaia Politika Frantsuskago Imperialisma*. (Anti-Soviet Policy of French Imperialism). Moscow, 1931

Gertshakh, Moisei I. *Politiko-Ekonomicheskie Vzaimostnoshenia Mezhdou S.S.S.R. i Pribaltikoi za Desiat Let (1917-1927)*. (Political and Economic Relations Between U.S.S.R. and the Baltic States Over a Period of Ten Years 1917-1927). Moscow, 1928.

Gina, G. K. *Sibir, Soiuzniki i Kolchak*. (Siberia, Allies and Kolchak). Peking, China, 1921.

Goode, William Thomas. *Bolshevism at Work*. London, 1920.

Gordon, Alban Godwin. *Russian Civil War*. London, 1937.



Gordon, Alban Godwin. *Russian Year, A Calendar of Revolution*. London, 1935.

Gorin, Pavel O. *Proletariat v 1917 godu v Borbe za Vlast. (Proletariat in 1917 Struggle for Power)*. Moscow, 1927.

Gorn, Vasilii L. *Grazhdanskaia Voina na Severo-Zapade Rossii. (Civil War in North-Western Russia)*. Berlin, 1928.

Gorn, V., Marguliss, M., Kirdetsov, G., Ivanov, N. *Yudenich Pod Petrogradom. (Yudenich at Petrograd)*. Leningrad, 1927.

Graham, Malbone Watson. *Russian American Relations 1917-1933*. Kenosha, Wisconsin, 1934.

Graves, W. S. *American Siberian Adventure*. New York, 1941.

Gregory, J. S. and Shave, D. W. *The U.S.S.R. - A Geographical Survey*. New York, 1914.

Gul, Roman. *Ledianoi Pokhod. (The Ice March)*. (No date or place of publication).

Herval, Rene. *Hiut Mois de Revolution Russe. (Eight Months of the Russian Revolution)*. Paris, 1918.

Hewitt, Norah, the Hon. *The Rulers of Russia*. London, 1924.

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (Edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.) (B) New York, 1939.

Hodgetts, Edward A. B. *Our Russian Ally*. London, 1915.

Houghleling, James L. *A Diary of the Russian Revolution*. New York, 1918.

Ianchulitsev, S. *Istoria Kavaler gardov. (History of the Mounted Guards Regiment)*. 4 vols. St. Petersburg, 1903.

Jubilee Publication for General Yudenich. *General Infanterii Nikolai Nikolaevioh Yudenlch. (General of Infantry N. N. Yudenich)*. Paris, No date.



Kakurin, N. *Strategicheskii Ocherk Grazhdanskoi Voini*. (A Sketch of the Strategy of the Civil War). Moscow, 1926.

Karaev, Georgii N. *Po Sledam Grazhdanskoi Voini na Severe i na Severo-Zapade*. (In the Footsteps of the Civil War in the North and Northwest). Moscow, 1932.

Karpov, Nikolai I. *Istoria Klassovoi Borby v Rossii v Materialakh i Dokumentakh*. Documentary History of the Civil War. Leningrad, 1926.

Karpovich, Michail M. *Imperial Russia 1801-1917*. New York, 1932.

Kerenskii, Aleksandr F. *The Crucifixion of Liberty*. New York, 1934.

Kersnovskii, A. A. *Istoria Russkoi Armii*. (History of the Russian Army). 4 vols. Belgrade, 1933.

Kirdetsov, G. U. *Vorot Petrograda 1919-1920*. (At the Gates of Petrograd). Berlin, 1921 Kislitsin, V. A. *V Ogne Grazhdanskoi Voini*. (In the Flames of the Civil War). Harbin, 1936.

Knox, Sir Alfred William Fortescue. *With the Russian Army 1914-1917*. London, 1921.

Konovalov, Serge - Editor. *Russo-Polish Relations*. Princeton, 1945.

Kornatovskii, N. *Borba za Krasnii Petrograd (1919)*. (Struggle for Red Petrograd). Leningrad, 1929.

Kornatovskii, N. *Geroicheskaia Oborona*. (The Heroic Defense). Leningrad, 1934.

Kovalevskii, P. E. *Istoricheskii Put Rossii*. (The Historical Path of Russia). Paris, 1946.

Kurlov, Pavel G. *Gibel Imperatorskoi Rossii*. (Destruction of Imperial Russia). Berlin, 1923.



Kuzmin-Karavaev, Vladimir D. *Obrazovanie Severo-Zapadnogo Pravitelstva*. (The Formation of the North-West Government). Helsingfors, 1919.

Lampe, A. A. von. *Prichini Neudachi Vooruzhennago Vistuplenia Belikh*. (The Reasons for the Failure of the Armed Uprisings of the Whites). Berlin, 1929.

Lansbury, George. *What I Saw in Russia*. New York, 1920.

Lawton, Lancelot. *The Russian Revolution*. London, 1927.

Leary, Daniel Bell. *Education and Autocracy in Russia from the Origins to the Bolsheviks*. Buffalo, 1919.

Lomonosov, Iurii V. *Memoirs of the Russian Revolution*. New York, 1919.

Maier, Nikita V. *Lebedinaia Pesn Petrograda*. (Swan Song of Petrograd). Sukhum, 1919.

Maksimov, Grigorii P. *The Guillotine at Work*. Chicago, 1940.

Margulies, Manuil. *God Interventsii (Sentiabr 1918-Dekabr 1920)*. (The Year of Intervention September 1918 - December 1920). Berlin, 1923.

Markovitch, Mme Marylie. *La Revolution Russe Vue par une Francaise*. (The Russian Revolution Through the Eyes of a Frenchman. Paris, 1918.

Marriott, Sir John Arthur Ransome. *Anglo-Russian Relations 1689-1943*. London, 1944.

Maslovskii, E. V. *Mirovaia Voina na Kavkazkom Fronte 1914-1917*. The World War on the Caucasian Front 1914-1917. Paris, 1933.

Mavrogan, A. *Grazhdanskaia Voina v. Rossii (1918-1920)*. (Civil War in Russia (1918-1920)). Moscow, 1927.

Meiendorf, Aleksandr F. *The Background of the Russian Revolution*. New York, 1929.



- Melgunov, Sergie P. *“Krasnii Terror” V Rossii*. (Red Terror in Russia). Berlin, 1924. -
- Menkevits, Nikolai A. *La Decomposition de l’Armee Russe*. (The Disintegration o the Russian Army). Paris, 1919.
- Miliukov, Pavel N. *Histoire de Russie*. (History of Russia). Paris, 1933.
- Miliukov, Pavel N. *Istoria Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii*. (History of the Second Russian Revolution). Sofia Bulgaria, 1921.
- Mirskii, Dimitrii P. *Russia a Social History*. New York, 1931.
- Nazanskii, V. I. *Krushenie Velikoi Rossii i Doma Romanovikh*. (The Crash of Great Russia and of the House of Romanov). Paris, 1930.
- No Author Given. *The Soviet Union, Finland and the Baltic States*. Soviet War News, (No Date).
- Nolde, Boris E. *L’ancien Regime et la Revolution Russe*. (The Ancient Regime and the Russian Revolution). Paris, 1928.
- Oberuchev, K. M. *Ofitseri v Russkoi Revoliutsii*. (Officers at the Time of the Russian Revolution). U.S.A. (No Date).
- Olsen (pseud.), *Uzhasi Chrezvichaiek*. (The Horrors of the Soviet Secret Police). Rostov On Don, 1919.
- Paliei, Olga V. (Karnovich). *Memories of Russia 1916-1919*. London, 1924.
- Paleologue, Georges Maurice. *L’ecroulement du Tsarisme*. (The Crash of Tsarism). Paris, 1939.
- Pares, Sir Bernard. *A History of Russia*. New York, 1947.
- Platonov, Sergiei F. *History of Russia*. New York. 1925.
- Platonov, Sergiei F. *Lektsii po Russkoi Istorii*. (Lecture on Russian History). St. Petersburg, 1901.



Podvoiskii, Nikolai I. *Kommunari Zashchishchaiut Krasnii Petrograd*. (Communists Defend Red Petrograd). Moscow, 1927.

Pokrovskii, Mikhail N. *Brief History of Russia*. New York, 1933.

Pollock, John. *The Bolshevik Adventure*. New York, 1920.

Pollock, John. *War and Revolution in Russia*. London, 1918.

Poole, Ernest. *The Village: Russian Impressions*. New York, 1919.

Popov, K. G. *G. Ofitseri*. (Officers) Paris, 1929.

Popov, K. *Hram Slavi*. (Temple of Glory). Paris, 1931.

Pozner, S. M. *Dela i Dni Petrograda 1917-1921* (The Days of Petrograd 1917-1921). Berlin, 1923.

Prioe, Morgan Philips. *My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution*. London, 1921.

Pukhov, S. *Kak Vooruzhalsia Petrograd 1918-1919*. (How Petrograd was Fortified 1918-1919). Moscow, 1933.

Rabinovich, Samuil E. *Istoria Grazhdanskoi Voini*. (History of the Civil War). Moscow, 1935.

Reed, John. *Ten Days that Shook the World*. New York, 1919.

Rivet, Charles. *The Last of the Romanofs*. London, 1918.

Ross, Edward A. *Russia in Upheaval*. New York, 1919.

Rostorguev, L. P. *The Revolution and the Unity of Russia*. London, 1919.

Sack, Arkady J. *The Birth of Russian Democracy*. New York, 1920.

Schuman, Frederick Lewis. *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*. New York, 1928.



Stearns, Muriel. *British Relations with Russia from the Armistice to the Signing of the Trade Agreement*. Stanford University, 1931

Shestakov, Andree V. *Bolsheviki i Krestianstvo v Revoliutsii 1917 goda*. (Bolsheviks and the Peasantry in the Revolution). Moscow, 1921.

Shklovskii, Isaak V. *Russia Under the Bolsheviks*. London, 1919.

Shliapnikov, Aleksandr G. *Les Allies Contre la Russie Avant Pedant et Apres la Guerre Mondiale*. (The Allies Against Russia Before, During and After the World War). Paris, 1926.

Sisson, Edgar Grant. *One Hundred Red Days*. London, 1931.

Sloves, Ch. *La France et l'Union Sovietique*. (France and the Soviet Union). Paris, 1935.

Sobolevits, Elias. *Les Etats Balte et la Russie Sovietique (Relation Internationales Jusq'en 1928)*. The Baltic States and the Soviet Union (Foreign Relations to 1928). Paris, 1930.

Sokolov, K.N. *Pravlenie Generala Denikina*. (The Rule of General Denikin). Sofia, 1921.

Solomon, Georgii A. *Sredi Krasnikh Vozhdei*. (Among the Red Leaders). Paris, 1931.

Sorokin, Pitirim A. *Leaves from a Russian Diary*. New York, 1924.

Spargo, John. *Bolshevism, the Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy*. New York, 1919.

Spinka, Mathew. *The Church and the Russian Revolution*. New York, 1919.

Struve, Petr B. *Razmishlenia o Russkoi Revoliutsii*. (Thoughts Concerning the Russian Revolution). Sofia, 1921.



Svechnikov, M. S. *Revoliutsia i Grazhdanskaia Voina v Finlandii 1917-1918*. (Revolution and the Civil War in Finland). Moscow, 1923.

Tal, Boris M. *Istoria Krasnoi Armii*. (History of the Red Army). Moscow, 1928.

Thompson, William B. *Pravda o Rossii i Bolshevikakh*. (The Truth About Russia and the Bolsheviks). New York. 1919.

Treviranus, Gottfried Reinhold. *Revolutions in Russia*. New York, 1944.

Trotskii, Lev. *Istoria Russkoi Revoliutsii*. (History of the Russian Revolution). Berlin. 1933.

Trotskii, Lev. *Boi za Peterburg*. (The Battle for Petrograd). St. Petersburg, 1920.

Vandervelde, Emile. *Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution*. London, 1918.

Varsher, Tatiana. *Vidennoe i Perezhitoe*. (What I Saw and Experienced). Berlin, 1923.

Vaucher, Robert. *L'enfer Bolshevik a Petrograd*. (Bolshevik Hell at Petrograd). Paris, 1919.

Veltman, Mikhail L. *Sovetskaia Rossia i Kapitalisticheskaia Frantsia*. (Soviet Russia and Capitalistic France). Moscow, 1922.

Vernadskii, Georgii V. *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia*. Boston, 1936.

Vitols, Hugo. *La Mer Baltique et les Etates Baltes*. (The Baltic Sea and the Baltic States). Paris, 1935.

Vodovozov, Vasilii. *Voina I Revoliutsia*. (War and Revolution). Petrograd, 1917.



Wesselitsky, Gabriel. *Russia and Democracy*. London, 1915.

Xydias, Jean. *La intervention Francaise en Russie 1918-1919*. (French Intervention in Russia 1918-1919). Paris, 1927.

IV. Periodical Literature

Arkhiv Grazhdanakoi Voini. (Archives of the Civil War). Edited by Russkoe Tverchestvo. Berlin, (No date).

Arkhiv Russoi Revoliutsii. (Archives of the Revolution). 21 vols. Edited by T. V. Gessen. Berlin 1923.

Belii Arkhiv. (White Archives). 3 vols. Paris, 1926.

Beloe Delo. (White Action). 7 vols. Edited by von Lampe. Berlin, 1926.

