Arms of Valor

Pavlo Shandruk

1. The Eve and the First Days of the Russian Revolution

Toward the end of 1916 I was in command of the 3rd Battalion, 232nd Reserve Infantry Regiment in the city of Tver. Attached to this battalion was a special company of draftees, numbering a little over 80 men who had completed higher or at least secondary education. I was often surprised at that time and forced to give thought to the somewhat aggressive behavior of those men toward their superiors and non-commissioned officers. Those educated draftees had not as yet completed their basic training and hence could not be appointed to non-commissioned command posts in their company. As a result of my social contacts with them (obviously within the bounds of the existing discipline within the Tsarist Army), I made attempts to get at the cause of their odd behavior through personal talks. From conversations with them I concluded that they had been informed, mostly by relatives visiting them on Sundays and holidays, even from such distant places as Kharkiv or Kiev, that the war would come to an early end with completely unexpected consequences. The men of Ukrainian origin were especially outspoken with me, knowing that I was an Ukrainian, too. In spite of such an attitude on the part of this Company, its commander, Lt. Omelchenko, and I managed to make it take so much training that the commander of the 32nd Reserve Brigade, Gen. Pigulevsky, assembled all battalion commanders and chiefs of N.C.O. Schools of the 42nd Brigade one fall day in order to demonstrate to them the arms and field training of that Company. I had some experience in this respect because prior to taking over command of the battalion, I had been in charge of the regimental school for non-commissioned officers. My battalion, moreover, despite certain laxity of discipline due to the war and the fact that a majority of its ranks consisted of so-called draftees of the second call (38 to 42 years of age), was awarded first place in the sharpshooting contest of the entire Moscow Military District, then under the command of General Morozovsky. The battalion also received first place in the brigade classification conducted by Gen. Morozovsky's deputy, General Syla-Novitsky, who was of Ukrainian origin. In the regiment, the battalion had the designation "disciplinary," but not in the punitive sense, only to denote its high discipline. Regardless of my rigorous service demands, off-duty I was merely an older colleague to my men and this fact stood me in good stead during the first days of the revolution.

I did not feel alarmed, but out of curiosity at the behavior of my men, I told my regimental commander, Col. Shastin, about it. He immediately decided to dispatch the chief of regimental intelligence to Petrograd to get at the root of the situation. The man dispatched was Lt. Ivanov, and on his return from Petrograd Col. Shastin called a secret officers' meeting and reported that there was a threat of a strike in heavy industry in Petrograd, and even chances of revolution breaking out. It should be noted that the largest arms and munitions plants were located in the Petrograd area: Petrogradsky, Petrozavodsky, Putilovsky, Sestroretsky, Ladozhsky, Continental and others. They were the largest in Russia and considerably increased in size and production since the beginning of the war. Col. Shastin added that the numerous and unreliable Petrograd garrison would also have to be considered, as the Guard Regiments are composed chiefly of Ukrainians. At that point the Colonel cast a meaningful look at me and at Captain I. Marchenko, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 232nd Regiment, who was sitting next to me.

The Tver Garrison consisted of three infantry regiments, an artillery division, a regiment of Don Cossacks and the well-known Tver Cavalry School – a total of about 40,000 men.

For the time being everything went on as before: training, rifle practice and dispatch of marching companies to the Front. Came New Year's and all the traditional celebrations in the regiments were

cancelled. Newspapers arrived late, but nothing was to be found in them, due to the censorship, anyway. We knew through "scuttlebutt" that a new Government had been formed, headed by the notorious member of the "Black Hundreds," Goremykin. It is worth remarking that at that time there was a lot of surreptitious but very indignant talk among the officers about the leading role played at the Tsar's Court by the charlatan Grigori Rasputin, who claimed to be able to cure the heir apparent, the Tsarevich Alexis of hemophilia. This was the cause of his hold upon the Tsaritza; and now Goremykin was Rasputin's protegee. Reports reached us late in February that a group of Russian aristocrats, headed by Prince Yusupov had killed Rasputin; that there were strikes and riots in Petrograd, so far of an economic nature, but that troops sent to put down the strikes had refused to obey orders. On March 4, 1917 Colonel Shastin assembled all regimental officers and announced that revolution had broken out in Petrograd and Moscow and that the Tsar had renounced the throne in his own and his heir's name.

Out of nowhere, like "Phoenix from the ashes" the regiment was suddenly overflowing with all sorts of agitators and revolutionaries wearing leather jackets. They immediately proceeded to establish "Soviets (councils) of Soldiers' Deputies" in all regiments of our garrison, following the example of near-by Moscow. These councils assumed the role of military authorities and our council removed Colonel Shastin, appointing Lt. Col. Lukashevsky in his place. The men disliked Col. Shastin solely because of his melancholy nature. He was a very liberal and sincere man, and the change in him occurred probably as a result of a serious wound at the Front. Fearful lest the agitated masses of soldiers kill him, I got in touch with Lt. Col. Lukashevsky and took Shastin to a near-by monastery; it was probably during the night of March 5th. I felt safe for the time being, the "Soviets" (councils) of the battalion and of the regiment having "confirmed" me in my position. A noted demagogue and a man without character, Lt.-Col. Pogorelov was "elected" chief of the Tver Garrison. Thus, the entire command of the garrison was completely taken over by the garrison councils. The next day, when complete anarchy reigned in the city, Lt.-Col. Pogorelov appointed me "chief of guards" in the city and I was required to restore a semblance of order. While I was serving in this capacity, however, some provocateurs killed General Chekhovsky who had arrived from Moscow to conduct an inspection on orders of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies (he was probably a brother of the well-known Ukrainian political leader, Professor V. Chekhovsky). The provocateurs immediately accused me of neglect of duty as commander of the guards and arrested me. When reports of my arrest reached my battalion, the men armed themselves with live ammunition and, accompanied by the regimental band, marched from the barracks to the city, to liberate me. Along their march they were joined by the Don Cossacks and the men of the Officers' School. The Garrison Soviet became apprehensive that it might be court-martialled, but chiefly, as I was able to find out later, that I might be proclaimed chief of the garrison, a delegation was therefore sent to me to City Hall where I was being temporarily detained under parole arrest. The purpose was to talk to me so that I would induce my men to go back to their barracks. Naturally, I was informed that I was free. I went out to my soldiers and told them that I was free and that they should go back without causing any trouble. I went back, however, to my place of confinement where I felt safer, and told the Soviet that I demanded an investigation of the killing of General Chekhovsky and until such an investigation was completed, I would voluntarily remain under arrest. The fact that members of the Soviet tried to induce me to leave for my home made me see clearly that I could save my life only if I remained where I was, under arrest. The investigation was conducted by a lawyer, a classmate of mine from the Aleksievska Military School in Moscow, Captain M. Ruzhytsky, subsequently a Colonel and Chief Prosecutor of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. He issued an order for my immediate release. I assume that this entire provocation against me was caused by my attempts to have separate detachments of Ukrainians established out of the Tver Garrison. My Ukrainian colleagues and I had demanded that one of the garrison regiments be made exclusively Ukrainian. Following my release I requested Lt.-Col. Lukashevsky to assign me immediately to the Front, to my own 70th Ryazhesk Regiment which covered a sector of the Front near Dvinsk. That same night I left on a brief furlough. All the officers accompanied me to the station, along with many soldiers from my battalion; but there were also lurking quite a few suspicious-looking people. The reason they did not take a chance and attack me

was the presence of a large number of my soldiers.

After my furlough, I joined my regiment at the Front. Here the atmosphere was entirely different, as it would be, facing the enemy. The regiment had a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, too, but acting merely in an advisory capacity attached to the Commandant, and concerned mainly with economic matters. I did not have an official assignment because all posts were filled, therefore I remained on special orders of the regimental commander, Col. Soloviev. The Regimental Soviet, however, soon proposed that I be appointed chairman of the Regimental Economic Committee.

A rumor began spreading early in June that an offensive would be mounted on the entire Western Front and on the Caucasian Front at the same time. In this connection on June 12, Dvinsk was visited by the favorite son of the revolution, the Socialist-Revolutionary Prime Minister and Minister of War of the Provisional Russian Government, Alexander Kerensky. Each regiment picked a delegation and Kerensky was to address the delegates. I was in charge of the delegation of my regiment. Over 1,000 delegates from the entire North-western Front assembled in the huge hall of the Dvinsk railroad station. After a fairly long wait, Kerensky finally appeared in the entourage of generals A. Dragomirov, Yu. Danilov, Budberg and others. The first impression was unfavorable: semi-military dress, all hatless and Kerensky in a fatigue cap; earthy-grey face, nervous movements. He began his address: no enthusiasm, only sporadic shouts by demagogues about the heroes of the revolution, appeals to the patriotic feelings of the soldiers and workers (whose only concern at that time was "let's go home, war without annexations or contributions") to defend "our common one and indivisible mother Russia." During his address Kerensky kept losing his false teeth and waving his arms; this detracted from his speech and caused ironic smiles in the audience. He went on like that for about half an hour and I thought that it would certainly not be he to lead Russia out of the chaos of the revolution. When two Non-Coms and I, who were the delegates of our regiment, were leaving the hall I asked them about their impressions. One of them, Sgt. Skidanenko, said: "the same impression as yours." I understood what he meant.

The so-called Brusilov Offensive started on June 18. But rumors notwithstanding, it was launched only on the Southwestern Front, and faced by the fire of German and Austrian artillery, it broke down on the second day. The offensive was not simultaneous, only in stages, and the attack on the Northern Front began only on July 8th, and ended the same day. After this June offensive, a "fraternization" initiated by the Germans went on on all fronts, with barter trade going on between the opposing lines. For all practical purposes the war was over.

We Ukrainians knew that the Central Rada with Prof. Michael Hrushevsky at its head was functioning in Kiev. It was a kind of parliament with the so-called Secretariat acting as a Government. We had been waiting keenly for someone from among the top leadership of the Ukrainian national movement to visit us and to tell us what we should do. As early as May, we had formed a Ukrainian national battalion out of the 18th Infantry Division and we had our Ukrainian banner. The battalion had over fifteen hundred men, I was in command and Captain Petrenko was my aide. We sent our delegates to the Central Rada in Kiev, but they never came back to the regiment.

In August food shortages became so acute that our regimental Soviet, on the initiative of two Non-Coms from Siberia, decided to send the Committee to Siberia to purchase meat and flour. The Division Soviet took over the idea and appointed me to head the Committee. It took us two weeks to reach Barnaul because railroads were completely disorganized, particularly in connection with the action of General Krimov who was marching on Petrograd at the head of a cavalry corps in defense of the Kerensky Provisional Government. It became known much later that Krimov killed himself and the corps was disarmed by units of the Petrograd Garrison when they were approaching Petrograd. Kerensky, however, managed to escape from Petrograd.

It was none other than Kerensky, acting as Prime Minister, who opposed the demands of the Ukrainian Central Rada merely to recognize home-rule for Ukraine and he issued an order to halt

Ukrainianization of the armed forces at the Front and in the hinterland alleging that this would undermine the defensive power of Russia; this, however, was merely a pretext. The order did not help because there was no power which could be used against the soldiers of Ukrainian and other nationalities who were following the Ukrainian example and emancipating themselves. It was quite natural for the Ukrainian soldiers to follow the voice of national and patriotic duty, but still, there was quite a numerous part who followed the voice of self-preservation and nostalgia. They wanted to go home, and in this they followed the example of the Muscovites who had become completely anarchized and began robbing military and private property, wrecking railroad stations (especially restaurants) and freight cars on the way to their homes. It comes to mind frequently, when I recall those days, that the Communist rulers deliberately permitted the worst instincts of men to get the better of them at that time in order to promote chaos, but right after the revolution the strictest kind of discipline was introduced. All Ukrainian detachments were completely disciplined and because of this fact, both Governments, that of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Russian Provisional, kept receiving requests from cities, towns, villages, factories and railroads to provide Ukrainian soldiers for their protection. Regular pitched battles were frequently joined between Ukrainian and Russian units, or groups of deserters, which always ended in victory of the Ukrainians, but which caused the Muscovites to hate the Ukrainians. On the infrequent occasions of Russian victory, the Muscovite bands usually disarmed the Ukrainians and shot them on the spot. But such incidents passed unnoticed by the Moscow Government and Command and nobody was ever punished.

All sources of Ukrainian memoiristic literature covering that period and historiography indicate that Congresses of Ukrainian soldiers were held in May and June 1917 and sailors of the Black Sea Fleet attended the latter, having hoisted the Ukrainian banner over that part of the former Imperial Navy. The Congresses elected a Ukrainian Military Committee headed by Simon Petlura and recommended that he proceed immediately with the establishment of new Ukrainian military formations and continue to Ukrainianize units of the Russian Army. It is significant that Kerensky prohibited these Congresses. Since that time there began formation, albeit on a very small scale, of exclusively Ukrainian units, mainly defensive. Formed in Kiev was the 1st Bohdan Khmelnytsky Infantry Regiment, in Kharkiv the Slobidsky Corps, in Chernihiv and Chyhyryn so-called Free Cossacks; also guard companies and battalions for the protection of important railroad junctions, such as Zhmerynka, Birzula, Koziatyn, Shepetivka and others, against plundering and to force demobilized Russian echelons from the southern and southwestern fronts to pass through northern junctions, by-passing Ukraine. Ukrainianization of the 34th Army Corps began in June; it was under the command of General P. Skoropadsky, later, in 1918, Hetman of Ukraine.

Meanwhile I, and my two Sputniks (fellow-travelers) were in Siberia. Complete order still reigned there and prices in particular were at least 5 times lower than in Ukraine and European Russia. For example: in Kharkiv butter was 9 rubles a pound, while in Barnaul a 50-lb. barrel of export butter cost 40 rubles, i.e. 80 kopecks per pound. Gold rubles were in circulation here, while in Ukraine they had disappeared a year earlier. We purchased in Novosibirsk and Barnaul 3 carloads of meat, 1 carload of ham and 10,000 lbs. butter and, accompanied by one of my fellow-travelers all this was routed to Dvinsk on special orders of the Tomsk Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. I took advantage of the return trip to visit my wife who was staying with her mother in Kharkiv. This was the end of October, it had taken me three weeks to reach Kharkiv and from there I could not even attempt to get to Dvinsk because the Bolshevik coup d'etat had taken place in the meantime. Early in December the quartermaster of my regiment, Lt. Zhyvotiuk visited me in Kharkiv and told me about events in the regiment and on the front. On orders of the regimental Soviet, the regiment demobilized voluntarily late in September, while the Ukrainian battalion under the command of Capt. Petrenko reached Kiev. Lt. Zhyvotiuk also told me that he had seen Capt. Petrenko in Kiev, and the latter told him that when he had reported to the Secretary of Defense, Lt.-Col. Zhukovsky, asking what he was to do with the battalion which was waiting in railroad cars at the Kiev 2 station, the Secretary replied: "Demobilize. Ukraine is socialist and instead of a regular army we are going to have a militia." Of all the food loaded in Siberia, the regiment received only the ham, the rest was requisitioned in Moscow, said Lt. Zhyvotiuk.

The Bolshevik coup in Kharkiv was extremely bloody, the Communists executing about 6,000 officers. A local bookbinder, M. Rukhimovich, became head of the garrison. He was subsequently a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, a short and skinny man who distinguished himself by his brutality toward officers. He issued an order requiring registration of all military men and I, naturally, reported, although I became very nervous when the file clerk took my card to Rukhimovich's office. Officers who were standing in line for registration advised me to flee immediately, but I stayed. A few minutes later the file clerk came back and quite politely asked me to see the commander of the garrison. Mr. Rukhimovich offered me the job of his aide and commandant of the city. This put me in a hopeless position: I could neither refuse, nor accept. After thinking it over for a little while I said that I accepted in principle, but being without experience, I wanted another day for my final answer. Surprisingly, he agreed. Right after I got home I told my wife that she should move to her aunt's while I changed into a private's overcoat and cap and walked to the Lubotyn station, to take a train from there to the city of Lubni where my family was living. I knew that my brother Oleksander, a Captain in the same 70th Ryazhesk Regiment and commander of trench mortars, was already there. This was January 1918.

Rumors reached us in Lubni that under the attack of the Bolsheviks pressing from the north and east under the command of Muraviev, the Central Rada had left Kiev and moved to Zhytomir; that Kiev itself was engulfed by a revolt of Bolsheviks and it was being defended by the Slobidsky Corps under the command of Simon Petlura. At that time I knew nothing as yet about the proclamation of complete independence of Ukraine (proclaimed by the Central Rada in Kiev on January 22, 1918). In spite of a severe winter, my brother and I were hiding in a near-by forest visiting the house only at night to have something to eat and most important, to warm up. We always had our pistols drawn in the woods. Sometimes there was heavy firing in the city, and then we would not leave our hideout at all, which was in a stack of hay. Then, at twilight, our sister or mother would come out to us. Every other day the Communists came to our parents' house and inquired about me. My brother and I were hiding out like that for almost three weeks. Then my brother, for whom no inquiries were made, went home and I stayed in the woods.

By the end of January my brother brought me a telegram addressed to my father. It was from my wife in Kharkiv and its text was alarming. I set out for Kharkiv immediately: first on foot to the railroad station at Romodan, from there some farmers met by chance took me by sled all the way to Poltava and from there trains were still running to Kharkiv. I found out upon my arrival that some armed bandits had come to my wife's apartment and took her to an isolated spot. Her mother followed them from a distance and when she met a Red Army soldier she told him what had happened. He ran after the bandits immediately and ordered them to stop. They let my wife go and started running, but the soldier killed both.

News reached Kharkiv that a delegation of the Central Rada had signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest, under which Ukraine was to get military aid against the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks in Kharkiv were so absorbed by events and preparations to defend the city, and they had already finished their "purge," so I was left undisturbed, without, however, leaving a house where I was completely unknown. The next news was that German troops were advancing into Ukraine, that they had liberated Kiev with the Central Rada returning there and that Ukrainian troops were closing on Poltava with the Germans. After checking this news, I left one night in the direction of Poltava and then Romodan. Near Solonytsia I was caught in a cross-fire: a battle was going on between Ukrainian troops and Bolsheviks, with the division of Commander Otaman Natiyev attacking, as I found out later. The Bolsheviks pushed a rifle in my hands and dispatched me to the right wing of the battle along with 11 soldiers. When I heard that they were all speaking Ukrainian, I led them away from the fighting line and when we were all alone, I ordered them to put their arms on the ground and to sit down fifty paces away. I covered them with my rifle. About 30 minutes later all firing ceased at the Romodan station and I saw two trains pull out in the direction of Poltava. The Bolsheviks were withdrawing. Right away we heard the clatter of horses hoofs and we were attacked by cavalry. But when they saw that we were without arms, they stopped and I told

them of my adventure. This was a cavalry company of the Zaporozhian Division under the command of Captain Rimsky-Korsakov. There I joined an armored car detachment and was placed in command of an armored car armed with a mountain cannon. I immediately christened the car "Polubotok" the name of a famous Ukrainian Hetman. Colonel S. Merezhynsky was in command of the armored car division.

2. The March on the Crimea

After the fall of Romodan the Reds only defended Poltava, and the Zaporozhian Division took it in the last days of March. The Bolsheviks fled Poltava toward Kharkiv and strongly fortified the western and northern suburbs of that city, putting a particularly strong force in the vicinity of the Lubotyn railroad station. Helped by German artillery, the Zaporozhians captured Kharkiv on April 6. In Lubotyn we found many bodies of sailors of the Black Sea Fleet who had taken part in the defense of Kharkiv. Finally the horrible days of Kharkiv were behind us.

It was very interesting that when Commander Natiyev announced that he would accept volunteers into his Division, only about twenty officers applied, but as usual, a large number of Cossacks joined (former soldiers of the Russian Army, of Ukrainian nationality, will be referred to by the Ukrainian designation "Cossacks"), All officers of Russian nationality who were still alive, were extremely hostile to the idea of Ukrainian independence, in spite of the fact that they sought asylum in Ukraine from the Bolsheviks. They did not, however, consider it their duty to defend Ukraine, preferring to work as waiters in restaurants, ostentatiously wearing their uniforms and medals: whom would they impress by this foolish demonstration? The same phenomenon could be observed again in November and December, even on a larger scale.

Due to the great influx of volunteers, the Germans having prohibited mobilization, the Zaporozhian Division was enlarged into a Corps, and when we were leaving Kharkiv for the South it took two days for the Corps to embark aboard railroad cars. I mention railroad cars advisedly because at that time warfare was conducted along rail lines, and only cavalry (the Haydamak Cavalry Regiment under the command of Col. V. Petriv, and the Mountain Artillery Mounted Division under Col. S. Almazov) could effect cross-country marches.

Thus, after two days, we reached the station of Lozova, and part of our Corps under the command of Commander P. Bolbochan was formed into the so-called Crimean group which marched on the Crimea through Oleksandrivske and Melitopil, while the other part marched via Kupiansk and Yuzivka to capture the Donbas industrial region. On orders of Commander Bolbochan, at Lozova station I constructed an improvised armored train from steel coal-hoppers cars, which we lined with pressed straw on the inside, and mounted behind steel plates, also reinforced in back with pressed straw, four machine guns and a three-inch cannon, plus two machine guns in reserve. One machine gun was in front of the train and on one flat car we carried my armored car **Polubotok** to be used on plain roads in case of need. The crew of the armored train consisted of four officers and a number of men, one of the officers being Lieut. S. Han, a member of the Central Rada who would rather fight than play politics. The base of our armored train was to be a troop-train consisting of one infantry battalion, one artillery battery, and one machine gun company under the command of my brother. On April 12 after a forced movement forward I reached Oleksandrivske, dispersing the Reds who offered resistance at every station and mined the tracks. Fortunately they were so inept at mine-laying and my train came at such high speed that the mines exploded behind us. Only once did we hit a pyroxylin charge which twisted the rails; we fixed the damage in a few hours, however, and the train went on. At that time I found out about the misunderstandings between our troops and the Germans who wanted to treat Ukraine as an occupied country, immediately requisitioning all goods on trains and at stations and shipping them back to Germany, and wanted to issued orders to our armed forces.

At the station of Oleksandrivske we made our first encounter with Austrian troops, they were the Ukrainian Sitch Riflemen (USS) under the command of Archduke Wilhelm Hapsburg, the Ukrainianized Colonel Vasyl Vyshyvany,[1] but we did not have time to tarry long with them. Toward the evening, as my armored train was nearing Melitopil, looking through my field glasses I

[1] Certain Austro-Hungarian monarchial circles intended to proclaim Archduke Vasyl Vyshyvany - son of Archduke Stephen, a candidate for the Polish throne – as king of Ukraine. Some Ukrainian circles had this intention, too.

saw a barricade and people on the track ahead. Presuming that they were Bolsheviks, I ordered my men to open fire, but thereupon the old Russian tri-color flag was raised over the barricade. We got close and found out that this was a White Guard Russian detachment of Colonel Drozdovsky, fighting its way toward the Don, where a Cossack State of the Don had been established. That state had also been taken over by the Bolsheviks, in spite of the Cossacks' stiff resistance under the leadership of General Kaledin, The Volunteer Army of General Kornilov was supposed to come to Kaledin's aid marching from the Kuban, and the Don Cossacks also expected German help. Colonel Drozdovsky would not let us enter the Melitopil station, of which I informed my commander, Otaman Bolbochan. Drozdovsky's and our parliamentarians finally agreed that Drozdovsky's troops would leave Melitopil the next morning. When we entered Melitopil, we found out that the depot with all surrounding tracks as well as the streets of the city were covered with mountains of corpses: those were not only of Bolshevik soldiers, but all suspected of aiding them, and particularly Jews.

I was called to report to Otaman Bolbochan at the Melitopil depot. He briefed me on the situation and told me what to do. It appeared that in spite of the protests of the Central Rada and his own, the Germans present here were set on reaching Sevastopol as soon as possible. They wanted to capture its port and docks, as well as the warships based there and we would not allow this, even if we had to use force. Therefore, I would have to accommodate one company of infantry with machine guns on my armored train immediately and set out across the Crimean Isthmus (Perekop), possibly ahead of the Germans who also had an armored train and were reported to be defending the crossing north of Dzhankoy. I was then to proceed to Simferopil and then to Sevastopol where Ukrainian sailors, who had already made contact with us, would help us, and with our appearance again hoist Ukrainian flags over the fort and warships. In order that the sailors know that we were Ukrainian troops, Otaman Bolbochan gave me two Ukrainian flags and ordered them displayed on the armored train.

After consulting my crew I decided to take the armored train across Perekop and through Dzhankoy at full speed, in order to surprise the enemy. To lessen the risk of wrecking the armored train and especially in order to protect the men, I ordered a motor trolley manned by a machine gun crew to precede us by about half a mile. This way we forced our way across Sivash Bay to Dzhankoy, firing heavily all around us. We had no losses, although we were under heavy fire near Dzhankoy. The next day, on the approaches to Simferopil, we encountered a calvary unit of Crimean Tatars who had taken up arms against the Bolsheviks. They told us that the bridge over the Salhir river near Simferopil was mined and that the depot was heavily manned by sailors who had an armored train and cannon on the track. I advised the Tatar commander to proceed north along the highway and he would meet the Cavalry Regiment of Colonel Petriv going along this highway. The Crimean Tatars, like all the other nations of the former Russian Empire, proclaimed their independence and had a Parliament (Kurultai) and Government, but the Bolsheviks liquidated them in their usual way. The native Tatar population of the Crimea constituted only 22-25% of the total, with about 40% Russians who were on the side of the Bolsheviks. The remaining population were Ukrainians, Greeks and Armenians. The Russian population of the Crimea wantonly killed the Tatars and plundered their property.

When our armored train was getting close to Simferopil, residents of buildings near the station shouted to us that the bridge across the Salhir was mined. Buildings obscured the view of the curve leading to the station for more than a mile, but we took a close look at the bridge and saw that surprisingly no one was defending it, nor were there any traces of mines. Observing the station from behind houses, we saw a real armored train under steam and people running around it. My artillery and machine gun crew were ready to open fire without orders, because if the Bolsheviks were ready to shoot, then the fate of our train could be decided in a fraction of a second. When our train cleared the curve so that our cannon could be aimed, we fired several rounds, but the red armored train did not reply. We continued forward, and then the red train left the station under full steam with sailors boarding it in motion. We stopped at the station for a few minutes and I left a platoon of Cossacks with two machine guns. Our train moved ahead, and although fired upon by red artillery from a

distance, we reached the station of Bulhanak by nightfall. I posted guards on surrounding hills and we rested all night. I returned to Simferopil on the motor trolley and found it occupied by Col. Petriv's cavalry. The local population had given a warm welcome to our commander, Otaman Bolbochan and a present was left for the crew of our armored train by the Tatars, a barrel of "Isabella" wine. I was surprised when Otaman Bolbochan ordered me not to proceed any farther, but to let a German armored train pass and then come back to Simferopil. The German train passed us at dawn proceeding south, but it did not reach the station of Alma because of strong red artillery fire from their armored train and field positions. The Commander of the German armored train, Oberleutnant Schmidt (I met him again in 1944, when he was a Major in the reserve and German "Orts-Komandant" of the city of Skierniewice in Poland) requested help, I ordered my train forward and both our armored trains drove the Bolsheviks away and I returned to Simferopil. There I saw an extraordinary sight: the depot was in the hands of Ukrainian Cossacks manning machine guns and facing them in a circle around the depot were German troops, with machine guns, too.

The Commander of the German division, General Kosch, had demanded that Otaman Bolbochan withdraw our troops beyond Perekop, but Bolbochan refused to move without orders from our Government. Our orders to move north finally came that afternoon and the Germans began to take over the station. The city, however, was in our hands, as it would take Col. Petriv and Col. Almazov at least twenty-four hours to effect evacuation of their troops. In this confusion – and this is a true story – our Cossacks managed to remove breech-locks from two German machine guns, but Otaman Bolbochan ordered me to return them when we found out that the German machine gun crews would be court-martialled for their lack of vigilance and would face the firing squad.

On a siding in Simferopil we found two freight cars full of the finest tobacco in the world, made by the firms Stamboli and Mesaksoudi. Their specialty was the fine and expensive tobacco No. 40 and 60, and their highest grades No. 80, 120 and 140 were supplied to the Tsar's court. My boys brought me several boxes of No. 140 as war booty. I don't smoke myself, but I kept the tobacco in my compartment and offered smokes to my guests: it was the most wonderful aroma imaginable.

Following orders of the Government, the army group of Otaman Bolbochan proceeded to the city of Slavyansk near Kharkiv, in the rear of Col. Sikevych's Operational Group which had the task of clearing the Donbas of reds.

It should be noted that by early May 1918 all Ukraine had been cleared of Bolsheviks and part of our Zaporozhian Corps was stationed east of Starobilsk, while another held the frontier north of Chernihiv all along with German troops.

3. In the Commandantura of Kharkiv

On our way to Slavyansk we were informed that there had been a coup-d'etat in Kiev: with German help, the Congress of Landowners elected General Pavlo Skoropadsky to the office of Hetman of all Ukraine. Within the Zaporozhian Corps, which wished to follow the old tradition of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and generally had democratic leanings, the opinion on the change of Government was divided. Part of the Corps was opposed to the Hetmanate and Col. Petriv was its chief spokesman, while another part believed that the Hetman, being an old soldier, would preserve order in Ukraine. This was imperative in Ukraine at that time due to the Bolshevik threat and it would also be beneficial to curb the overly individualistic Ukrainians. It was also hoped that the Hetman would be capable of dealing with the Germans who had begun to behave like conquerors in Ukraine, and not like allies.

There being no immediate prospects of action for my armored train and mobile artillery, I decided to take a furlough and visit my family in Kharkiv. On arrival in Kharkiv I registered in the local Commandantura. There, I made the acquaintance of chief of the Commandantura office Captain Borys V. Homzyn, a man of high intelligence and culture and, as I was to find out later, a descendant of a noble Ukrainian family.

I asked him whether I could perhaps be assigned to the Commandantura, in view of the fact that fighting operations were finished. After consulting the chief of the inspection department. Captain of Cavalry M. Dobrzanski (formerly of the 29th Regiment of Dragoons. I met him again later when he was a Lieut. Colonel in the Polish Cavalry Officers' School), Captain Homzyn went to the Commandant, Colonel Anisimov, and the latter assigned me to the Commandantura, with proper notification to the staff of the Zaporozhian Corps.

During the time that I worked in the Commandantura, i.e., from August 23rd to the uprising against the Hetman, there were no events worthy of note. While there, I met members of the Ukrainian National Association (UNS) who were opposed to the Hetman. On orders of the Commandant, I intervened frequently at the German Command in matters of arrests which the Germans made without consulting the Ukrainian authorities, although as a matter of principle these matters were within the competence of the Gubernial Commissar and district commissioners.

It became known in October that the Hetman had surrounded himself with former officers of the Tsarist army and appointed as Prime Minister V. Kolokoltsev, a well-known local leader of the Kharkiv Zemstvo (Zemstvo was a unit of local self-government under Tsarism) and Russian patriot, although a progressive.

Meanwhile the German and Austrian troops, following the defeat in the West and also due to Bolshevik propaganda, began to disintegrate. Their conduct toward the local Ukrainian population, on which they levied a tax in kind, over the protest of the Ukrainian Government, and which they collected ruthlessly, dispatching armed detachments to the countryside and executing recalcitrant peasants; their wrecking of entire villages and restoration of land of the great estates to the landowners; and finally, exportation of huge quantities of chornozem (black top-soil) by the thousands of carloads to Germany, all this caused numerous riots and uprisings. The population was solidly against the Germans and this in turn could not remain without its due influence upon the Ukrainian military, and particularly upon the Zaporozhian Corps. The behavior of the Germans also swayed the feelings toward hostility to them of two Ukrainian divisions, the Synezhupannyky which had been formed in Germany and the Sirozhupannyky which had been formed in Austria, both recruited from among Ukrainians, former Russian prisoners of war. The political organization behind these military formations was the Association for Liberation of Ukraine, known by the letters SVU (Soyuz Vyzvolennya Ukrainy). Because of unrest in these divisions, the Germans partially demobilized them, in spite of the fact that they were excellent fighting units and indispensable for the defense of Ukraine. On top of all this, the Germans arrested Simon Petal who

was already a legendary hero to the whole country.

The gravest political error committed by Hetman Scoreboards was his signing, along with the Otaman of the Don Cossacks, P. Krasnov, on November 14, 1918, of an agreement in which Gen. Krasnov purported to be representing a "future Russia" promising federation of Ukraine with Russia. Our officer group was the first to find out about this, because the meeting and signing took place at a railroad station east of Kharkiv. This act of the Hetman, unwarranted by the existing political situation, placed the entire conscious Ukrainian community in opposition and the UNS then proclaimed an uprising against the Hetman. Faced with the pressure of public opinion, the Germans released Simon Petlura. To direct the movement against the Hetman and to restore to Ukraine all political rights provided for by the Fourth Universal Proclamation, the UNS elected a Directorate (Dyrektoria) composed of 5 prominent Ukrainian leaders: Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Simon Petlura, Fedir Shvets, Opanas Andrievsky and Andriy Makarenko. They represented all strata of society and all political trends of the country. The Zaporozhian Corps and all other military units which had been formed by the Hetman Government and even the so-called Serdyuk Division which consisted of the sons of wealthy farmers and was the Hetman's mainstay, all joined the rebels. The Directorate relied in the first days of the uprising mainly on the USS Legion (Ukrainian Sitch Riflemen) which was quartered in the area of Bila Tserkva near Kiev. The USS Legion, aided by demobilized former Tsarist soldiers from the neighborhood, attacked Kiev, defeated the Hetman's volunteer detachments which were composed chiefly of former Russian officers, and on December 15, 1918 the Directorate entered Kiev, the Hetman leaving for Germany.

Since that summer the Bolsheviks had been massing troops on the northern and eastern borders of Ukraine, whose nucleus consisted of alien brigades (Latvian, Bessarabian etc.) augmented by Moscow volunteers who proclaimed the motto "Ukraine does not give us bread – let's go to Ukraine after bread." And while the morale of German troops in Ukraine became shaky, the Bolsheviks made contact with German Councils of Soldiers' Deputies and got their promise that the Germans would maintain neutrality during an attack by the Bolsheviks against Ukraine. In return, the Bolsheviks promised the Germans peaceful return to Germany. Early in November large numbers of Bolshevik agitators appeared in Kharkiv, going first of all after railroad workers. With the eruption of the uprising against the Hetman, the great railroad yards of Kharkiv and the locomotive factory were completely dominated by the Bolsheviks. A Soviet of railroad management was set up and it refused to provide transportation which would bring parts of the Zaporozhian Corps to Kharkiv. There was a change in the Kharkiv military command. Prior to the uprising the Gubernial Commander of Kharkiv, with jurisdiction over all county commands, had been Colonel Myronenko-Vasiutynsky, who was replaced by Otaman P. Truba, Colonel M. Popsuy-Shapka replaced Col. Anisimov as city commander. The personnel of the Commandantura did not change, except that Captain H. Simantsiv became chief aide of Col. Popsuy-Shapka. Simantsiv was a very intelligent and energetic person, a leader of the Kharkiv branch of UNS and by his political convictions a socialist-revolutionary. The only armed force on which both commands could rely, the Gubernial and local, was the headquarters battalion of about 80 men under the command of Captain Havrylenko. I had been appointed chief of the Commandantura's technical department with the task of taking over all transportation means in Kharkiv, primarily the very few automobiles. In this role I made my appearance at the Soviet of the Southern Railroad, accompanied by only two non-coms of the headquarters company. In conversation with the chairman I demanded that orders be issued in my presence providing railroad transportation for units of the Zaporozhian Corps located at Kupianske station and anywhere else where representatives of the Corps would demand. I threatened that upon refusal I would arrest the entire Soviet and place them before a court-martial, with simultaneous appointment of experienced officers to manage the railroad and all stations. I pointed to the window and said: "Look and see that the building is surrounded with our patrols and no one is going to leave this place." I was lucky that none of them took up my challenge because there was not a single soldier in sight, but such a bluff could be pulled off only during those perilous times when human life was worth nothing. My ultimatum was accepted and the chairman of the Soviet issued orders right there in my presence that all commands of Ukrainian military

authorities should be complied with. This was an unexpected success, and as a result the very next day units of the Zaporozhian Corps under the command of Colonel I. Lytvynenko appeared on the streets of Kharkiv. An attempt by the Communized workers to seize the State Bank, the Telephone Exchange and Post Office was nipped in the bud and complete quiet reigned in Kharkiv. Colonel Popsuy-Shapka appealed to Ukrainian students and to the Ukrainian population of Kharkiv to establish units of self-defense in connection with the Bolshevik movement in the city and the approach of the reds from Bilhorod. Several thousand volunteered and the Commandantura organized them. This put us on 24-hour duty and all the sleep we could catch was on chairs.

It was only toward the end of November that we were informed about the "November Coup" in Galicia, where the Ukrainian National Council under Dr. Evhen Petrushevych seized power and declared the independence of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZOUNR), i.e. of all Ukrainian territories which had formerly been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Secretariat of Military Affairs under Colonel D. Vitovsky began organizing the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) taking advantage of reserves of the USS Legion as its center. There was no time for organization, however, since from the very first day the Poles, who had a military organization in Lviv, rose against the Ukrainian authorities in arms: this was the beginning of the Ukrainian-Polish war. Ukrainians were now compelled to fight on two fronts: east and west. We in Kharkiv were so absorbed in the struggle against the Bolsheviks that we knew little about events in Galicia, but news reached us soon that the Poles had taken Lviv and that the Directorate, in spite of a shortage of manpower to defend the front against the Bolsheviks, dispatched some units to help our Galician brothers. This was more in the nature of a display of national unity, just as the Galician USS Legion had been helping us politically and militarily; Meanwhile the Bolsheviks were pushing their way into Ukraine from the north and east. The volunteer self-defense units offered to go to the front lines, but this could not be done for lack of arms and difficulty in organizing supply lines, and of course, there was a great reluctance to send untrained young boys to the front. Nevertheless they did man the defense of several important points and one company was assigned to the chief of the Kharkiv militia. Students also helped in setting up defense posts and barricades which were to be manned by the Zaporozhian Corps. By Christmas the Bolsheviks were already close to Kharkiv. Fighting went on for a whole week, however, and only on December 31 Col. Truba issued orders to evacuate and proceed to Poltava. It was too late to do anything, but nevertheless Col. Truba ordered me to salvage the valuables from the vaults of the Bank. I was given several teams of horses hitched to sleighs and a guard of four officers. The Bolsheviks were already within the city limits. We had hardly finished loading three sleighs when local Bolsheviks opened fire on us from windows and the unloaded sleighs dispersed. We barely escaped with our lives, but managed to transfer everything to a train. Only some of our gallant youths joined the Zaporozhians and withdrew with us. When we were ready to start, we found out that the engineer had disappeared and we lost hope of ever leaving Kharkiv. When I had been in command of an armored train I had handled the throttle several times and volunteered to take the train out in view of the hopeless situation. I went quite slowly, but still I managed to reach Poltava and it was high time, because the Bolsheviks were approaching Poltava from Sumy! During a brief stop in the Poltava Depot, I was called to appear before Colonel Popsuy-Shapka and ordered to take over the command battalion, which was also being evacuated by the same train, from Capt. Havrylenko. According to Commander Truba's orders my unit would be completed to full strength from all county command companies which were marching toward Poltava. After completion, the battalion was to become a fighting unit in the Zaporozhian Corps as the Independent Zaporozhian Rifle Battalion. To complete its organization, the battalion was moved to the city of Lubni, but it also had combat duty in holding the front toward Romen and keeping a small garrison at the Hrebinka railroad station. Captain Havrylenko was to be either my aide or company commander.

4. 1919 Independent Zaporozhian Rifle Battalion

We all left for Lubni immediately and arrived there on January 4. I made a personal check of the personnel and material resources of the battalion: there were no weapons, no food, no supplies of any kind nor people to perform medical duties. Everyone had to scrounge for food by himself, and for lack of uniforms most soldiers wore civilian clothes; only one out of ten men had good shoes. I immediately appointed my brother Oleksander to the quartermaster command; although I was decidedly opposed to any form of nepotism, I had no other choice. Knowing my brother's knack for organization, I knew he would go out of his way to help me. As I have already noted, he had been staying in Lubni and had many friends there; he got in touch with the city administration and they gave him woolen goods for 100 uniforms and overcoats (there was a first-class woolen mill in Lubni, owned by S. Shemet the well-known Ukrainian leader of the land-owner-hetman movement). Local shoemakers received orders for 200 pairs of boots. From military warehouses we were issued weapons, utensils, mattresses, sheets and blankets.

We had to send part of our better-equipped men in the direction of Romen to Hrebinka, a very important railroad junction to us and the Zaporozhian Corps because it provided communication with Kiev. Within a few days we were able to produce a company of over 70 well-dressed and well-armed men which we paraded across the city making an impression upon the people: respect for us grew immediately and the population felt safe. It is interesting to note here that prior to our arrival in Lubni, a local communist sergeant formed a cavalry company in the village of Tymky, terrorizing Lubni and the entire neighborhood. The city even paid him 100,000 rubles ransom. As garrison commander I ordered a curfew to prevent night robberies and I called upon youth to volunteer for service in the battalion. About thirty local high school students volunteered, among them one Jew, Bukhman. My staff and myself, with part of the battalion, were quartered on a train in the station, as this facilitated better contact with Poltava, Kiev, Hrebinka and Romen. The guard in the direction of Romen was inspected by me daily. Everything looked all right, but my men noticed that some civilians, probably as a result of news coming through "scuttlebutt" were hostile toward them and called them hirelings of the bourgeoisie. There was good discipline and morale in the battalion and this was not to the liking of peasants who had been agitated by the Bolsheviks. Many Bolshevik agents swarmed over the countryside and I had neither the time nor the men to watch for the appearance of hostile agents. It was easy for them to penetrate into the villages in which no authorities were present. Warfare between the Bolsheviks and all Ukrainian Forces was waged along railroad lines: our forces were inadequate and because of winter we very rarely policed the villages, and not even the towns which were situated far from the railroad.

Among others, a classmate of mine from the Ostrih High School (Gymnasium), class of '07, V. Moshynsky, who was a teacher of mathematics at the time in the local girls' high school came to see me. He learned about me from posters and immediately stated that he was a Communist, but a Ukrainian one. He said that he condemned the Russian Bolsheviks' attack upon Ukraine and their undemocratic methods and political demagoguery, but that he was certain that the Moscow Bolsheviks would leave Ukraine when the war was over because, he alleged, they had been invited to Ukraine by the Ukrainian Bolshevik Government. He made a proposition to me that I should remain in Lubni on his assurance and join the reds when they come; he said that he knew the reds were in dire need of imaginative and experienced officers. He added that a Ukrainian Red Government was already functioning in Kharkiv and that its members were our classmates and colleagues: D. Z. Manuilsky, H. Lander and Georgi Pyatakov, who would certainly welcome me into the ranks of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Army. On my part I reminded him that we were Ukrainians and that at one time in high school we had been members of the Ukrainian "Hromada" which stood clearly aloof from Muscovite political trends. I added that I fully realized that the Bolsheviks would never leave Ukraine voluntarily. At the same time I expressed my surprise at his detailed information of what was going on in Kharkiv. When he saw that his talk had left me unconvinced, on taking his leave he said: "perhaps you are right, we shall see." Indeed, later that

year, in August, he was executed by the Bolsheviks for his attitude of opposition in spite of the fact that he had held the high position of commissar of the province of Zhytomir.

Within a few days, a delegate of our Government, Mr. Stepan Skrypnyk[1] came to me from Kiev with orders to evacuate the county state treasury. He was the first to tell me that Simon Petlura had been designated by the Directorate as commander-in-chief with the title of Chief Otaman of the Armies of the Ukrainian National Republic. Out of the money requisitioned in the county treasury, S. Skrypnyk gave me 20,000 rubles (their value was about 500 pre-war rubles) for the needs of the battalion. This was the first sum which gave me an opportunity to purchase a lot of indispensable things, primarily medical supplies, and to pay each soldier 25 rubles.

Within days the battalion was engaged in action. Captain Musiyenko informed me from Hrebinka by telephone that he was engaged in battle with a Bolshevik band which was approaching Hrebinka from Drabova-Baryatynska; the attack of the band was temporarily repelled, probably with great losses, but the Captain feared that he might become surrounded at night because the band was ten times as strong as his forces and fought in full battle order. I took two platoons and immediately left for Hrebinka and, along with Capt. Musiyenko, led an attack toward Drabova: as a result we simply dispersed that company with machine gun fire. I had to reinforce Capt. Musiyenko, however, leaving him one of my platoons, and I ordered him to keep strong patrols on the outskirts of Hrebinka.

That same day an improvised armored train entered the Lubni station quite unexpectedly from the direction of Hrebinka. Capt. Musiyenko could not warn me in time due to a disruption of telephone and telegraph communications which shortly, however, we succeeded in restoring. There were about 30 men on the train under Otaman Myasnyk. At first, it was hard to find out from his words and behavior what he had come for, but his mysterious and bandit-like appearance made me order the battalion to an alert. I ordered half a company with machine guns to proceed from the Theological Seminary in Lubni to the railroad depot. This seemed to cool the enthusiasm of Myasnyk. Meanwhile the Tymky Communist company entered the city and began skirmishing with my patrols. I proposed to Myasnyk that he help me liquidate this Bolshevik band and he put 20 of his men at my disposal. At the same time he declared that he had orders from the Government, to take the money from the country treasury, but when I remarked that the money had been taken to Kiev, he became very angry and said that he would have to check this. He immediately recalled his men who were on their way to help my men. It was now quite clear to me that Myasnyk had come to rob the treasury and perhaps also the city and that we were in his way. He left with his armored train toward Hrebinka. I was very much alarmed by the question: who had permitted him to organize an armored train and to roam all over the railroad tracks without any control? This fact alone gave an idea of the complete lack of military and administrative control in our hinterland. We found out later that Myasnyk had taken money from the treasury in Pyryatyn and then robbed all railroad stations on the Yahotyn-Hrebinka sector. After this, his name disappeared from the annals of the liberation struggle completely. He probably joined the Bolsheviks.

We fought a battle with the Bolshevik company of Tymky and liquidated it. We had it quiet for a few days after this. Several boys from the Bolsheviks joined my battalion, saying that they had been pressed into service, and kept by the Bolsheviks under terror. Subsequently, they were exemplary soldiers. It was also quiet on the Hrebinka front.

During those days Colonel Popsuy-Shapka passed through Lubni on his way to Kiev and, naturally, spent some time with me. He informed me that the Zaporozhian Corps was going through Kremenchuk and Znamenka for the purpose of defending that sector and joining our forces which were operating in the Odessa-Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovske-Zaporozha region, and that in case of necessity it would cross Romania into Galicia to join the rest of the Army which, for purposes of reorganization was stationed in the area of Lutsk-Rivne-Proskuriv-Husiatyn. On the advice of the

[1] At present Archbishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in the United States.

General Staff, Col. Popsuy-Shapka told me, Commander-in-Chief Petlura agreed that the Army detach itself from the enemy under cover of rear-guards and take a rest and regroup for a counter-attack in the early spring. To keep the Bolshevik hinterland under threat, the Commander-in-Chief left trusted men in many places from which we withdrew with orders to organize insurgent partisan units. Such units, based on forests in the Trypilla area of Kiev province and in the Kovel-Sarny region would keep communications under control. This insurgent-partisan movement developed to such an extent in 1919, that the Bolsheviks could not cope with it. These were really large units, some several thousand men strong and they operated behind Bolshevik lines entirely unimpeded, as for example the group of Otaman Yurko Tyutyunnyk, which was 4,000 strong and was subsequently incorporated in the Army as the so-called Kiev Division. Colonel Popsuy-Shapka also brought me orders from Colonel Bolbochan that my Battalion was being transferred to the command of the Army Staff in Vinnytsya.

Right after Col. Popsuy-Shapka left I was advised by the Army Staff that I must take part in liquidation of a Bolshevik band in the area of Yahotyn. The band would be attacked from the direction of Kiev by the SS Brigade (Sitch Riflemen) under the command of Col. R. Sushko. After liquidation of the band our Battalion was to proceed to Vinnytsya via Berdychiv and there await further orders. The following day the Battalion proceeded on two trains toward Hrebinka, the Company of Capt. Musiyenko joined us, and under cover of two armed trolleys we went on toward Yahotyn. Before we reached Yahotyn we found evidence of battle along the track and learned that Col. Sushko's Brigade routed the Bolshevik band in a surprise night attack and immediately went back toward Kiev, leaving orders for us with the station master to go through Kiev without stopping to Vinnytsya because Kiev was threatened from the direction of Kruty-Nizhyn. Our trains started and we reached the station of Kiev III (a junction on the left bank of the Dnipro). The picture I saw at this station was horrible: all tracks were filled with evacuation trains, mainly freight trains and the only bridge across the Dnipro could be crossed by trains on an average one train every half hour. The station commandant was Otaman Samusenko who told my aide, Capt. Linytsky, without any hesitation that he would let our trains through before our cum on payment of 100,000 rubles. And to think that such people who were out to make money on the people's misfortune were given positions of trust. This was the same Samusenko who subsequently staged a pogrom in Proskuriv for which he was sentenced to the firing squad by court-martial. Revolution produces odd situations with which the law cannot cope, particularly if it is going on during the tempest of war. I ordered Samusenko's arrest, took over command of the station and in cooperation with the station master I began to untie the bottleneck. It took about 12 hours to check the contents and destination of trains, the number and condition of locomotives, and to coordinate matters with the commandant of the Kiev passenger station on the Right Bank of the Dnipro clear the tracks for smoother communications. Our trains began to move late at night and we reached Vinnytsya after 24 hours.

At that time Vinnytsya was the seat of the Army Staff and I expected to find things to be more orderly. Far from it. Only much later, when I began to understand the laws or lawlessness of revolution, I became aware of my lack of experience and adaptability to conditions of anarchy, and to the ruthlessness of clever people. I never changed my hard soldierly nature which at that time seemed out of place, but actually indispensable, unless one would become an opportunist and sacrifice the future for the present. Only those who lived through similar circumstances will be able to understand what I mean. Nevertheless I found out that sometimes it was necessary to apply political and psychological flexibility. I never acquired a moral flexibility, even in the face of death. No soldier, and especially the one whom fate calls to a position of high responsibility, should ever try to be "morally flexible," but unfortunately, during our revolution, subsequent difficult times of exile, under new hardships of World War II and finally upon closer contact with the West, I observed many instances of such superfluous flexibility, which nearly bordered on lack of backbone. I have never been able to observe that denial of moral principles would pay off: either to the cause or to the person.

In Vinnytsya I reported to the Minister of Military Affairs, Col. 0. Shapoval, former commandant of

the 1st Bohdanivsky Regiment in the Zaporozhian Corps. It must be noted that although Col. Shapoval was a member of one of our leftist socialist groups, he proved to be a true statesman. He was a soldier-patriot, a man of firm character who placed military matters above party tactics. After hearing my report, Col. Shapoval ordered a review of my battalion for 7 A.M. the next day, February 8. On a bright cold morning the men appeared for the review in front of the station: four rifle companies, one machine-gun company, one cavalry platoon and units of liaison and supply. We were not full strength, only about 250 men, but trim in appearance and identically uniformed. They were well trained because I had been exercising them during every free moment; even I was impressed by their appearance and awaited the Minister with a feeling of pride. A large group of officers and officials of various ministries immediately gathered around the depot and they all asked what group this was. The most impressive thing about my men was the fact that they were all wearing steel helmets which my brother, Captain Shandruk procured during our prolonged stay in Kiev. At 7 o'clock sharp I issued the command for a salute by presenting arms and gave my report to the Minister who had come to take the review accompanied by the whole Staff, including Col. M. Kakurin and Otaman Truba. Colonel M. Kakurin, an officer of the Russian General Staff was an advisor to the Minister and a noted expert in military affairs.[1] I was very pleased to hear from Col. Shapoval and Col. Kakurin that they had never seen such a fine unit before and that I should present the battalion for review by the Commander-in-Chief Simon Petlura the following day. I was given a special citation of the High Command of the Armies of the Ukrainian National Republic signed by S. Petlura. Later, I had a lengthy talk with Cols. Shapoval and Kakurin and Otaman Truba in which I made known the battalion's requirements. All my requests were granted with firm orders issued: the battalion would be completed to full strength in Brailov (the next station west of Vinnytsya), where all command units from Kharkiv already had been dispatched; I would receive all necessary equipment with material for uniforms and footwear (there was nothing ready; everything would have to be custom-made) and finally, a physician was ordered to join the battalion, Dr. Yurko Dobrylovsky. Otaman Truba also gave me 250,000 karbovantsi, in the presence of the Minister, for the battalion's expenses. After completing all organizational work, on which I had to make weekly progress reports, the battalion was transferred to the railroad junction of Yarmolyntsi with orders to hold this point and to defend the Husiatyn-Yarmolyntsi line. This was an example of real good care of a military, unit which had not as yet had an opportunity to prove itself in battle. Probably that same day we left for Brailov via Proskuriv.

[1] Late in 1919 Colonel M. Kakurin joined the communists and was chief of operations under Gen. Tukhachevsky in the war of 1920 against Poland. He was later a professor of Tactics in the Red Army General Staff and Command College (so-called Frunze Academy in Moscow). It is very unfortunate that after the resignation of Col. Shapoval our military command was unable to enlist the services of Col. Kakurin in our cause. Colonel Kakurin was co-author of a book "Voyna s Belopolakami v 1920 g." (War against the White Poles in 1920.)

5. Surprises at Brailov

It was at the end of the month of February. Cossacks from country command companies from Kharkiv province were indeed waiting for us. We began feverish activity of bringing the battalion to full combat strength. The battalion was then completed as follows: four rifle companies with three officers and one hundred and twenty men in each, machine gun company with three officers and sixty men, six machine guns of which two were on carriages; a cavalry company with three officers, sixty-five men, three portable machine guns and ninety horses; liaison unit with necessary technical equipment for communications up to twenty miles; medical unit and supply unit. The total strength of the battalion was twenty-seven officers, about six hundred men and one hundred and ten horses. I appointed Captain I. Shevtsiv to be my aide; commanders of companies were: Lieut. V. Petriv, Capt. Vodianytsky, Capt. Musiyenko, Capt. Blahovishchensky, Capt. Havrylenko, Capt. P. Moroz (nick-named "Taras Bulba" for his huge physique, he had been a colleague of my brother and myself in the seventieth Russian Regiment). Captain V. Linytsky was battalion aide-de-camp, Capt. O. Shandruk-Shandrushkevych was quartermaster and Dr. Yu. Dobrylovsky was medical officer. The battalion was quartered in empty school buildings near the depot tracks. All tailors and shoemakers of Brailov were hired to make uniforms which were identical from mine down to the ranks. Notwithstanding the severe winter the battalion never missed a day's training.

One day a Jewish delegation from the town headed by the Chief Rabbi I. Feldfix appeared before me and asked that the town be patrolled at night because local bandits were robbing the Jewish population. The railroad depot was nearly four miles away from the town, but I complied with their request and there were no more robberies.

The trains in the station were guarded. One morning at six o'clock, the guards alerted the Company and me aboard the train. We were surrounded by a large number of soldiers armed with hand-grenades who were warning us not to leave the train. It was still fairly dark and difficult to see with whom we were dealing. Within a few minutes, however, my soldiers who were quartering in the school-house came running under the command of Lieut. Petrov, and in turn surrounded our would be captors. One careless move and we might have a battle on our hands. I came out of the train, ordered my men to lower their arms and asked the strangers who they were and what they wanted. One of the men answered that they were Ukrainian Sitch Riflemen. Their commander came closer and asked me whether I was the man in charge. We now learned that this was a battalion guarding the Army Staff, that this unit was under the command of Lieut. Kmetyk[1] who had received orders from Chief of Staff Col. A. Melnyk to disarm us because "we were a Bolshevized unit which refused to go to the front." This was a perfect example of disorganization and misinformation, one of the immutable laws of revolution: the Commander in Chief and the Minister of Defense had inspected the battalion and given it a citation, while the Army Staff believed that it was in sympathy with the Communists. I suspected that this was due to an attitude of bias toward me on the part of the Staff Intelligence Service and my suspicion was later confirmed. Together with Lt. Kmetyk I went to the station carrying the Commander in Chief's citation in my hand and we called Col. Melnyk on the telephone. Lt. Kmetyk assured the former that the citation was genuine. He stated that this was a case of some misunderstanding and that even if he were to proceed with carrying out the order of disarming us, this could not be done because of the strength and attitude of my battalion. Colonel Melnyk showed himself a gentleman, apologizing to me for the misunderstanding and ordering Lt. Kmetyk to return to Vinnytsya. I requested, however, Col. Melnyk's permission to let both our units search the neighboring countryside for weapons concealed by demobilized soldiers in the villages, in order to protect the people from robberies. We found a lot of arms and even machine guns hidden in haystacks.

Sometimes we had odd situations arising, like after this joint expedition, my battalion quartermaster Capt. Shevtsiv gave Lt. Kmetyk's boys dinner. After they had left, he came to me and told me in a

[1] Subsequently a General in the Red Army.

voice of despair: "we fed them, but they took all the spoons with them – what are our boys going to eat with now?"

Several days later, I received orders from Col. Melnyk to proceed with the whole combat part of my battalion to the city of Proskuriv in order to put down the pogroms raging in that city and to arrest the guilty. Identical orders were issued to the Sitch Riflemen Battalion. The pogrom, not only of Jews, but of the entire population, had been staged by "Otaman" Samusenko, the same man with whom we had had trouble in Kiev. Right after we entered the city, the bandits disappeared and we found only a few exotically uniformed "Samusenkists" whom we sent to Vinnytsya under guard. I stepped into the local Commandantura, where I found Captain Kalenik Lessiuk to be in charge (living in the United States since 1922, at present director of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago, Ill.). He told me that Samusenko, accompanied by several soldiers, had raided the Commandantura, terrorized the crew with hand-grenades and began a pogrom. Captain Lessiuk did not have enough men to cope with the situation and the local police force went into hiding. Soon after word spread that we had restored order, a delegation appeared in the Commandantura from the City Council, including the Rabbi representing the Jewish population. They thanked us profusely for restoring order and particularly Capt. Lessiuk for keeping the city under control until this latest incident; they even called him "father." We learned later that Samusenko had been arrested on orders of Commander in Chief S. Petlura and a court-martial condemned him to death. It is noteworthy that one of the results of our appearance in Proskuriv was that 8 young Jews, former soldiers of the tsarist army, enlisted in our battalion, among them the wealthy local merchant H. Roytberg. I remember him very well, since I had appointed him to be the liaison man with the Jewish population at the suggestion of my aide. Roytberg, who is at present in the United States, did a lot of good for the battalion, he helped us in getting food supplies and other material, especially medical supplies; he also did a lot for the Jews, calming them in their fright. The Jews were at that time living in terror of exaggerated reports about pogroms. They took extremes for the average and would not believe that anyone would stand up for them. It was a known fact that the Jews kept a good line of communication among themselves throughout the country: they told me that wherever the Reds appeared, they would appoint Jews to all kinds of responsible positions, as city or county commissioners, etc. and require them to deliver all sorts of goods, including such valuables as watches, Jewelry and gold; if the commissars were unable to comply with the orders, the Bolsheviks would make them personally responsible. The population was hostile toward those commissars since it was widely believed that the requisitions were ordered for their own personal benefit. The Bolsheviks strengthened this naive belief through a whispered campaign: this was clear provocation which resulted in pogroms. The Jews used all available means to dissuade their compatriots from collaborating with the Bolsheviks. In a majority of the cases the Reds robbed the Jews and instigated Jewish pogroms.

6. Defense of the Yarmolyntsi-Husiatyn Sector

It had become necessary to move the Government and Army staff west and away from the front-line. Early in March I was therefore ordered to move to the railroad junction of Yarmolyntsi and simultaneously I was appointed garrison commander of an area within a 15-mile radius of Yarmolyntsi. I was to make the area ready for defensive action and to evacuate a huge depot of artillery supplies located at Victoria, about 5 miles west of Yarmolyntsi, to Galicia. When the news spread in Brailov that our battalion was leaving, a delegation of the local populace came to me, headed by the above mentioned Chief Rabbi I. Feldfix. They made a desperate appeal to me to leave a small crew in Brailov to preserve order. There was only one advice I could give the Rabbi: that he should make this request to the Army Staff or to the Minister of Jewish Affairs. Rabbi Feldfix then handed me an envelope with a document written in Hebrew, and lifting both hands high, he said: "Whenever in your life you will find yourself in a position of danger, show this paper to any Jew, and you will be given all possible help by the Jews".[1]

After the arrival of my battalion at the Yarmolyntsi station, I dispatched two rifle companies and one cavalry company to the near-by city of Yarmolyntsi and left the rest at the station. I placed a string of patrols all along the eastern line of my command sector. One day a cavalry dispatch rider came galloping to me with a laconic message from Capt. Moroz, commander of the cavalry company, stating that my presence in the city is immediately required. When I came there, Capt. Moroz told me that about two hours earlier a group of 19 riders headed by "Otaman" Bohun had entered the city and began robbing the people. Moroz had surrounded them, disarmed them, and now the robbers were under arrest in the schoolhouse. I summoned Bohun, and he declared with an air of arrogance that I had no right to detain him and his troops, demanding immediate release and return of their arms. When I explained to him that he was a common robber and that according to the laws of war he will be court-martialled, he laughed. I immediately convened a court-martial headed by Captain Moroz and with 2 officers and 2 enlisted men as members. Only Bohun was sentenced to death and the sentence was confirmed by Commander in Chief Simon Petlura within 24 hours. I had a talk with Bohun's group of men and they all enlisted in my battalion. I found them to be very good and disciplined soldiers. As the Ukrainian proverb justly says: "fish stink from the head down."

Soon thereafter Lieut. Fedorchak and Subaltern Fedak from the Chief Command of the Ukrainian Galician Army came to me with a document confirmed by the Army Staff which stated that they were authorized to evacuate the artillery stores from Victoria and that they should load 20 carloads each day. I put the 4th Company under Capt. Musiyenko at their disposal and transferred it to Victoria. I continued to equip my battalion while in Yarmolyntsi and succeeded in obtaining 200 pairs of shoes. Several days later the Army Staff ordered me to transfer the entire battalion to Victoria in order to speed up the evacuation of artillery stores. I was to turn over defense of the Yarmolyntsi junction to the Haydamak Group under Otaman M. Sereda. The latter appeared the same day and I moved the battalion to Victoria. I saw an extraordinary picture on my arrival at Victoria: Capt. Musiyenko told me that a few hours before a unit under the command of Major Kaspariants (an Armenian by birth, former Non-Corn in the Russian tsarist army) arrived there. There were 9 men who placed a 3" cannon in front of the railroad station and Kaspariants personally fired the cannon around a 360° radius all over the distant countryside. When I asked him why he was doing this, he replied: "to keep the Communized countryside frightened." I told him to leave the place immediately and reported the incident to the Army Staff. I never heard of Kaspariants again. This is the kind of behavior we had to contend with, in spite of severe

[1] First of all I asked my liaison officer H. Roytberg to translate the contents of the document for me. He read it, then kissed it and said: "You deserve it, I have observed your attitude toward the populace and particularly toward the Jews." He would not, however, tell us what the document said. No other Jew would tell me its contents cither. There were several occasions when the document came in handy.
As noted before, H. Roytberg is now living in the United States.

punishment meted out to culprits. These are obviously quite normal occurrences of every revolution. As a student of history, I knew well what went on in France in the late 16th century, in England over a period of nearly two centuries, and again in France during the Great Revolution. The difference was, however, that revolutionary events in Ukraine were more in the nature of purely accidental and quite petty banditism, whereas in the great historical revolutions tens of thousands of people perished, particularly those of another faith, as e.g. Jews. The Ukrainian revolution never assumed the character of mass destruction, as in the Soviet Union, where millions died, including nearly all Bolshevik leaders, and in the artificially induced famine when several million of my hapless countrymen died. In Ukraine, in the 1917-1921 period things were comparatively well under control, mainly thanks to the attitude of our Government and the Commander in Chief, Simon Petlura. Nevertheless, some newspapers in the West, which on one hand were misinformed about events in eastern Europe, and on the other hand deliberately inspired by Russians, attempted to slander the entire Ukrainian liberation movement, and particularly the Ukrainian Armed Forces for an alleged lack of culture and tendency toward anarchy. It is quite obvious that the newly established Ukrainian Government could not have the same kind of political and diplomatic contacts as the Russians, it did not have financial means for propaganda counteraction which in our materialistic epoch, is actually the only factor of political decision. The Ukrainian Government should certainly have publicized all positive manifestations of the struggle for independence and corrected unfounded falsehoods. In this instance it would have been well to the point to answer both the White, as well as the Red provocateurs in the words of the Ukrainian proverb: "people might believe some of your lies, but not for long."

In order to investigate the veracity of Kaspariants' report about pro-Communist sympathies of the countryside, I immediately dispatched patrols under Capt. Musiyenko to the largest village in the area, the name of which I no longer remember. The patrols came back with quite disturbing reports: the people in the villages were not basically pro-Communist, but there were large numbers of Bolshevik agitators all over. There was a bright side to the reports: the peasants were not inclined to offer resistance to our battalion, saying: "it would be a hard job to fight those boys in steel helmets." That same night, however, Captain Musiyenko disappeared, and there was all reason to believe that he had gone over to the Communists. Special security measures had to be undertaken. The next day I took a motor trolley toward Yarmolyntsi to get a report from Otaman Sereda, and on my way I nearly fell into a Bolshevik trap: they were there, but well concealed and they permitted my trolley to get quite close. I had to hurry and set up defenses around Victoria, as one railroad employee had found out that night over the telephone from his colleague in Yarmolyntsi that a Bolshevik armored train had arrived there. We blew up all bridges between Yarmolyntsi and Victoria immediately, but the Bolshevik armored train could reach us by artillery fire and we had to move about 1,5 miles west of Victoria. For about 3 days the Bolshevik troops did not bother us at all, but we learned later that they had forcibly armed the entire countryside in order to surround us. While we were still in Yarmolyntsi, a Rumanian officer, Lieut. S. Madij reported to me. He was an artillery man and with his help I organized a battery in Victoria, two 3" cannon mounted on wheels and two more on flat-cars, something in the nature of an improvised armored train. I placed the cavalry company and the battery in Horodok, 2 miles west of Victoria, and I told Capt. Moroz specifically that his squadron was the combat protection for the battery. The battalion was well uniformed and well armed, with a total complement of 700 men; this was a lot at a time when some of our entire divisions did not have more than 400-500 men. I was not surprised when one day, one of many days so full of different and difficult work that I and my officers often slept with our clothes on, and sometimes had to go without sleep for 2-3 days at a time – the battalion was visited for a full inspection by the Commander in Chief accompanied by the Commander of the Chortkiv Military District, Major M. Orobko. The Staff usually transmitted my reports to the Commander in Chief, and the latter, upon inspection, expressed his satisfaction with the condition of my troops and the order prevailing in areas which were under our control. The next day after the Commander in Chief, Simon Petlura left, our battalion passed a difficult trial of battle, unfortunately with heavy and unexpected losses.

Meanwhile the situation on the fronts against the Bolsheviks was not rosy at all. Our army was in

retreat on all fronts, as I found out from reports coming to me from the Army Staff. The Zaporozhian Battalion and the Odessa Group were retreating in the direction of Tiraspol, and was trying, with the aid of our Government, to be permitted to cross Rumania into Galicia, in order to reach the region of Proskuriv or Volochyska. The Sitch Riflemen Corps and other units attached to it were retreating on the Proskuriv Volochyska line, and the Northern and Kholm Groups were moving toward Sarny and Lutsk. At that time, a thing quite usual under conditions of military failure, all kinds of adventurers began to appear, who were not dedicated to any ideals, but merely sought to satisfy their personal ambition or to gain material profit. Thus, for example, Commander of the Northern Group, Major P. Oskilko[1] proclaimed himself commander of all military forces of Ukraine and went so far as to put members of the Government under arrest. This certainly contributed to a decline of morale and combat readiness of our troops on the northern front. Another self-styled "Otaman," Volokh, who became commander of the Zaporozhian Corps in some mysterious manner, announced that he was in favor of a communist order in Ukraine and began unauthorized negotiations for an armistice with the head of the Ukrainian Soviet Government, Christian Rakovsky. There was disorganization and demoralization among our troops. The Commander in Chief and the Army Staff made feverish attempts to restore discipline, and they were soon successful, because the masses of the Ukrainian troops were patriotic and understood that adventurous moves were harmful.

Since the very beginning of its assumption of power, the Directorate sought all possible diplomatic means to get help from the victorious Allies in order to continue resistance against the Reds. Delegates of the Ukrainian Government negotiated with Allied representatives wherever possible, particularly in Rumania. This was all fruitless, however, because the Allies were in favor of restoring Russia and their statesmen believed that Russia could be rebuilt on democratic principles. In this they were duped by foreign agents of Moscow abroad who had old contacts with foreign governments. Indeed, it was perhaps difficult to foresee at that time that "Satan is ascending," but we know that the West helped Poland and the newly established Baltic States, the only country refused help was Ukraine, and the whole world, together with the Russians, opposed the struggle of the Ukrainian people. Old Russian diplomats of the Tsarist times, pictured the Ukrainian national movement as Ukrainian Bolshevism. When I had a chance, much later, to become acquainted with memoiristic literature, and primarily that of the Russians, I observed that the Russians were ready to accept the existence of Bolshevik Russia, but of an independent Ukraine – never. The world has suffered much harm because of the Russophile tendencies and political shortsightedness of such political leaders, or rather dictators, as Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and to some extent Winston Churchill. We should always keep in mind that they were the undertakers of the Ukrainian freedom cause and actual creators of the power of Bolshevism. It was not the Germans, who delivered Lenin and Co. to Russia in 1917, but the Allied statesmen, who were the real authors of Bolshevism because they would not help wreck the rule of the Reds and thus contributed to the ascendancy of the Soviet empire. They are responsible for the decline of the power of their nations: France will surely never rise again, and England is slowly following her. There existed, however, sure possibilities of finishing off Moscow imperialism by aiding Ukraine and the other nations, Turkestan, Byelorussia, and others. Instead, we now have rampant Red imperialism which is on its way to conquer the world without even attempting to conceal its plans. While it is true that to err is human, the French have a better saying: "*c'est plus qu'un crime, c'est une faute*" (mistakes are worse than crimes). To what extent the West was politically and militarily demoralized at the time of the close of World War I is evidenced by the following fact: yielding to the persistent demands of the envoy of the Provisional Russian Government, P. Izvolsky and delegate Paul Milyukov, M. Clemenceau decided to establish a staging area in southern Ukraine near Odessa, for operational aid to the Russian Volunteer Army which assembled in the Caucasus under General L. Kornilov, and after his death of Generals Aleksieyev and A. Denikin and fought the Reds. Four Allied divisions landed in Odessa supported by appropriate naval forces. The divisions were: one French, one Greek and two French colonial. Fighting began between the Ukrainian garrison in Odessa and Russian

[1] Later murdered by the Communists in Volhynia under Poland 1930.

White Guards which were being organized under Allied protection. The Ukrainian garrison retreated from Odessa, which was immediately attacked by the insurgent group of Otaman Hryhoriyiv 6,000 strong, which not only dispersed the Volunteers, but also forced the entire Allied Corps to flee from Odessa, with the Greek units offering the only real resistance as attested to by memoiristic sources. Unfortunately, Hryhoriyiv was one of the many naive who trusted Moscow. He joined the Bolsheviks and was subsequently liquidated by them.

7. The Struggle of the Ukrainian Galician Army Against Poland

Meanwhile there was a sad turn of events in Galicia. The so-called Blue Army of General Haller, recruited in America and in France, arrived in Poland 75,000 strong, well armed and equipped. It gave the Poles an edge over the Ukrainian Galician Army which was forced to retreat eastward. The question arose: whither? The Army of the Ukrainian National Republic was already retreating under Bolshevik pressure westward and now there was only a small strip separating the two Ukrainian Armies. In this critical situation, the youthful Galician officers requested their High Command to order a counterattack. The Galician President E. Petrushevych appointed General O. Hrekiv as Commander in Chief and ordered a counter offensive. It is hardly believable because it was almost a miracle that the Ukrainian Galician Army, by superhuman effort, broke the Polish front. The supply of ammunition was so scant that after one day's fighting the soldiers were rationed only several rounds per day which could be fired only on clear orders of officers. The Ukrainian Galician Army began its offensive on June 8th, called the "Chortkiv Offensive" and within nine days it penetrated a distance about eighty miles from the Chortkiv-Terebovla-Ternopil to the Stanyslaviv-Burshtyn-Peremyshlany line. The Poles threw in fresh troops and halted the Ukrainian offensive. The Ukrainians' ammunition was exhausted, for although they had captured large supplies from the Poles, it did not fit their arms. There was a new retreat of the Ukrainian Galician Army which was trying to detach itself from the pursuing enemy in order to redeploy its forces. The Ukrainian Galician Army was quite depleted, by losses, sickness and lack of opportunity for fresh recruitment. The Chortkiv Offensive was, however, of great importance to the operations of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic because it halted the Poles for a considerable time, the latter following the Ukrainian Galician Army at a slow pace and requiring more than three weeks to re-occupy the areas which they had lost, a time of great value to the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. Now the Ukrainian Galician Army, ready for combat and confident in ultimate victory assembled in the rear of the UNR Army for a joint offensive against the Reds.

The Government of the Ukrainian National Republic was well aware of the difficult strategic position of Ukraine due to the necessity to fight on two fronts and a none-too-friendly neutrality of Rumania. Therefore the Government decided to seek an armistice with Poland, of which we were appraised by reports from Army Headquarters. As far as the political side of this matter is concerned, it must be stated that both the Government of the Western Ukrainian Republic as well as all soldiers were opposed to this, but the strategic position of both our Armies being hopeless, the only way out was to make peace with one enemy and untie our hands for a fight with" the other. Negotiations with Poland dragged out fairly long, the Ukrainian delegation doing its utmost to have the demands of the Ukrainian Galician Army and Government taken into consideration. Quite unexpectedly, however, the Allied Supreme Council issued a directive to the Polish Government to take all Galicia under temporary occupation, all the way to the river Zbruch. There was nothing else left to the Ukrainian delegation, but to accept this condition and to get the Poles to agree, to cease military operations so that the Ukrainian Galician Army could cross the Zbruch intact. We also needed territory on which the Ukrainian Galician Army could be deployed, and this had to be taken from the Bolsheviks. The situation was a little more favorable at that time because the Bolsheviks did not attempt to cross the Zbruch and their offensive in Volhynia was completely unsuccessful. The UNR Army began an offensive to gain territory for the Galician Army. In June the UNR Army reached the Kamyanets-Podilsky-Dunayivtsi-Proskuriv line, but with much effort and aided by the Ukrainian Galician Army.

Much later, when I studied the details of the Ukrainian liberation effort, I pondered over the circumstances of the so-called "November Feat" which constituted the beginning of statehood of the Ukrainian Galician territory and was carried out by a small group of Ukrainian Galician patriots. In Lviv itself the group of the "November Feat" did not number more than 1,500 men, most of whom were soldiers of advanced years or convalescents without much ability to fight. In reality, Lviv was seized by no more than five-hundred men and the action succeeded only thanks to the determination

and superhuman efforts of a small group of officers headed by Colonel Dmytro Vitovsky, who became Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army and War Secretary. In the countryside the take-over went much smoother because there was no organized counteraction on the Polish side and because the Polish population was very small. We were also filled with admiration and pride at the Galician Ukrainians' ability to organize a strong army within a short period of time and under difficult conditions. It was 80,000 strong in the early days of 1919, a figure easy to quote now, but we must take into consideration the difficulties of mobilization, organization of technical, material and medical equipment, transportation, etc., all taking place on ruins in which Galicia lay at the end of World War I, being the main theatre of operations between the Central Powers and Russia and changing hands numberless times.

8. Withdrawal across the Zbruch near Husiatyn

The battalion at Victoria was actually surrounded by the enemy, and only one road remained open: the Victoria-Lisovody-Husiatyn railroad, which was continually patrolled by a platoon, on flatcars, and armed with machine-guns. The day after Lieut. Musiyenko's disappearance our guard platoons were exchanging fire with the enemy from early morning and were forced to withdraw. We had to break out of the encirclement, and withdrawal was made more difficult because I had only one locomotive. The engineer was a Pole, but we had had an opportunity to find out that he could be trusted, moreover, one day he had asked me directly to let him join his own people if we crossed the Zbruch, and I promised to do so. That afternoon I dispatched the first supply train to Husiatyn, which is west of the Zbruch, and when the locomotive came back, after two hours, everything was ready for immediate departure under the direct cover of my flatcars. I ordered Capt. Moroz and Lieut. Madij to leave Horodok immediately and to march through Lisovody to East Husiatyn where the battery was to prepare the position, with an observation point on a bluff on the east of the river. There were trenches on the bluff from World War I, and although they were facing west, they could be used in the opposite direction. I called Capt. Moroz' particular attention to a wooded defile west of Horodok which could conceal an ambush. Things happened just as I had feared. First of all, Capt. Moroz started late. The whole battalion was at the Lisovody station when we heard rifle shots, then three mortar shots in the woods, and then all was quiet. Within a few minutes Capt. Moroz and his squadron ran out of the woods in disorder and stopped in front of me; I was with a rear-guard platoon on the road. The battery was missing! But it came in sight after a few minutes, in disorder! As I had expected, the battery had been attacked in the woods by the Bolsheviks, and also probably by neighboring peasants, because it was reported that the enemy was in great force, and our cavalry squadron not only did not defend the battery, but not even itself! Lieut. Madij and several non-coms from the battery were captured, some were killed and some wounded. This was a terrible and unnecessary loss. It was getting dark, and the patrols reported that the enemy was still encircling us, so I gave orders to leave for Husiatyn right away. I removed Capt. Moroz from the command of the cavalry company.

During the night I put patrols around the Husiatyn bridgehead, pushing sentries to the eastern end of the village of Velyky Olkhovets, in order to guard Husiatyn from enemy artillery fire. While doing this I encountered Lieut. Z. Stefaniv of the Ukrainian Galician Army, whose company was guarding the west bank of the Zbruch. The following morning the Bolsheviks approached the line of my patrols and began firing at Husiatyn from two batteries and from an armored train. This was actually the first battle of my battalion. The patrols did not stop the enemy, although we had the support of the UHA artillery firing from positions west of Husiatyn, and we began crossing the Zbruch. I kept only one company, with two machine-guns, in the trenches on the bluff to halt the enemy advance. I stayed with the company to get a clear picture of the situation, but I also observed that my presence was necessary because the morale of my soldiers was shaky, probably due to the loss of the battery and the apparently overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

Lacking any orders from my high command, I left the company of Capt. Blahovishchensky, in order to put sentries for the night on the west bank of the Zbruch together with Lieut. Stefaniv, and withdrew my battalion to the nearby village of Vasylkivtsi. The whole Zbruch sector, the so-called Third Sector, was held by two Galician battalions with two batteries under Major Martynovych who had his staff headquarters of the Third Sector of Front with the Staff-Quarters in the village of Krohulets. That same evening. Major Martynovych accompanied by his aide, Capt. Penchak came to see me and requested that my battalion man this Sector. He said he would transfer a battery to my command, the 6th, under Captain V. Zarytsky. Soon Major Orobko came to me with identical orders from the Army Staff. He was the commandant of the Chortkiv Military District, and he also brought me an appointment to command the Third Sector with responsibility for the defense of the Zburch line from Skala to Pidvolochyska. South of my command the Zbruch line was held by a group under Col. M. Shapoval, and north of me the front was held by Otaman Bozhko.

The Bolsheviks did not attempt to force the Zbruch, and I ordered the bridge at Husiatyn to be left intact, just to hold it under heavy fire. One night we made a sortie to the east bank of the Zbruch and took several prisoners. We learned from them that we were faced by the 12th and 13th Volochysk regiments. The front was fairly quiet and I managed to organize a battery with two cannon. Soon thereafter, in connection with a planned offensive to the east, I was given additional troops: the Rybnyk regiment with about 200 men under the command of Colonel Matsak. Pursuant to orders of the Army Staff, from then my battalion, the Rybnyk regiment, and the 6th SS Battery, formed the so-called Colonel Shandruk Group.

We did not get fresh orders until May 21. New events, however, occurred in the meantime. In the course of reorganizing the Army, Col. V. Salsky was appointed Commander of the Zaporozhian Corps, and Col. P. Bolbochan was transferred to the reserve, to the command of the Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Galician Army. Col. Bolbochan believed that he was being treated unjustly and tried to get back to his command of the Corps. Probably due to the fact that the Zaporozhian battalion was originally part of the Corps, although it had since been detached, Col. Bolbochan came to see me on May 16th and requested to talk to me alone. Col. Bolbochan told me his personal sad story about being removed from his command without cause, and added that the division commanders of the Corps and all of the ranks were clamoring for his return because without him the Corps could lose its historical battle valor. He said that he was being urged to do this regardless of the consent of the Commander in Chief, Simon Petlura. Col. Bolbochan asked me whether he could count on my support. I answered: "I don't think it right to make such a 'coup d'etat' under difficult conditions of war; in my opinion the division commanders of the Corps' units could present the case of the Corps to the Commander-in-Chief through the channel of the Army Staff, suggesting that you should be restored to your command. Regardless of whether the battalion is engaged in battle or not, I shall never take part in an adventure, but I shall be happy if the case is resolved in your favor in a legitimate manner." We learned later, however, that Col. Bolbochan proceeded on his own, taking over the command of the Corps by force and arresting Col. Salsky. The result was an order for the arrest of Col. Bolbochan issued by C.I.C.S., Petlura and a subsequent court-martial ending in a sentence of death by firing squad. The sentence was duly carried out. He was executed ten days after sentencing.

It should be noted that the institution of State Inspection was introduced into the Army at that time. Its task was the investigation of the political beliefs of the commanders, educational and cultural work among the troops, plus the duty of controlling the quartermaster corps. This innovation was probably patterned after "the most democratic" Bolshevik system, since the institution of political commissars existed only there. In our Army, however, this caused a wave of disapproval among the officer corps, as an alleged sign of distrust in its patriotism. I do not recall who was the author of this political move, but it was clear that it was the work of the political parties then in power, headed by Prime Minister I. Mazepa. In spite of its dissatisfaction and occasional ignoring of the State Inspection agents, the officer corps put up with this unwarranted and unexpected suspicion of disloyalty. It should, however, be stated for the sake of historical truth, that although State Inspection did not perform anything worthwhile, no real harm was done, outside of a few instances of misunderstanding between commanders and Inspection agents who pretended to be political commissars. The Inspection was not needed to watch over matters of loyalty to the state, and it had no time to attend to matters of education of the troops, as they were always on the march or in battle. State Inspection was headed by Col. V. Kedrovsky, a gentleman and patriot who was able to give proper direction to the work of his subordinates, demanding their full support of the commanding officers. My circumstances took a fortunate turn, as the regimental inspector did not interefere at all, while the inspector of the General Staff was my former classmate of the Historical-Philological Institute, Capt. M. Hladky, and the inspector of the Ministry of War was my personal friend, A. Pevny. All this turned out to be important to me when I was subsequently appointed commander of the 1st Recruit Regiment in Kamyanets. Anyway, the institution of State Inspection withered away, and was not reestablished in 1920.

9. Attack on Ukraine

On the night of May 23rd I received orders from the Army Staff through Maj. Martynovych to force the Zbruch immediately, and to march in the direction of Dunayevtsi. My neighboring commanders simultaneously began an offensive: Col. Shapoval toward Kamyanets, and Otaman Bozhko toward Solobkivtsi. It was disappointed that this joint action was not put under a single commander, for purposes of coordination. Maj. Martynovych promised to support my attack with two batteries and to put one infantry company with four machine-guns in my reserves. During the night of May 25th I marked the entire front of the group with the help of this company, and knowing the exact location and routine of the enemy, I pulled all my troops into a woods five kilometers north of Husiatyn so as to effect a march in the enemy's rear and encircle his entire Husiatyn Sector. The enemy was caught by surprise and began fleeing after a few shots, so that by 7 A.M., we had liquidated two enemy regiments, taking 150 prisoners, and capturing three cannon, seven machine-guns on carriages, a lot of military supplies and more than forty horses. I ordered the Zaporozhian battalion to place sentries along a sector of five to six kilometers, and the Rybnyk regiment, as reserve to move into the village of Velyky Olkhovets. In the course of these movements there was unceasing fire east of Velyky Olkhovets and liaison-couriers dispatched to the commander of the 2nd company, Capt. Vodyanytsky, did not return. Therefore I decided to proceed there in person. I was accompanied by Col. Matsak, my aide, Capt. Linytsky and three mounted order-lies. On a hill east of Velyky Olkhovets stood the ruins of a manor destroyed during the war, and the road passed through a deep ravine. When our group came close to the ruins, standing on both sides of the road, we did not see our sentries which were supposed to be there, but instead, from behind a building on the right, a band of fifteen to twenty Reds jumped out and with shouts of "surrender" began to shoot from a distance of about forty to fifty paces. My horse was killed under me and fell over my left leg. Bullets were literally grazing me. I freed my leg with difficulty and immediately drew and cocked my Browning automatic pistol, not wanting to be taken alive. Meanwhile Capt. Linytsky and the soldiers got off their horses and managed to run up the left escarpment, hiding behind the walls on that side and firing at the Reds. This gave me a chance to run up and join them. Under the cover of the ruined walls we managed to get behind the buildings at the north end of the village, but we were met with fire there, too. We found out that it was a patrol in deployment proceeding to take its position among the ruined buildings. Col. Matsak turned his horse around and escaped to Husiatyn where he alerted the reserves. When we were near the city we met the company on its way to rescue us. When I wanted to unload my pistol later, I found that it was jammed. Providence saved me from enemy bullets and probably from my own bullet, too.

A report reached me from Maj. Martynovych in the meantime that neither Col. Shapoval, nor Otaman Bozhko had started their attacks because they had not managed to get ready in time: this was the result of the lack of unified command. We captured the bridgehead, as the offensive was postponed to May 27th. On that morning, pursuant to orders, the group began moving toward Dunayevtsi without opposition. From time to time we heard artillery fire on our right and left. Before Dunayevtsi, near the city of Shatava, the Commander in Chief arrived and after receiving my report ordered the column to rest and informed me about the situation. The new commander of the Skala group, Col. O. Udovychenko, who had replaced Col. Shapoval, had already captured Kamyanets Podilsky and was proceeding toward Dunayevtsi where a battle was in progress. Otaman Bozhko had also forced the Zbruch, but his eastward march was halted by overwhelming enemy forces; the Zaporozhian Corps had dispersed the enemy in the upper Horyn region and was moving on Proskuriv. My group was renamed the 9th Infantry regiment and embodied in the 3rd Infantry Division, the former group of Col. Udovychenko. Other regiments in the Division were the 7th Blue regiment under Col. O. Vyshnivsky and the 8th Black Sea regiment under Col. Tsarenko; the artillery regiment under Col. H. Chyzhevsky consisted of four light and one heavy subdivisions; the cavalry regiment in the Division was under Col. M. Krat. In Dunayevtsi I reported to Col. Udovychenko, whom I had met during my stay in Yarmolyntsi when he was chief of staff of the Slobidsky Corps.

The next day the regiment attacked in the direction of the city of Nova Ushytsya. I was proud and happy to watch the 1st battalion (the former Zaporozhian battalion) deploy in ranks without faltering under enemy fire, as if on maneuvers. I had the opportunity to see the whole battlefield from my command post, but the battalion commander, the experienced line officer Capt. Shevtsiv, sent me dispatches on the course of the attack. My 6th battery was firing at the enemy almost from the line of the infantry. The 2nd battalion, however (the former Rybnyk regiment), did not display activity on the left wing of attack and I had to send runners with orders to hasten their movement, particularly since on the sector of this battalion near Zamikhiv the enemy was not active, either. While I was standing at the observation point under an old huge lime tree two kilometers west of Nova Ushytsya, I heard the whine of one of the enemy cannon shots. I had no time to hide behind the tree and the shell fell right at my feet but did not explode. That day the regiment reached Mynkivtsi without much resistance from the enemy.

In the following days the regiment marched forward through Verbovets and Kurylivtsi Murovani in order to take the station Kotyuzhany on the Zhmerynka-Mohyliv line and prevent the enemy from evacuating Mohyliv toward Zhmerynka. The task was accomplished: forty kilometers in three days with fairly heavy enemy resistance. After taking Kotyuzhany I pushed the 1st battalion to Kopayhorod in order to defend Kotyuzhany from the north and east. In Nova Ushytsya, Verbovets, and Kyrylivtsi Murovani and all around, the people were out to give us a hearty welcome, with the Jewish population taking part. But when the battalion was entering Kopayhorod in battle order, shots were fired at it from buildings and several men were wounded. I was with the battalion and ordered patrols to leave the city and the battalion to surround it without letting anyone leave the city, because the Bolsheviks could not be distinguished from the civilian population. I was certain that the shots from windows were fired by Bolsheviks who had not managed to leave the city. The patrols searched the city and determined from which houses shoes had been fired at us. When we brought those whom we had detained before members of the City Council, the latter stated that they were all local residents. All those detained were young Jews and we found them in possession of arms and ammunition. I held them in the school building and conducted the investigation in person in the presence of members of the City Council, the local Rabbi, and the pharmacist, who was also Jewish. In answer to questioning all of the detained admitted that they had been shooting. There were about 15 boys and they said that they had been armed by the Bolshevik commandant of the city who persuaded them to fire at us, alleging that we were "Haydamaks"[1] who would butcher all local Jews! A local Jewish tailor had been the Bolshevik commandant, so it is not surprising that they obeyed him. This was the first instance when I made use of the letter I had from Rabbi Feldfix: when the Rabbi of Kopayhorod read it, he addressed the young Jews very sharply and they all fell to their knees and begged for mercy. We did not even arrest any of them. We only asked that their families take care of our wounded soldiers.

The regiment stopped in the Kopayhorod-Kotyuzhany regions for several days because we learned that the Division could not advance as the 2nd "Zaporozhska Sitch" Division of Otaman Bozhko, which was supposed to have taken Zhmerynka, had to retreat before overwhelming enemy forces first to Bar, and then southwest to Yaltushkiv. The enemy had advanced up to thirty kilometers behind the regiment. When the Bolsheviks brought reinforcements to Zhmerynka with two armored trains, the Division had to retreat all the way to Nova Ushytsya. It should be noted that such a withdrawal, in addition to political and moral difficulties, also created tactical hardships, because all roads led through larger towns and cities situated in deep river valleys (Stara Ushytsya, Kalus, Lozova) parallel to the front and flowing to the Dnister river. With fresh troops of the 41st Bessarabian Division the enemy attempted to destroy our Division, but Col. Udovychenko frustrated all these attempts with adroit maneuvers inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

In this quite difficult and uncertain situation the well-known leader from Bukovyna, Otaman V. Topushchak came to me and told me that he had brought with him from Bukovyna, which had now

[1] Eighteenth century Ukrainian revolutionaries.

been occupied by the Rumanians, a whole battalion of very good soldiers to Kamyanets. He wanted his battalion to be attached as an independent unit to an appropriate unit of our Army. The Commander in Chief permitted him to visit the front and to select this unit. He had visited all, including our 9th regiment, without our knowing about it. The Commander in Chief granted his request to be attached to our regiment and now he was asking me whether I would have his battalion under my command. I could only thank Otaman Topushchak for his confidence in me, and his battalion was attached to my regiment in Nova Ushytsya. The battalion consisted of three infantry and one machine-gun companies with additional units and supplies. It was under the command of Captain Zipser, with Lieut. Cantemir as aide-de-camp. There was a total of about 320 men. I was always careful to keep this unit of such fine boys from suffering losses and I ordered them into battle only when it was absolutely necessary. Thus, my regiment unexpectedly grew larger, and in spite of losses which were fortunately not too heavy, now counted over 900 men. At that time the problem of clothing and especially shoes became very acute. We had worn them out in battles and marches! I was helped a lot by the Divisional Quartermaster, Captain Bazylevych, who had set woolen mills and tanneries in motion at Dunayevtsi, behind our lines.

The reinforced "Zaporozhska Sitch" Division finally took Zhmerynka and our Division received orders to go forward and take the Vapniarka railroad junction. This time I was to lead the attack through Kurylivtsi Murovani to Mohyliv. Mohyliv (Mogilev) was being defended by the Nemiya-Serebriy red regiment under Chaban, over 1,000 strong with an armored train and a number of cannon.

Following the bad experience with our 2nd battalion, I put it in reserve and led the attack on Mohyliv with the 1st and 3rd battalions, the 1st having the task of attacking north of Mohyliv and cutting off Chaban's avenue of retreat to the east. We dispersed the enemy after a fairly brief battle and captured seven cannon, the armored train and 200 prisoners. When my troops and I were going down the road to Mohyliv, which lies in a deep valley on the Dnister, Rumanian artillery fired at us from the other side of the Dnister! Captain Zipser immediately dispatched three officers, under a flag of truce, by boat across the Dnister, and they explained to the Rumanian commander of the sector in the city of Ataki exactly who we were. The firing ceased immediately, but we had several killed and wounded. Our delegates brought a report from the Rumanians that they had been informed by Chaban that Mohyliv was being attacked by bandits and that was why they had been shooting at us.

In Mohyliv the local population arranged a banquet reception for the entire regiment, presided over by the President of the City Council and by the Chairman of the County Board, the brothers Dyadynyuk (one of them was the father of the well-known Ukrainian painter and engraver V. Dyadynyuk who enlisted in my regiment as private). The banquet in honor of the officers and myself was held in City Hall, and for the soldiers in schools. The Rumanian commander of the city of Ataki, Major lovanescu was present at the banquet and apologized in a speech for firing on the regiment. I was told later by the Dyadynyuk brothers that all the guests had been waiting for my speech in great anxiety, hoping to hear that they would be safe from the Bolsheviks and could sleep safely and soundly without fear of excesses. It was evident from the way they reacted to my address that the civic leaders sighed with relief. The City Council offered as a gift to the regiment 200 complete uniforms with shoes, and the gift was delivered later that fall after 1 had been transferred to Kamyanets. An old friend of mine and associate from the Kharkiv Command, Lieut. Col. P. Nechytailo, came to offer his services to me in Mohyliv and I appointed him regimental quartermaster because my brother, who temporarily had been holding that position, had been appointed to the Foreign Department of the General Staff and had left for Kamyanets.

After three days in Mohyliv, where I had been collecting intelligence reports from the direction of Yampil, the regiment advanced through Sharhorod and Dzhuryn with the objective of helping to take the station of Rakhny and thus create a barrier toward Zhmerynka for further operations of the Division directed at Vapniarka. The enemy brought in considerable reinforcements, and the

Division, which stretched in various directions along a front of sixty kilometers, had to execute difficult maneuvers for over a week in order to hold the region of Dzhuryn-Murafa-Rakhny as a base for future operations toward Vapniarka. Colonel Udovychenko showed great operational ability and defeated the enemy on all sectors. The regiment stopped at the Murafa river line to guard operations of the main forces of the Division and engaged in heavy battles with overwhelming numbers of the enemy pressing from Zhmerynka in the north and from Tyvriv-Krasne in the east.

10. To Kiev

Reorganization of our high command to take charge of both Armies the UNR and UHA, and operational centralization and direction under battle conditions required much of the time and efforts of the Commander in Chief and his Staff. There was now doubt, however, among the soldiers, that by the common effort of both Armies, which were nearly 150,000 strong, we would finally conquer the Bolsheviks. The enthusiasm, however, did not extend beyond a few weeks. It did not occur to anyone, for example, to think of what would happen in the fall, but the Command and the Government did think about it.

Reasons of policy probably demanded centering of all our efforts on Kiev, but strategy looked for contact with the world through the port of Odessa. Politics won, and the bulk of our operations were directed toward Kiev, with safety measures undertaken both to the north and south. The direct attack on Kiev was led by the 3rd UHA Corps and the Zaporozhian Corps as the General A. Kraus Group. On August 30, Kiev was in our hands. Several days later we learned that our forces had again withdrawn from Kiev, and this was a terrible blow to the morale of our soldiers.

We knew from the communiques of the General Staff that our strategic position was deteriorating in connection with the movements of the "White" Russian army of General Denikin who did not conceal his aggressive plans toward Ukraine and other nations that had proclaimed their separation from Russia. Denikin knew, of course, that his success over the Bolsheviks was not so much due to the aid of the Western Allies, as to the Ukrainian Army which had dispersed the Reds. Renewed efforts of our Government and Commander to reach an understanding with Denikin by sending two delegations to him were unsuccessful: Denikin proclaimed that his aim was to restore "Russia, one and indivisible" and in the areas of Ukraine which came under his occupation all manifestations of Ukrainian political activities were summarily dealt with. It should be noted that he displayed the same hostility toward other non-Russian people who proclaimed their independence after the fall of tsarist Russia: the Don, Kuban, Georgia, and others. He ordered the execution of noted patriots of these countries, for example, he ordered the hanging of the Kuban patriot V. Kalabukhov. Denikin refused to talk to the Ukrainian delegates and even threatened them with arrest. Renewed appeals of our Government to the Allies were also futile, both to Allied representatives attached to our Command, as well as through our diplomatic representatives in Paris and London. One word from Clemenceau or from Lloyd George could have put an end to Denikin's military adventure, and could also have decided the fate of the Bolsheviks by directing all forces opposed to them in one unified action. But they were still dreaming of restoring great Russia with her profitable and insatiable market. It is hard to understand the working of the mind of Denikin and of the "great" statesmen of that time; they would not look at history, tactics or experience. We can well seek the causes of the decline of England and France in the events of that time.

When the troops of the General Kraus Group were marching into Kiev in parade order on August 31, General Bredov's group of Denikin's "White" Russians attacked our vanguard patrols guarding the bridges across the Dnipro, and broke into Kiev. General Kraus obeyed prior orders of our Staff and ordered his troops to withdraw to the western part of Kiev and waited for a political solution to the problem of our relations with Denikin. Gen. Bredov, however, took advantage of the situation and pressed the attack against our troops. The General Staff of the Commander ordered a halt to operations both against the Red and White Russians, and to permit the Reds marching from the south to engage the Whites – a very wise strategic move.

11. In Kamyanets Podilsky

At that time I suffered a relapse of my old illness, nephritis, and I was given one week's furlough, by Col. Udovychenko, to rest in bed and get well. On my way to Kamyanets, where my wife was staying, I met the Commander-in-Chief in Verbovets as he was proceeding to the front-line of our Division. After receiving my report about the situation in the Division and finding out that I was going for a rest, the Commander told me that he also wanted to speak to Col. Udovychenko about me. He wanted to transfer me to Kamyanets, the temporary capital, to take command of the 1st Recruit Regiment which was to be formed there and which was to garrison the city as a sort of guard regiment. For two reasons I felt that I should refuse this new assignment: I did not want to leave my brave comrades and soldiers; and I doubted whether Col. Udovychenko would let me go. A decision was difficult as I could not ask the Commander questions about the details of my new assignment. The Commander's aide. Col. O. Dotsenko, however, took advantage of a good moment and whispered to me: "take it, you will have the full support of the Commander and us" (this meant of the Commander's staff). I therefore gave an answer that if I felt better and if Col. Udovychenko would let me take a few of my officers from the regiment, I would be at the Commander's disposition. When I returned to the regiment after a week, Col. Udovychenko, with his usual composure and tolerance, not only consented to my transfer, but even let me take several officers, well knowing that I would pick the best and weaken the staff of my former regiment. My need, however, was also for reliable aides in forming a new and exemplary regiment. So began a new chapter in my life.

After arriving in Kamyanets I reported to the Minister of War, Col. V. Petriv, and received my first instructions: the 1st Recruit Regiment will be under the Minister of War through the Quartermaster-general of the Staff, Staff General S. Dyadyusha, who would have the rights of division commander in relation to the regiment. The regiment would be quartered in the barracks of the former Russian 45th Azov Regiment, where a nucleus of officer and noncom personnel was already available, and Capt. Kolodyazh, an officer of Moldavian descent, was provisional commander. After paying Gen. Dyadyusha a visit, I reported to State Inspector of the Ministry of War, A. Pevny, whom I knew from Kharkiv. I had a hearty talk with him about the appointment of a state inspector for the regiment, and he told me that he would make the appointment after consulting Col. Kedrovsky and Capt. Hladky, state inspector attached to the General Staff. I also visited Hladky and asked him not only for an inspector, but even for a controller, on condition that I could show some initiative and not be stopped over details. The man appointed as inspector was Capt. Harasym Drachenko of the Grey Division. He gave me full support and even defended me from all sorts of whispers coming from various party circles. In my further talks with Col. Petriv and Gen. Dyadyusha I insisted on providing the regiment with food and clothing because under then existing conditions these were of the greatest importance to the soldiers. In this I also had the support of State Inspection.

After a closer look at the personnel of the regiment I appointed Capt. Kolodyazh as my deputy, I placed Capt. Shevtsiv of the 9th Infantry Regiment in command of the 1st Battalion, Capt. Vinnytsky of the 2nd Battalion, and Capt. Sirenko of the 3rd Battalion. Lt.-Colonel Nechytailo, also of the 9th Reg. was my quartermaster and other officers taken by me from the 9th Regiment were Capt. Vodyanytsky, Lieut. Raskin, Lieut. Ovcharenko and a few junior officers. I immediately ordered decontamination of the barracks and all equipment, and preparation of food. The biggest trouble was clothing and shoes, but we managed somehow. The regimental warehouse had plenty of fine pre-war tarpaulin and the Quartermaster-General permitted its conversion to shoes and puttees, and delivered an appropriate quantity of leather for soles and trimming, but would not undertake to set up shoemakers shops. I then applied to the City Council and its Chairman, Mr. Fisher (I showed him the letter from Rabbi Feldfix), agreed to send me a master shoemaker to organize production. My condition was that the shop would be in the barracks of the regiment, for better control. In a few days we had a shop in production, turning out sixty-five to seventy pairs of shoes and puttees a day. The shoes were so good that I saw them being worn by soldiers a year later without much sign of

wear! Many state dignitaries, including Prime Minister I.P. Mazepa, came to the regiment and admired the production of shoes – from that time on, I had no trouble in getting funds and goods from the Quartermaster-General. Things were difficult with uniforms which were also in charge of the Quartermaster-General and were supplied primarily to front-line units. Some were assigned to me, but it was still warm and my troops wore heavy white shirts of which there was a plentiful supply as the Bolsheviks, surprisingly, did not take them when evacuating. Because of these shirts, my soldiers were called "our white guards." There were no difficulties with food and we were soon able to organize an officers' mess. The remount Commission supplied us with a number of horses and carts, but we had to repair the wagons ourselves. Lt-Col. Nechytailo helped me greatly in all these undertakings. Our main task, however, was mustering and training troops.

By the middle of September noncoms began arriving every day, and soon thereafter, also recruits. We conducted an accelerated review with the noncoms for a few days, according to rules tried out in the Zaporozhian Battalion. The inspection commission headed by Capt. Drachenko rejected only a few noncoms who were suspected of Communism and they were sent back to the Chief of the Draft District. Recruits came chiefly from the counties of Mohyliv and Ushytsya, 20-year-olds in groups of 40 to 100. Two commissions were set up in the regiment, Medical and Educational, the latter charged with picking out the brighter and better educated boys to the School for Non-commissioned Officers. It was very odd that nearly all recruits, as if by prearrangement, arrived in barracks literally in underwear, sometimes just in a long nightshirt, and barefoot. When asked about this they said that they had nothing else to wear or that that was the way their parents had equipped them. Another order that the boys brought from home was "don't fight Onykyn" (Denikin) whose troops were just then moving north in Right-Bank Ukraine (Bredov). Gen. Dyadyusha and Col. Petriv often attended field exercises and offered valuable advice. Within ten to twelve days the regiment had 2,000 men who were gradually being put in uniform and intensively trained. The Commander in Chief visited us before the Feast of the Holy Virgin (October 14), and told us that a "solemn swearing in" would take place on the holiday, and the regiment should be ready for it. We even had our own band by then.

On October 14th the swearing in took place. I brought out the regiment composed of three battalions, although some companies were not full strength because we could not parade those that were still barefoot. The armed regiment marching to the main square with its band made a tremendous impression. Foreign military agents watched the proceedings. Gen. Dyadyusha introduced me to some, and they would not believe that the regiment was actually only three weeks old. The ceremony lifted us all in spirit, especially the beautiful Divine Service and the sermon of Chief Chaplain, Very Rev. Pavlo Pashchevsky.

And now, although the work in the regiment was organized, the worries of my staff and mine were increasing. In connection with the departure of our Armies and the approach of "White-Guard" Russians, desertions from the regiment were growing. We had reports that the Reds had the better of the Whites in battles, and particularly Budenny's mounted group spread fear among the Whites. Our recruits were doubtlessly influenced by the approach of the march to the front-lines while we had only one exercise with live ammunition, and moreover our troops had no winter clothing. Our soldiers also saw thousands of typhoid patients brought to Kamyanets from the front. The noncoms were in this matter "in cahoots" with the enlisted men, therefore I gave orders that one officer of each company must spend the night with his men in barracks. Obviously, Capt. Drachenko and I informed our superiors about desertions and about the situation every day. We had daily talks with the men informing them about the cause of the struggle and tried to make them conscious patriots. I requested Col. Petriv to make a proposal in the Council of Ministers that desertion be made punishable by death, but he was opposed on the ground that such a law would be undemocratic (Col. Petriv was a member of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries). In violation of service, procedure I appealed in this matter directly to the Commander in Chief, and the law was passed. In the meantime I formed several patrols of non-coms commanded by officers and dispatched them to the villages to catch deserters. But if one day fifty boys were brought in, the same night an equal

number escaped in spite of all precautions. By early December parents of recruits came from the countryside and simply took their boys home at night. It was no use even to think about applying the death penalty.

Late in November the situation of our armed forces was precarious. Although the enemy did not attack, heavy winter did, and due to a lack of clothing and medical supplies, we had the catastrophe of the "Quadrangle of Death" in the Lubar-Ostropil region. The two united Armies which prior to the attack on Kiev had about 100,000 men under arms and 300 cannon, were reduced by the end of November to 4,000 men still able to carry arms, but unable to fight. The question arises: what happened to the rest? Uncounted thousands were dying of typhoid fever and thousands froze in the open fields. In every peasant cottage there were between ten and twenty sick soldiers, also on floors of schools, and more than 1,000 in a little hospital for 100 – all this without medical aid of any kind. All those unnamed heroes begged their comrades in their feverish ravings to shoot them and not leave them to their cruel fate. There was no water and no one to hand it around. There are no words eloquent enough to describe this suffering, and there is no one brave enough to talk about these sacrifices of our heroic soldiers.

The hapless population, chiefly the peasants in the areas of operation of our troops was also decimated by diseases. They came to the aid of our troops not as soldiers but as human beings and showed them unlimited compassion. When, in the spring of 1920, I was preparing for an offensive which we were undertaking together with the Poles, I was located with my brigade in several villages of Nova-Ushytsya county. There I saw entire villages empty of people, and tragic black boards at the entrance saying:

"Caution, typhoid wiped out the village." In one village I found the whole family of my good friend A.M. Hamaliya, an attorney in Lubni, who had been escaping to the west with the Denikin troops. They looked like skeletons and I did not recognize them, but they recognized me, told me who they were and then the brigade physician saved their lives.

I have often heard it said that our soldiers also died of malnutrition. This is true only to the extent that there was no one to take care of food supplies, but food was plentiful, there was enough to eat and all kinds of food products could be gotten from the peasants. This proves that in spite of several years' war in Ukraine, in spite of the revolution, in spite of requisitions by the Bolsheviks, Germans and Denikin, the land was still not poor, and the farmers often would refuse to take debased money, but supply food without charge. Organization of food supplies was particularly efficient in the UHA.

12. The Army in the Winter March

Then came the epic "Winter March." Early in December I received orders to form a battalion out of the remnants of the regiment and to send it to Yarmolyntsi to defend the Proskuriv-Kamyanets line from Denikin's troops. I appointed Capt. Vinnytsky commander of the battalion. He returned to Kamyanets on December 7th with only a handful of officers because all the soldiers had run away. When I received the order, I had explained the situation among the soldiers to Gen. Dyadyusha and warned that this was a hopeless gesture: the soldiers would desert. And so it happened.

On December 2nd the Commander in Chief called me and said that he was leaving to join the Army in connection with the situation at the front, and, leaving me in Kamyanets he hoped that I would keep up the action of holding up the spirits of the officers and men, and wait for spring which "might bring a completely unexpected change of our position." He told me to keep in close touch with the Minister, the President of Kamyanets University, Professor I. Ohienko whom the Government was appointing its chief delegate, and with General Kolodiy who was military aide to Minister Ohienko. At the time I did not catch the meaning of the Commander's words, but they soon came true.

At a conference of the members of the Government and of Army Commanders in Lubar it was decided that the Commander in Chief with some cabinet members, primarily with Foreign Minister A.M. Livytsky, would seek sanctuary in Poland, diplomatic relations with Poland having already been established, and the Army or the still battle-able parts of it, would go behind enemy lines, in a raid into Ukraine. The Army started on this march on December 6th and this was the historic "Winter March." General M. Omelanovych-Pavlenko was appointed commander of that army, but the real promoter was Gen. Yu. Tyutyunyk.

During that time the UHA found itself behind the lines of Denikin's Army, and the Commander of the UHA, General M. Tarnavsky concluded a truce with Denikin to save the remnants of his troops. For this, General Tarnavsky was removed from his command and put under court-martial by President E. Petrushevych, but the court-martial exonerated him. The new Commander of the UHA, General O. Mykytka was by then caught in a web of circumstances. The UHA was temporarily concentrated in the region of Koziatyn-Haysyn-Khmelnyk, and the UNR Army marched in that direction. After reorganization it counted about 3,000 men, nearly barefoot, badly clothed and without ammunition. But they were proven and chosen Ukrainian patriots. The Prime Minister, I. Mazepa was also with the Army.

It is necessary to digress into the future a little, in order to explain what reports on the "Winter March" reached us in Kamyanets, and what were the results of that march. First of all, the appearance of the army behind Denikin's lines so surprised and frightened General Denikin that he was the one to propose now an understanding and common action against the Bolsheviks. The Reds, too, when they found our Army behind Denikin's lines, proposed a truce and common action against "the imperialist, Denikin." Gen. Omelanovych-Pavlenko, however, refused to talk to either, and the Army first fought the Whites, and then the Reds. The attitude of the population to the Army was favorable because the people had already experienced the rule of both Russian armies. The people supplied the Army with food and men and helped in reconnaissance work. In connection with movements of the Army, a wave of uprisings broke out locally on both sides of the Dnipro, the Army having also made a raid to the Left Bank.

During the long winter months the Army was on the march and fought a series of battles with both enemies, capturing valuable arms from the Denikin troops. When the Reds approached Odessa, which was the supply base of Denikin, even the delegation of the Allies expressed a readiness to negotiate with the Ukrainians, but the Ukrainians demanded transfer of authority in the regions to them, and immediate removal of Denikin troops from the Odessa region. This was in January 1920. The plan was not carried out in spite of Allied consent because Odessa was occupied by the Reds

within a few days. Allied ships evacuated most of Denikin's troops to the Crimea which was fortified and placed under the command of General Wrangel replacing Denikin. There were many Ukrainian soldiers in the Odessa region and they made their way to our Army, strengthening it numerically. The Reds tried to encircle and destroy our Army, but due to able maneuvering and action behind their lines our Army survived. Moreover, detachments of the UHA and individual Galicians joined our troops, so that by April its ranks had grown to 6,000 men, including over 1,000 horses.

Meanwhile the Government and the Commander in Chief had begun negotiations with Poland regarding recognition of the Ukrainian Government and aid in the fight against Moscow. The Polish Chief of State, Jozef Pilsudski was just as much aware as we of the threat to Poland on the part of Red Moscow, and, as we learned later from his memoirs, he was at that time looking for allies. Russian activities, consisting of massing huge troop concentrations along the Polish border demanded immediate Polish action to avert the danger. A Ukrainian-Polish Agreement and Military Convention was signed on April 22, 1920, under which the Polish Army was to march into Ukraine as soon as possible and help liberate Ukraine.

13. Under Polish Occupation

To get back to events in Kamyanets: Polish troops entered Kamyanets on December 8, 1919 and moved east along to Ushytsya river to Proskuriv-Shepetivka-Olevsk. In the south they held a line of defense against Denikin, but when pressed by the Reds, Denikin's troops surrendered to the Poles, the latter contained the Reds from advancing along this line any farther. There was no peace under Polish occupation in the Kamyanets region because lower Polish officials started requisitioning goods from the people who replied with sabotage. Officers of the 1st Recruit Regiment paid me frequent private visits and reported on the behavior of Polish authorities. There was a fairly large Polish population in Kamyanets and my Polish neighbors watched the comings and goings of suspicious-looking visitors to my apartment. One night several men of the Polish military police entered my apartment, searched it, and arrested me. When I was being taken into the police car I heard my Polish neighbors say: "That's he." A captain of the Polish military police interrogated me immediately and when I explained why these people had been coming to see me, he ordered my release.

Without much to do, I renewed close contacts with my high school classmates, Dr. B. Matusov and Engineer[1] H. Lerner who were staying in Kamyanets. The latter was an official of the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, and he told me an interesting story. It seems that in September a complaint reached the Ministry signed by Jews of Mohyliv county which stated that "Colonel Shandruk oppresses Jews, demands money from them under threat of throwing hand-grenades into their homes, forces Jews to make the sign of the Cross and to eat dirt," etc. A secret investigation of the charges was ordered by Minister P. Krasny and conducted by Lerner and a department chief. The result was both surprising and humorous. When the investigators asked the complainants to describe Shandruk, they said: "he is short and wears a red goatee." Lerner told them in the presence of Minister Krasny that this was some kind of provocation because "Shandruk is tall (over six ft.) and has no beard, only an upward-pointed moustache." Unfortunately, nothing more was done about this matter, although I had a fairly good idea about the identity of the person acting under my name.

Late in January 1920, our Foreign Minister A.M. Livytsky came to Kamyanets from Warsaw where he also headed the Ukrainian delegation negotiating with Poland. He called a meeting of responsible Ukrainians to report on the progress of negotiations. I attended the meeting and heard all the people then present who represented all political parties, speak in favor of our Government's bid for Polish military and political aid, provided that our political position was clearly understood by the Poles.

Several days later General Kolodiy asked me to start work on a list of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Kamyanets region. The order was issued by our Minister of War, Col. V. Salsky, then in Warsaw, and approved by the Polish authorities. There were immediate complications, however, arising from a lack of coordination: an identical order was issued to Col. O. Shapoval who was also in Kamyanets appointed to command the 2nd Infantry Brigade which he was to form. I offered my services to Col. Shapoval, promising to join his brigade with all my former subordinates. According to instructions of the Minister of War the brigade was to consist of three infantry battalions, an artillery division and a cavalry company with the provision that with growing enlistments the brigade would develop into a division, and battalions into regiments. In order to work out the details of this matter. Minister Ohienko, acting on the recommendation of General Kolodiy and Col. Shapoval, sent me to Warsaw. The trip was difficult, but very interesting. It was interesting because I went in uniform, on military travelling orders issued by the commander of the 18th Polish Division; General Krajowski, which was holding the front against the Bolsheviks on the Kamyanets sector. It was a hard trip because the passenger coaches were unheated to Ternopil, and we had January weather. My appearance in Warsaw in uniform created a sensation, and Polish officers asked me on the street of what nationality I was. During my two weeks in

[1] Engineer – graduate of Technical Institute (College).

Warsaw I reported on the military situation to the Commander in Chief and Minister of War. They gave me money for Col. Shapoval and organizational projects.

There I also learned that after I had left Kamyanets a considerable armed force of partisans began operations against the Bolsheviks around Mohyliv. The partisans had been organized by Col. Udovychenko who had been ill with typhoid in December and taken to Odessa. After recovering he reached Mohyliv on his way west. Col. Salsky had plans to give Col. Udovychenko command of the 2nd Division which would include the remnants of the 1st Recruit Regiment as a nucleus of a fourth infantry brigade (this was an organizational innovation because formerly divisions consisted of three brigades). Col. Salsky told me that he would put me in command of the 4th brigade, but the final decision would be up to Col. Udovychenko.

At this time Col. Salsky also informed me about the course of diplomatic negotiations with the Poles in the matter of a Ukrainian-Polish alliance, and noted that Polish parliamentary and party circles were creating difficulties with recognition of Ukraine and engaging Poland in military aid to Ukraine, but that the final decision was in the hands of Chief of State Jozef Pilsudski whose attitude was favorable. Our military Attache to the Polish high command was Col. B. Homzyn, mentioned before, who informed the Commander in Chief on all military matters.

14. The Ukrainian-Polish Alliance

I returned to Kamyanets hopeful and in good spirits. I was being awaited impatiently because everyone wanted to hear about the chances of resuming war against the Bolsheviks. Col. Udovychenko had already received orders to take command of the 2nd Division, he was in Kamyanets and offered me the post of commander of the 4th infantry brigade. The Division was to be composed of the 4th, 5th and 6th brigade, one artillery brigade and a cavalry regiment with all auxiliary units. We expected to reorganize the whole on this pattern soon. I received Col. Udovychenko's offer with enthusiasm. Col. Shapoval was given a diplomatic appointment.

I had to start assembling personnel again, and new troubles began with uniforms, food, etc. Early in April I moved a nucleus of three battalions to Ivashkivtsi-Borsukivtsi where the brigade was to get recruits from a draft of three age groups in the county of Nova-Ushytsya. The commanders of battalions were: 10th – Capt. Kolodyazh, 11th – Capt. Hrabchenko (my colleague from the 232nd Russian reserve regiment), 12th – Lieut.-Col. Bilan, and Capt. Verekha in charge of the cavalry company. The artillery unit was part of the artillery brigade, and was only tactically under my command, it was commanded by Lieut.-Col. Loburenko. Awaiting supplements, we held daily exercises with the cadres, but even here we had difficulties with lack of arms, particularly machine-guns for technical and tactical exercises. Negotiations between Col. Udovychenko and commander of the 18th Polish Division, General Krajowski, had little effect, since the Polish Division was short of arms, and in spite of the fact that Polish Chief of State Pilsudski, as we learned later, had issued appropriate orders, they never reached Gen. Krajowski.

We received information that the offensive of Polish and Ukrainian forces was to begin on April 24th. But actually we had still neither enough men nor sufficient arms. Out of the entire cadre of the Division Col. Udovychenko formed a separate detachment under my command, consisting of 350 infantry men and two cannon. Together with the 35th Polish Brigade under Colonel Lados, this detachment began an offensive in the direction of Ozaryntsi (north of Mohyliv) via Verbovets. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment of Col. M. Frolov was proceeding along the Dnister river. This regiment with its commander had left the volunteer army of Gen. Bredov, and joined us. In one day our detachment reached the Vendychany-Ozaryntsi-Mohyliv line where we stopped for mobilization and organization, and the 18th Polish Division continued east. The brigade, quartered in the Ozaryntsi region, was soon supplemented with men, armed and uniformed, and organized. The people of Mohyliv tendered the Division a grand reception, and present were also the officers of the 18th Polish Division with General Krajowski and Colonel Lados. The latter, during an appropriate moment, danced a beautiful Cossack dance to loud applause of all Ukrainians.

On May 6th, the Army of the UNR, in the glory of its legendary Winter March and brilliant victories, entered the Mohyliv regions from the rear of the Bolsheviks under heavy fighting. In this fighting, the Army completely annihilated the 14th Soviet Army in the Rybnytsya-Rudnytsi regions. Lightly guarded and without much bother from the enemy, the Army rested in Mohyliv-Yampil regions and reorganized into five infantry and one cavalry divisions and two reserve brigades. At that time our Division got back its old name from the previous year, the 3rd Infantry Iron Division because most of its officers, now headed by General Udovychenko, were the same as in 1919, and the men were from the same localities. My brigade was named No. 7.

About the middle of May I received orders from Gen. Udovychenko to proceed to woods about seven kilometers north of Yampil, and there incorporated in my brigade a Galician detachment of Lieut. Yaremych which managed to join us from behind Bolshevik lines. There were 260 men with machine-guns and equipment. This was another manifestation of the comradeship in arms of the UNR and UHA armies. Galician soldiers were joining us nearly every day, many officers among them. I remember well the fine officer Capt. Dr. Hrynevych who was all bedraggled. To me personally this was new proof of the confidence of the Galicians in me, and Gen. Udovychenko said: "you have always been a patron of the Galicians, and when they learned that you were here,

asked to be put in your brigade." I attached this unit to the brigade as the 21st battalion and the rest went into the brigade police company.

Our bivouac in this region lasted until May 27th when the Division received orders to march to the front on the river Markivka line, and the brigade was to hold the Myaskivka-Haryachkivka line. On the day of departure, a delegation of Jews of the city of Ozaryntsi came to me and presented me with a scroll which stated, among others:

"We, the Jews of Ozaryntsi, never had it so peaceful since the revolution of 1917, as during the time when the 7th Brigade was stationed in our vicinity."

The position of the brigade was at the most exposed northern wing of the Army and it maintained liaison with the neighboring Polish units. The whole Army front stretched out for over eighty kilometers. News reached us that the 3rd Polish Army, which included our 6th Infantry Division formed from our men who had been held as prisoners of war by the Poles, had captured Kiev, and that our Commander in Chief had been received by the city of Kiev. At first we did not know why we were not advancing east, but early in June it became known from communiques that the Bolsheviks had massed on the southern front opposite the Poles and us, the mounted Army of Budenny in the region of Lypovets. The Polish command had therefore halted the offensive in order to annihilate Budenny on prepared positions. After several attempts, however, Budenny succeeded in breaking through the Polish front near Samhorodok, and the Poles could not stop him in spite of filling the breach with reserves. A retreat began on the entire front from Kiev to the Dnister, but in spite of the Bolsheviks' huge superiority in numbers, they failed to encircle or destroy any of the Ukrainian or Polish units. The situation became aggravated by the fact of desertions caused by our defeat. True, desertions were not on the mass scale of the previous year because the people had already experienced the Bolshevik "paradise," but nevertheless our ranks thinned. When we entered Galicia in our retreat, large numbers of Galicians went home, too. Another, fairly large part of the 5th Kherson Division crossed the Carpathians into Czechoslovakia.

The brigade experienced heavy fighting against overwhelming enemy forces, particularly against the cavalry near Sydoriv (east of Chortkiv) and along the line of the rivers Seret and Strypa, but we fought back without heavy losses. In the Sydoriv region enemy cavalry succeeded in pushing the 21st battalion out of Vasylkivtsi and it managed to hold on only to the western part of the village. We had to win the position back at all cost because the flanks of neighboring units were threatened. The 19th reserve battalion had orders to recapture Vasylkivtsi, but unfortunately, the commander of the battalion left the village unescorted and encountered enemy cavalry hiding in a land depression before the village. In flight from the sabers of enemy cavalry the battalion rushed back to the village which was only a short way off, but it lost fifteen men, a great loss at the rime when the whole battalion had only sixty men. The loss was a blow on our morale, too. At my request Gen. Udovychenko sent a cavalry company from the 8th brigade and two companies of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment from the division reserve to our aid and our cavalry restored the break. Soon, however, the enemy threw in another huge cavalry group and our Division could not hold out. But finally the Cavalry Division came from our reserve, and together we annihilated the enemy cavalry: the Red Cossack Cavalry Division and the Bashkir Cavalry Brigade. This example shows that the enemy was not superior to us. Our Division fought on this front for nearly two weeks, and orders to withdraw to the river Strypa line came only in connection with the situation on the Polish front.

On the last day before withdrawal to the Strypa line the brigade received reinforcements: a full battalion of 250 men of former POWs in Poland trained in a Polish camp under Capt. Trutenko. I left this battalion intact as the 21st battalion, dividing the 21st battalion among the 20th and 19th. Our withdrawal was very slow and during the night our brigade occupied for defense several villages on the east bank of the Strypa, Capt. Trutenko's battalion taking the whole east end of the large village of Trybukhivtsi. Being completely exhausted, I did not personally supervise placing of patrols, expecting that Capt. Trutenko, an experienced World War I officer, would take care of

guarding us for the night. I felt uneasy, however, and my uneasiness was justified: the Bolsheviks attacked Trybukhivtsi during the night and panic ensued. Order was restored, however, when I came to the threatened place with my own men. The battalion held on only to the northern end of the village until morning, and then we crossed to the west bank of the river Strypa. After this event I replaced Capt. Trutenko with Lieut.-Col. Bazylevsky.

To the north, defended by the 1st Zaporozhian Division, enemy cavalry broke through to its rear and threatened our entire front, but there again, the Cavalry Division frustrated the enemy's attempts and inflicted heavy losses on him. Meanwhile the 6th Polish Army which was in operational contact with our Army, withdrew toward Lviv leaving our entire northern wing exposed and this compelled our Command to begin a withdrawal across the Dnister. The withdrawal was completed around August 18th and 19ch after heavy fighting. The brigade, which had been covering the Division in its withdrawal, was ordered to the region of Vynohrad-Yaseniv for a rest, and then it was placed on a sector of the front along the Dnister, with the bridge at Nyzhniv as the center of defense. We had only daily exchange of shots with the enemy, but passive defense was not in the plans of Gen. Udovychenko, and during that period of seven to eight days while we were stationed along the Dnister. We made several night sorties across the river and finally secured the opposite bridgehead and our 3rd Cavalry Regiment made a raid as far as Monasteryska.

Under pressure of circumstance and on demand of our prominent high officers the matter of ranks and promotions was finally taken care of at that time. A special commission was appointed under Gen. M. Yanchevsky which compiled a register of the entire officer corps of the Army for the purpose of determining ranks, and drafted regulations for promotions. I was confirmed in the rank of Captain with full seniority with simultaneous promotion to Colonel for meritorious battle service.

The news reached us only late in August that the Poles had thoroughly beaten the Reds near Warsaw, striking from the river Wieprz against the southern wing of the Bolshevik front which reached from Demblin all the way to Torun. Our Army began preparing for attack and the 3rd Division was moved to the south to Horodenka, where it was to force the Dnister and proceed eastward to capture the line of Skala-Husiatyn. During the course of several nights and under cover of woods our 3rd Battalion of Engineers built planks and pontoons, and in the night of September 15th the 8th Brigade forced the Dnister on pontoons and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment swimming. Enemy sentries were all taken prisoner and the Reds began to retreat in panic. Within four days the Division traversed over 120 kilometers with light skirmishes and crossed the Zbruch again on September 21st. On our own free soil all soldiers not on duty assembled on a hill near Orynin attending Divine Service of thanksgiving for the happy return to the Homeland.

The brigade was in poor condition. In spite of successful attempts to destroy the enemy with the least possible losses to ourselves, our losses accumulated. Some battalions had no more than fifty to sixty men, the 12th had over 100, and the cavalry company had thirty horses. We were hoping that the enemy would not be able to prevent our mobilization of new recruits in the area, and that the Poles Would have better opportunities for supplying us with arms. The enemy was retreating in panic and our Command took full advantage of the situation. Although the Bolsheviks threw in fresh troops soon, we realized that regardless of our exhaustion we had to advance as fast as possible, taking advantage of our good morale. We had the same thing all over again: battles and forced marches, and organization work.

Unexpectedly, however, reports came in that the Poles accepted the Bolsheviks' offer of a cease-fire, and that they were ready to negotiate peace. General Udovychenko was pressing the attack, to gain as much depth in territory as possible for a "breather" and finally the Division pulled far ahead of the right wing of the front, reaching the river Markivka. Our Division and the newly created First Machine-gun Division constituted the Right Army Group of General Udovychenko.

On October 18th came the end of our fighting job on the front along the river Markivka. We had to stop the fight for the liberation of our Homeland because the Poles had signed an armistice which

included the entire front of our Army. The Poles had sent their detachments to the line of our front in order to mark that all this was the Polish front. It was quite clear to me that our struggle against the Bolsheviks, considering Red Moscow's potential, had entered into a new stage of crisis. I kept all the ill omens of our situation to myself in order to lift the morale of my troops in expectation of an early renewal of operations because the armistice was valid only until November 10th. The Bolsheviks, I felt, would not keep any promises made to us. The Poles were unable to satisfy our needs for materiel and supplies. We were particularly short of ammunition for the infantry. Our Command had hopes to recover arms and ammunition from the Rumanians which they had taken from the Zaporozhian Corps during the tatter's crossing of Rumania in 1919. Negotiations with the Rumanians ended in their consent to return this property of ours in exchange for sugar which we had available from the Vendychany refinery situated in the region of the 3rd Division. This fact of the Rumanians' trading our own property should be well remembered. At the time, however, this was the only way we could supplement our stock of arms of which we were in dire need since we had several thousand draftees in our mobilization centers. With these arms, and with all the work of our armorers who cleaned and reconditioned arms and ammunition taken from the population, we had only forty to fifty rounds per man and four to six tapes per machine-gun. Rifles were in such worn condition that at a distance of 100 paces the target would be missed by several feet which I observed personally. Regarding clothing, we were somewhat better off than in 1919.

I went to Kamyanets on November 4th to take care of several matters during a week's furlough, but early in the morning of the 12th H. Roytberg (mentioned before) came running to my house in Kamyanets with the news that he barely escaped from encirclement by a Bolshevik brigade. I left for the front right away, but I could only reach Nova Ushytsya, the front being on the river Kalus line. Gen. Udovychenko was extremely busy with the new situation, but he took time to tell me briefly that early in the morning of November 10th the Bolsheviks attacked in great force of cavalry and infantry our 9th Brigade in the region of Sharhorod, made a deep breakthrough and almost annihilated our Division. My brigade suffered particularly heavy losses being attacked by Red Cavalry on the defense line near Chernivtsi, and the General sent the 8th Brigade to help. All ammunition was spent soon and the brigades held the line with bayonets. The enemy could not take Chernivtsi and went around them. In the night the decimated brigades withdrew to Luchynets-Yaryshiv. Some ammunition was supplied by our Army Quartermaster, but the enemy could not be stopped. The Army Staff dispatched the Cavalry Division against the attacking enemy groups, but it suffered heavy losses and could not contain the enemy. With ever fresh forces brought in by the Bolsheviks into battle, we could not regroup the Army and hold the enemy. The Army was in full retreat, but the retreat was orderly so as to prevent encirclement and annihilation. The group withdrew to the Zbruch on the Volochyska-Ozhyhivtsi line and was to cross into Poland on terms agreed upon in advance. For the first time in our fight for independence we had horrible losses and nebulous prospects for the future. In talks with my commanders of battalions and from reports of commanders of other divisions I could piece together the whole situation and our operational mistakes which could have been the cause of all that happened. First of all, my conjecture was quite correct that we should not have waited with launching our offensive until the very last minute of the expiring armistice, all the more so since Polish token forces had been withdrawn on November 3rd. In any event, we would have had the initiative, although, naturally enough, one could predict the outcome of such an offensive. The Army Command did not consent to the proposal made by the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, M. Frolov, to create a mobile attack group out of all cavalry units and make a deep raid behind enemy lines in October, at a time when the Bolsheviks were concentrating their forces On our front. This would also have been an action of operational intelligence which was not undertaken, we did not even engage in deeper tactical intelligence. As we learned from intelligence reports of the Army Staff, all intelligence was gathered by agents, a system which is always unreliable. The time of year was against us, but it was just as much against the enemy. In men and materiel, however, the enemy was undoubtedly superior to us.[1]

[1] "Ukrains'ko-Moskovs'ka Viyna v dokumentakh" (The Ukrainian-Muscovite War in Documents), by General V. Salsky and General P. Shandruk. Published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, 1935.

Thoughts were discussed that the Army might go on another winter march, but it was quite clear that neither the relation of forces nor operational conditions would be in favor of such action, the Bolsheviks being no longer busy on other fronts, as was the case in 1919.

According to data of the Army Staff, as of November 10th the Army held a front from the Dnister near Yampil through Bar to Lityn, i.e. over 120 kilometers. Our numbers were: about 14,000 infantry, about 3,000 cavalry, eighty cannon and a few armored cars. Facing us, the Reds concentrated about 25,000 infantry (the 12th and 14th Army) and about 5,000 cavalry with incomparably stronger artillery and with full technical and materiel supplies.[1] Hence, with our experience in waging war against the Bolsheviks and with our determination we could count on some initial success which could have developed into something bigger in connection with the low morale of the Red troops following the defeat at Warsaw. This, however, is merely conjecture, albeit based on logical analysis.

For 11 days in heavy and unequal battles, the Army was withdrawing westward, under cover of thinning cavalry ranks and machine-guns mounted on carts. Our retreat was also covered by the so-called 3rd Russian Army of General Peremykin, formed in Poland under the auspices of the Russian Political Liberation Committee headed by the well-known Russian political leader Boris Savinkov who recognized Ukrainian independence. The forces of that army were too weak, however, to stop the advance of the Reds. Accompanying Gen. Udovychenko, I just managed to get across a bridge at Volochyska on November 21st at night under enemy machine-gun fire. The Bolsheviks did not gain much booty from us because everything that could be moved (trains, horses, artillery) was moved by us to Polish territory.

The war was over, and in spite of wholly unjustified official optimism, I did not see any prospects of a change in the political and military situation in our favor, I did not see any possibility of a new rise to arms.

[1] E. Melikov and M. Kakurin, "Voyna s belopolakami" (The War against the White Poles), Moscow, 1928.

15. In Camps for Internees in Poland

After disarming, we were directed to various camps, built by the Germans for prisoners of war during World War I. The entire 3rd Division travelled several days in unheated freight cars and arrived in Kalisz (Camp No. 10). The first inspection of the camp left us with the impression that after we would get our quarters in order we would manage somehow – we had managed to survive four years of war under conditions that cannot be described. At first I was appointed camp commandant, but several weeks later the 2nd Volhynian Division arrived in camp and a group Commandant was appointed for both Divisions. After a short rest and primitive organization of the lives of about 5,000 people, we were faced with the problem of occupying such a large mass of men massed together, since it is a known fact that even the most disciplined crowd kept idle is apt to produce spiritual and even physical conflicts. The situation was made more difficult because food was pretty poor, the Polish supply command allotting us about 1,400 to 1,500 calories. Clothing worn by our people was simply in catastrophic condition, even some officers could not get up from their beds of boards for days, having nothing to put on. We started to look for a solution because in addition to going hungry ourselves, lice were eating us. Intervention by our diplomatic representatives with the Polish authorities in Warsaw and appeals to welfare organizations like the Y.M.C.A. and B.R.M.[1] produced some results: the Y.M.C.A. gave us a certain amount of underwear, linen, clothing, shoes and evaporated milk for children (at least 2,000 women and children had been evacuated together with the Army, and soon more children were born in camps). The Poles gradually increased quantity and quality of food and assigned some money for needed medical supplies. But in order to stop feeding idlers, the Poles offered group work, e.g. in sawmills, on large estates, in sugar refineries, etc. Many soldiers took advantage of the offer and thus, the 3rd Cavalry Regiment went to work in the sawmill in Suwalki, and the 20th Battalion to the Bialowiezka Puszcza hunting preserve. We also established various trade schools and shops: carpentry, tailoring, shoemaking. An old officer, Col. Melnykiv was in charge of these in our camp. The Y.M.C.A. organized an embroidery enterprise for the women which provided a modest income for beautiful work. Modest indeed, for example: an artistically embroidered tablecloth with 12 napkins, over which a woman had to work four to five weeks, including long nights with candle-light, fetched only five to six dollars in equivalent Polish currency. In addition, painters' studios were organized and our painters sold pretty paintings which sometimes found buyers out of charitable motive. Selling paintings all over the country created a numerous class of "travelling salesmen" who improved their own and their suppliers' standard of living. This was the material side of the case.

The spiritual side was very well and constructively organized. First of all, each camp built its own church in the barracks from the internees' own funds. In our camp the first chaplain was the Chaplain of the 7th Brigade Rev. P. Pyatachenko, then Chief Army Chaplain Very Rev. P. Pashchevsky, well-known for his patriotic sermons. Later schools of general education were established (grade, supplemental, courses, etc.), and even a high school in which I taught history, geography and French. This work was conducted by cultural-educational department of divisions under the general chairmanship of our esteemed professor, the Hon. V.K. Prokopovych, former Ukrainian Minister of Education. Lieut.-Col. M. Derkach was in charge of the cultural-educational department in our camp and contributed much time and effort to this work.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks took advantage of the still confused conditions in the young Polish Republic, and in spite of the peace treaty signed in Riga, they organized armed bands which attacked villages across the Polish border, burning and devastating entire settlements. The raids sometimes penetrated to a depth of fifteen kilometers into Poland. General Yu. Tyutyunyk, the well known organizer of uprisings against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine wanted to make the best of this confusion along the border, and got the consent of our Commander in Chief to organize a raid into Ukraine. He assembled a large detachment of volunteers who were willing to organize a rebellion in

[1] British Relief Mission.

Ukraine, and he kept these activities secret from the Polish authorities. Preparations were under way in March 1921, but due to the necessity to keep them secret and technical obstacles, the raid was delayed. The rebel group which called itself "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) was able to start from the forests of Podilla and Polissya only late in October, when weather conditions were absolutely unsuitable for such operations. The most important problem was arms and transportation because Gen. Tyutyunyk's plans quite justly called for speedy movement deep into Ukraine, in order to surprise the enemy and prevent possible encirclement. The only chance to capture arms was to stage a surprise attack on one of the border garrisons. The group, divided into two detachments, crossed the border early in November, destroyed Bolshevik defense posts on the border, and captured some arms and horses. Moving quickly, the main force under Gen. Tyutyunyk's personal command reached the city of Korosten (over 100 kilometers east of the border) within two days. In a surprise attack on the enemy garrison, and after heavy battle, they took the city of Korosten and made it a base for further operations. Gen Tyutyunyk intended to attack Kiev from there, and then turn south in order to join other insurgent groups which were still active in the southern part of Kiev province. If this action had been started at a different time of year, rebellion would probably have spread all over Ukraine where life under the Bolsheviks was very hard, the conquerors repressing all passive resistance and active rebellion of the Ukrainian people. The Bolsheviks, however, took a successful gamble: they threw the cavalry Division of Kotovsky into the fight to encircle Gen. Tyutyunyk, part of the Ukrainian force which was already near Kiev, had to withdraw to the west under heavy snow and cold weather. Enemy cavalry encircled the group completely near the village of Mynky. A part fought its way out, but 359 soldiers were taken prisoner. When our soldiers rejected the Reds' offer to serve in the Red Army, they were tried by court-martial and sentenced to death by firing squad. They went to their death in the city of Novy Bazar singing the Ukrainian National Anthem. Another group, under Col. S. Paliy Sydoryansky which was under enemy attack from the very moment that it crossed the border, luckily fought its way back into Poland. They were interned by the Polish authorities along with the remaining men of Gen. Tyutyunyk's group.

We had a diplomatic mission in Czechoslovakia since 1919, and at its request the Government consented to admit a large number of our scholars and to establish many scientific and educational institutions, as the Pedagogical Institute, Husbandry Academy, Free University, high school and different courses. There the Ukrainian Civic Committee was headed by the well-known pre-war Ukrainian leader M. Shapoval, a man full of energy, but politically one-sided as a former member of the party of socialists-revolutionaries, and this had a certain effect on his selection of pedagogues and school personnel. Later, M. Shapoval's party fervor became less acute. When news about educational opportunities in Czechoslovakia reached our soldiers, they began to seek opportunities to get there. My soldiers came to me for advice, and I openly advised them to go to Czechoslovakia instead of sitting around in camp wasting time in expectation of a change of the political situation, an expectation I thought entirely unwarranted. The Ukrainian Civic Committee offered advice how to cross the Polish-Czechoslovakian border illegally. The border was crossed in the Carpathian mountains with receiving points set up on the other side. Both governments, the Polish and Czechoslovakian, probably knew about this and kept one eye shut because there was not a single instance of anyone being caught on the border. Thus, first the young people went in large masses to Czechoslovakia, followed by their elders, but by then we had gained the right to travel on passports. One of those who went to Czechoslovakia and graduated from the Husbandry Academy in Podebrady was my former chief of staff, Lieut.-Col. D. Linytsky. My attitude in the matter of the soldiers' departure to study in Czechoslovakia created some unpleasantness for me because our "camp command" wanted to have "an army" – since without an army their ranks were becoming meaningless. For this reason the commanders thought that I was doing "subversive work" and wanted to compromise me. I also wished to go abroad, even to walk west, but during an audience with the Commander in Chief on the occasion of my promotion to General (early in 1925), he prohibited me from leaving Poland by reason of future possibilities. Hence, with the departure of men for studies and for jobs, life in the camps began more tolerable for the rest, with better food and more clothing available.

Concerning our organized activities it should be noted that on the initiative of General Salsky, the Ukrainian Military Society (UWET) was established, subsequently changed into the Association of former Soldiers of the UNR Army; it existed until the outbreak of World War II, when it was liquidated by the Germans.

At that time I became interested in military literature, and this was the beginning of my modest contributions to Polish military magazines "Bellona," "Przeglad Wojskowy," and "Polska Zbrojna," and to the French magazine "Revue des Deux Mondes." At the same time I conceived the idea of publishing a Ukrainian military-historical magazine in order to preserve our historical and military material and to shed at least some light on the epic of our armed effort. I talked the matter over with Gen. Kushch and Professor Prokopovych and they supported my project. Gen. Kushch became chief editor, and I was secretary. The name of the journal was "Tabor" (Camp), and it was our military-historical journal, and later military-scientific. This publication also existed until World War II. I contributed several dozen articles to it, including a tactical assignment within the framework from a platoon to an infantry regiment. A Course for Staff Officers was founded in our camp on orders of Gen. Salsky, and I taught applied tactics and topography, and also took part in tactical games. The Courses were headed by Staff General, Lt.-Gen. S. Dyadyusha. From among my students I remember Captains V. Shevchenko, A. Shevchenko and P. Orel-Orlenko, I had a very interesting encounter with the last-named later. When the housing shortage tapered off I proposed that we establish an officers club. It was decorated in Ukrainian style by our best painters: V. Dyadynyuk, M. Zhukiv and Ya. Shcherbak. Various military adages and sayings of famous military leaders were inscribed on the walls, with a portrait of S. Petlura on the main wall. Under it was the renowned call of Garibaldi to his soldiers.

On their part, the Bolsheviks did not leave us in peace, either. In 1922 a Soviet mission visited the camp several times to talk our soldiers into returning home. Pursuant to the Polish-Soviet agreement it had the right to appeal to the soldiers directly. In our camp all the residents were assembled in the square and in reply to the delegates' call for return to the homeland, there was deep silence, not one came forward and this probably happened in all camps, of which there were seven. The Bolsheviks did not address our soldiers any more. They resorted to a different method: they tempted people individually. We learned later that one of such traitors was no less a person than deputy chief of staff of our Division, Captain Makarenko: he left for Warsaw one day without warning and even took with him part of the staff documents. He began writing letters to officers trying to convince them to go home. There was another case in my Brigade: Lt.-Col. Nechytailo went to take a job in the Carpathians in 1922, but several weeks later he came to me with a letter from his wife and from Otaman I. Kobza. The latter had been temporary commander of the Slobidsky Corps in 1919 and a friend of Nechytailo, as both had been members of the Democratic Peasants Party. The letters urged him to return home immediately because he was assured of a pardon, and his wife with three children certainly needed his help. Lt-Col. Nechytailo asked me for advice. I told him to weigh the matter very carefully before making his final decision, cautioning him that the Bolsheviks never kept their word, and emphasizing that the report of Mr. Kobza about new favorable conditions under the Bolsheviks in Ukraine sounded rather strange. Nevertheless, he decided to go. Subsequently we had news that he never even reached his home, but was sent to the concentration camp in Kolyma together with Kobza. The General Yu. Tyutyunnyk, mentioned before, the well-known commander of the 4th Kiev Division and leader of a partisan detachment 6,000 strong, who had joined our Army in August 1919 and gained a great reputation in Ukraine, also went home on an individual pardon. At first he was manager of a tannery in the Volga region, but later he was reported to have been executed.

It can be stated generally that during the period to 1926, all our interned soldiers in Poland proved themselves to be of the best caliber in every respect. They kept their patriotic spirit, high morale, and military discipline, based, under existing circumstances, mainly on mutual confidence and respect.

The year 1926 was a turning point in the position of Ukrainian emigres. Marshal Pilsudski came to power in Poland in May. After a few months we felt a changed attitude toward us on the part of official Polish circles. Before that, Chief of the Polish General Staff, General S. Szeptycki told our General V. Salsky: "Get out of Poland, you loafers!" Late in 1926, General V. Salsky presented Marshal Pilsudski with a memorandum in the name of the UNR Government on the necessity: (1) to make military preparations for the future, (2) on the care of our disabled men and old officers, (3) on formal approval of a Ukrainian civic committee to have the right to act throughout Poland and take care of our emigres, and (4) on transfer to our management of the camp at Kalisz, to serve as a home for our sick and older soldiers. All these matters were gradually approved by the Polish authorities. First of all, formal sanction was granted to the Ukrainian Central Committee (U.Ts.K.) with branches in all localities with a concentration of our emigres. Ukrainian emigres were given legal status and the right to use so-called Nansen passports. The Kalisz camp was transferred to our independent administration and renamed "Ukrainian Station", other camps were abolished and all emigres unable to work found defuge in it. The U.Ts.K. appointed a Board to manage the Station, consisting of: Gen. Salsky, chairman, Gen. Kushch, his deputy, myself, as chief of housing and administration and Gen. H. Bazylsky, as chief of supply. Within one year we rebuilt nearly all the barracks into separate homes, and modestly furnished. Separate homes were for the men with families, and some dormitories were set up for single men. Gen. Bazylsky was in charge of food, with a special commission elected every six months taking care of the kitchens. At that time I proposed that we conduct courses for chauffeurs at the Station, the proposition was accepted by the U.Ts.K. and funds assigned for the purchase of two used cars and a repair shop. I gave instruction in driving and mechanical repairs. Within two years we schooled fifty-seven chauffeurs and they got their licenses from the Examining Board in Lodz. The U.Ts.K. also received formal license for the Station High School which existed until the outbreak of World War II and had over 250 graduates.

Early in 1928 more requests presented by us were granted by Marshal Pilsudski. Our disabled men were placed on a nearly equal footing with Polish invalids, and after going through examination by a qualifying commission, they were granted modest pensions.