

The Battles at Ulaan Khad

One of the most important events in the struggle for Mongolia's independence

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Until recently the history of the new State of Mongolia was strongly ideological. The liberation of Mongolia from occupation by China at the beginning of the twentieth century was attributed to the Red Mongol and Soviet forces. The most important event was considered to be the liberation in 1921 of Maimaicheng, on the border with Russia near Kyakhta (or Khyagt). At the same time, the invaders were driven out of the capital of Niislel Khüree¹ by Mongolian and White Russian detachments under the command of Baron R. F. von Ungern-Sternberg. It is known that Ungern defeated the Chinese troops in several other places. This was usually quietly glossed over, or considered less important than the capture of Maimaicheng.

Only recently, with the cessation of censorship and the opening of the archives, has Ungern's true role in Mongolian history begun to be realised. This was noted by Mongolian President Ts. Elbegdorj during his visit to Germany in 2012 in an official speech in the Bundestag:

Last year, Mongolians celebrated the 2220th anniversary of the Mongolian state and the 100th anniversary of independence. At the beginning of the 20th Century, Baron von Ungern-Sternberg – who was of German origin and served in the Russian Tsarist Army – fought shoulder to shoulder with our patriots to liberate the state of Mongolia from foreign invaders. He played a decisive role in the return to the throne of the Great Khan of Mongolia, for which he received the highest award from our last Great Khan.

An analysis of the sources show that the largest battles that led to the expulsion of the Chinese occupiers from Mongolia in 1921 took place in Niislel Khüree, Kyakhta/Maimaicheng, near Choiryn-khure,² and to the west of Niislel Khüree. But where to the west? The location is indicated differently in different sources, and the distance between the most extreme points is 150 km.

Materials and Methods

There are very few written sources on this issue. The memoirs of the clerk Anwan and the soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army – participants and eyewitnesses – contain only a few words about those battles. Moreover, they have signs of Red censorship: most memoirs do not mention these battles at all. They usually describe Bayar-gun's attack on Kyakhta/Maimaicheng immediately after the description of the expulsion of the Chinese from Maimaicheng by the Reds. In fact, there were more than two months between these two events: just at the time the Whites defeated the Chinese troops moving from Maimaicheng to the south.

B. Shirendyb, judging by his dissertation, talked to eyewitnesses of those battles and passed on some of their information. But we could not find records of these stories. They are not in Shirendyb's archives, stored at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Mongolia.

The memoirs of several White émigrés³ contain more detailed information, but the actions of the Mongol detachments are barely mentioned in them. Finally, some information is contained in [Mongolian and Russian] archives.

We studied the archives and literature, then visited possible battlefields in 2008-2012, interviewed local residents, and compared what we obtained with known documents and memoirs. The main difficulty is that the witnesses of the events are no longer alive. The most that can be found out are the memories of the old people about what they saw in those places and what their elders told them. Much has already been forgotten, but it is not just inaccuracies. In some cases, the fruits of Red propaganda are visible (for example, that D. Sukhbaatar won the battles, that planes were called there from the USSR, etc.).

¹ The traditional Mongolia name of the Mongol capital, which the White Russians called Urga. Now Ulaanbaatar.

² That is the former Choryn Monastery, in the hills to the west of the town of Choir.

³ Volkov, 1921; Golubev, 1926; Knyazev, 1942; Tornovskiy, 1942.



In some places we found trenches and remnants of ammunition. All finds were mapped on site using GPS. Both sides – the Whites and the Chinese – used basically the same types of weapons. Therefore, it is difficult to determine their positions by the remains of the weapons and ammunition. The ammunition found, its dating and origin were determined by S. E. Plotnikov (Central Museum of the Armed Forces, Moscow), the Asian characters on the base of some cartridges were translated by S. V. Dmitriev and E. V. Molodyakova (Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences).

Results and Discussion

Location. Where did these battles take place? Let's turn to the memoirs of eyewitnesses. Lieutenant Knyazev pointed to "one of the wide valleys of the Bayan-gol, 150 versts to the west-north-west of Urga", on the 5th *urton*⁴ of the Ulaanbaatar to Bulgan⁵ road.⁶ A "distance of five *urtons*" from Urga is also indicated in Golubev's manuscript. The anonymous person in the archives indicated a closer distance: 60 km west of Ulaanbaatar. Volkov, from the words of eyewitnesses, indicated: "within three *urtons* of Urga on the Uliastai road, near the Tsegen-Tsagan *orton*." This is the area of Lake Tsegen-Tsagan-nur⁷ near the Ulaanbaatar to Uliastai main road.

The Mongolian eyewitnesses – Baljinnyam-gun, soldiers of the People's Army Togtokh, Sh. Luvsannam, D. Namdag, J. Genden, and the clerk Anwan – reported that it was in the area of Ulaan Khad. Baljinnyam pointed out that this area was located in the Jonon-gun *khoshun*.⁸ It was located to the west of the Lun district, between the Kharaa-Bukhin and Tuul Rivers, on the territory of the modern districts of Buregkhangai, Bayannur, Dashinchilen (Bulgan *aimag*) and Zaamar (Central *aimag*).

A participant in the first battles, Colonel M. G. Tornovskiy, indicated the terrain located somewhat to the west. Since Tornovskiy's memoirs contain the most detailed information, with sketches, it is logical to rely on it. In addition, the quickest way to China from Maimaicheng in winter is along the ice of the Tuul River and further south through the Lkha-Bayan area. It is known that some White detachment passed from the Lkha-Bayan area, where it had camped for 2-3 days before. It was Baljinnyam-gun's detachment. Bayar-gun, who led another detachment, later reported that he had received an order from the baron to move "to Khadasun-gol and Lakha". Khadasun-gol is the Kharaa Bukhin River. Lkha-Bayan is the local name for the vicinity of Mount Lha Uul,⁹ and the locals do not say "Lkha", but "Lakh" – as in the quoted document. This place is located to the south of the modern Dashinchilen district (Fig. 1). Residents told us that there had been a monastery to the south of Lkha-Bayan, the monks of which, having heard about the movement of *Gamins* southwards along the Tuul, disguised the golden roof of the main temple so that it could not be seen from a distance. So those monks were also expecting the *Gamins* to move south there.

Based on Tornovskiy's information, the area where the Whites were intending to meet the Chinese was to be on the Khadasan-gol River. This is the place where the Khadasan-gol flows into the Tuul, at the Khurum hill¹⁰ (Fig. 1). Moreover, on the Khurum, there are heaps of stones taken out of *kereksurs*,¹¹ of which there are many thereabouts. Two such piles are old semicircular walls about 0.5 m high, convenient for shelter when shooting. Two local residents then told us that on the hill they once collected shells for scrap metal, and on the other bank of the Tuul there is a "house of the Whites" made of stone. All this, combined with the data on Lkha-Bayan, led to the conclusion that the battles took place near Mount Khurum.

We know the battles ended with the surrender of the Chinese. But some of the latter fled the same night. The Whites pursued and destroyed a significant portion of them. When we visited the Talyn Ulaan Khad area, located to the southeast, we found many old cartridges on one of the hills: these could be the

⁴ The old Mongol message relay points.

⁵ Then called Van Khure.

⁶ The word used throughout is *trakt*, which indicates more of a well travelled route rather than a road as such.

⁷ Lake coordinates: 47°53.335'N, 105°25.738'E

⁸ Province.

⁹ Approximately 47°45.876'N, 103°57.671'E

¹⁰ 48°11.461'N, 104°17.815'E

¹¹ A *kereksur* is a pre-historic structure peculiar to Mongolia and southern Siberia. They were generally sizeable circular features made of stone.



positions of the Chinese who tried to detain their pursuers. However, in 2011, White firing points and numerous cartridges were found there on many other hills in that area. This contradicted the conclusion that the fighting had taken place at Mount Khurum.

In 2011 and 2012, we conducted additional studies in both areas and interviewed all the elderly people living there. The following was revealed.

Of the six *arats*¹² living in *gers* near Mount Khurum, only two said that they had heard from old people that there were *Gamins* there; The grandmother of an old man lost his sister because of them. They did not know of fighting between the Whites and the *Gamins*, about the cartridge cases and their collection for scrap metal. It turned out that the stone “house of the Whites” on the other side of the Tuul is the ancient ruins of Taijiin-Tsagaan-baishin. So there was a misunderstanding: the old man meant “White house” (tsagaan baishin) when he was talking about Whites (tsagaantnud). In 2011 and 2012, we found shells on fourteen of the heights in the Ulan Khad area – on all the hills surrounding the valley and on the mountains to the north and east. There were clearly intense battles there. The location of the positions also corresponds to Tornovskiy’s sketches.

Why, then, does he indicate “Khodisin” (i.e. the Khadasan)? This mistake is explained by the fact that Tornovskiy wrote his memoirs from memory 21 years later (in 1942). He used Knyazev’s book. That indicates the 5th *urton* “150 versts west-northwest of Urga”, and the daily marches of the Whites amounted to 45 versts. This does not agree with Tornovskiy’s sketches. On the other hand, those sketches (Fig. 2) generally agree with the map from the article by Colonel of the General Staff A. A. Batorsky – the most detailed at that time, moreover, reproduced in the well-known book by the traveller P. K. Kozlov (Fig. 3). The Tuul River below the mouth of the Khadasan River is marked by Tornovskiy as Khodisin, and “kar[aul] Khodasyn” – as urt[on] No. 4. Indeed, this guardhouse indicated on the map is the fourth from Urga. this is the modern village of Khadasan.¹³ It is located 228 km as the crow flies from Ulaanbaatar. Usually, *urtons* were placed about every 30 km, but their position moved, so the distances differ. By the way, the Doltse-gegen Monastery on old maps is obviously Tolty.¹⁴

In Knyazev’s and Tornovskiy’s memoirs, apparently, one of the *urtons* of the Ulaanbaatar to Uliastai road is meant, leaving from which to the north-west, you can get to Van Khure (now Bulgan). Apparently, the fourth *urton* was about 120 km from Ulaanbaatar along the highway: approximately at Lake Tsegen-Tsagan-nur, which is indicated by some authors (Fig. 1). Tornovskiy and Knyazev were on another *urton* and incorrectly identified it on the map. After all, they came to it from the northeast, and not directly from Ulaanbaatar, from where the *urtons* were counted. They could add the distance travelled to the north to the distance from Ulaanbaatar along the Uliastai road. In Tornovskiy’s manuscript there is crossed out: “we went to the 4th Urga – Ulyasutai *urton*” and instead added “reaching the Khodisin *urton*, where we stopped”. The word “Khodisin” is inscribed on top of an ellipsis. This means that Tornovskiy wrote this name later – apparently, from the same map. A. F. Ossendovskiy has a more accurate location of the area, although without its name: 15 miles (24 km) from the ford across the Tuul from the Uliastai side. The area is indicated more precisely by Bishhereltu gun Sundui: “more than three *urtons*”, according to the clerk Anwan and in the Military Archives of Mongolia it was three *urtons* to the west of the capital. As will be shown below, the Whites reached the third *urton*, then walked about halfway to the fourth, and there they met the Chinese. According to interviews in the village of Bayankhangai (at the site of the battle), there were no battles near the Tsegen-Tsagan *urton*.

As will be shown below, the Chinese headed from Kyakhta/Maimaicheng not to the south-west along the Tuul, but to the south. Then they went southwest down the valley near the Ulan Khad mountains, where they were stopped by Baron Ungern’s troops. The battles described by Knyazev and Tornovskiy took place there.

¹² Nomadic Mongolian peasants.

¹³ 47°51.620'N, 103°53.042'E

¹⁴ 47°14.149'N, 104°14.375'E



In the valley to the south-east of the Ulan Khad mountains there are hills which they called: “Tornovskiy’s Hill”, where Tornovskiy’s detachment was located – Khaliun Tolgoi¹⁵ or Khaliu Tolgoi,¹⁶ Height No 1 – (colour photo 1) and “General’s Hill”, where General Rezhukhin’s detachment was positioned – Talyn Ulaan Khad,¹⁷ or Talyn Ulaan Tolgoi, Height 2 – (colour photo 2).

Ossendovskiy, who passed through this area on 7 May 1921 (about a month after the fighting), described his impressions as follows:

Our small caravan reached the banks of the Tuul River close to nightfall. We could not find the ford, and I forced my camel to enter the water at my own peril and risk. Fortunately, it was quite shallow there, although the bottom was muddy, and we safely crossed to the other side. We were lucky: for if a camel is in deep, as soon as the water reaches the neck, it does not move its hooves like a horse and swim in an upright position, but immediately leans on its side, which is, of course, not very convenient for the rider. Down the river we set up a tent. Another 15 miles and we found ourselves on the battlefield where the third major battle for Mongolian independence was fought. Here Baron Ungern’s troops met in a duel with six thousand Chinese heading from Kyakhta to help their compatriots in Urga. The latter suffered a crushing defeat and four thousand of them were captured. However, the prisoners tried to escape at night. Baron Ungern sent units of the Baikal Cossacks and Tibetans in pursuit.¹⁸ About fifteen hundred corpses were left unburied, and the same number, according to the testimony of the Cossacks who accompanied me and also participated in the battle, were buried in the earth. The bodies of the slain were slashed with sabres, and military equipment was everywhere lying on the ground. We saw them all over – now hiding behind a rock, now hiding in a ditch. Packs of feral dogs fought to prey on them.

Current state of the area. According to the stories of the old people, there used to be weapons, cartridge cases and human bones in the mountains of Ulaan Khad, The construction site of the Atar state farm (now the village of Bayankhangai) also had a lot of fragments of wheels, carts, firearms, broken swords, pikes, shoes with leg bones, cartridge cases, skulls, etc. A resident, Bujinkham, who was the secretary of the Atar MNP, told us that the bones and debris found were buried in a ravine 4-5 m deep, used by Soviet builders for construction debris. This ravine was located on the western side of the current “Uvguchudyn buuts” and on the northern side of the old centre of the town. Later, Russian builders buried construction waste and old equipment in the same pit. Residents of Bayankhangai told us that back in the 1990s, local residents collected and handed over tens of kilograms of metal (some used metal detectors) from the different hills. According to Bujinkham, the above-mentioned ravine was excavated at the same time for the sake of its metal. At present it seems that the old metal is no longer collected. It is quite rare, but on almost all the hills.

The area is a valley surrounded to the north by the Ulaan Khad mountain range and smaller mountains of different heights, to the east by mountains, to the northeast there is a road, to the south it is joined by the old main road connecting the capital of Mongolia with the city of Uliastai (colour photo 3). In the north-west of the valley, in the foothills of Ulan-Khad, there is the village of Bayankhangai,¹⁹ founded in 1977. According to local residents, people had used to avoid settling or roaming in these places. The construction of the state farm here is explained by the convenience of a branch from the Ulaanbaatar to Uliastai main road passing by, although there is a lot of free land to the east and west. From Bayankhangai to the north to the mountains of Ulaan Khad there are wide gorges. To the southeast of it is the Talyn Ulaan Khad area around the hill of the same name (colour photo 4). Almost all local residents there know about the battles between Ungern’s troops and the Chinese, but they know almost nothing about how the

¹⁵ 47°56.436'N, 105°34.277'E

¹⁶ A soldier of the People's Army, D. Namdag, recalled that the Mongols were heading towards Ulan Khad and Khuliikhen. Perhaps the last one is Khaliun.

¹⁷ 47°56.410'N, 105°35.641'E

¹⁸ Here and below: Ossendovskiy and Knyazev mention only the participation of Tibetans in these battles. According to Tornovskiy, they were the Mongols. According to Mongolian sources specifically Chakhars.

¹⁹ 47°57.097'N, 105°32.796'E



battles went. It is pointed out that the Chinese were driven here to the plain (from Maimaicheng) and destroyed.

Reconstruction of the course of the battles. On the night of 17/18 March 1921, the Chinese left Kyakhta/Maimaicheng under the pressure of the troops of the Mongolian People's Party (MNP) and the Far Eastern Republic. According to archival materials the total garrison numbered 1500 people: 500 old servicemen (200 cavalymen and 300 infantrymen) and 1,000 recruits. However Maimaicheng and its neighbourhood also included several thousand other Chinese soldiers who had left Niislel Khüree after its capture by Ungern on 4 February 1921.

Now the Chinese soldiers began to withdraw from the north of Mongolia. Some of them went southeast towards Ibityk, some crossed the border with the Far Eastern Republic (where they were disarmed and interned), and some went to Manchuria. But most of them moved to the south and south-west in order to bypass Niislel Khüree to the west and reach China (Fig. 1). Apparently, they went in several groups. On the way, they engaged in robbery, killed Mongols, and forcibly enlisted Chinese peasant colonists.

On March 24, a courier galloped into Niislel Khüree with an urgent letter from Khobotov, who commanded Ungern's 2nd Regiment in the north. He reported that the Red Mongols had attacked the Chinese, the latter had moved away from Kyakhta, pushed back the 2nd Regiment and were moving to Ulaanbaatar. The Chinese obviously first moved to the southwest, then south along the Orkhon River. Then they headed south – along the Kharaa-gol River to Niislel Khüree.

And indeed, most of them appeared in the area of Barun-Khara,²⁰ in the area of Tsagan-Bulak, and Ugtal,²¹ heading to the area of Ulan-Khadaa. (Shirendyb, 1960)

They were also seen in the areas of Gurvan-Urt, Khar-Burgas, Khukhdiin-obo (east of the village of Bayanchandmani²² and Gunyn Kharudzur. Apparently, the Chinese got off the main road to Niislel Khüree and moved southwest in the direction of the modern villages of Jargalant and Bayanchandmani, then further south. Judging by the Mongolian memoirs, the groups of Chinese were widely dispersed as they were moving along.

From those places, the main roads lead to the southwest to the village of Bayantsogt.²³ Obviously, it was there that Dund Urtyn-baishin was located, where Mongolian scouts had a skirmish with a group of Chinese soldiers and captured several of them. From here the road goes to the south-west and comes out to the north of Talyn Ulaan Khad (Height 2) into a large valley "running from north-east to south-west". Its northern and eastern slopes are indeed enclosed by a mountain range.

On 25 March Rezukhin marched north. He had only 355 soldiers. Knyazev indicates the 3rd Cavalry Regiment (apparently those 355 men) and a *divizion*²⁴ of Tibetans (Tornovskiy indicates Mongols), with four guns (of which only two mountain guns were operational) and eight machine guns, for a total of 700. This means that the White and Mongol forces unlikely to be over 800 men – and then only if the *sotnias* were fully manned, which is unlikely.

Moving north along the main road from Niislel Khüree, Rezukhin received another report from Khobotov at the Kharaa-gol River (according to Tornovskiy, the next day) that the Chinese were not heading south, but somewhere to the west, probably along the left bank of the Orkhon River. However a snowstorm had interfered with the reconnaissance. Rezukhin, "without a moment's delay, moved to the southwest to reach the Urga to Ulyasutai road." He "crossed the mountains of Khaltsan and Gurban-Urta-nur and reached the Van Khuren highway." In fact, the Chinese did go south, not west. Then, from Baruunkharaa,

²⁰ Now the village of Bayan-gol: 48°53.775'N, 106°13.179'E.

²¹ In the mountains west of modern Jargalant. Note this is the Orkhon Jargalant, not the larger town of that name.

²² 48°13.835'N, 106°18.322'E

²³ Presumably the one at 48.125N, 105.81E.

²⁴ A cavalry *divizion* is two (sometimes three) squadrons – although the Baron's army termed its squadrons *sotnias*, in the Cossack style.



they moved southwest. Apparently, Rezukhin did not reach the place where they turned off the main road, and therefore did not meet them.

On 30 March, moving to the southwest, the Whites reached the Uliastai road. On the night of 31 March, Rezukhin and Tornovskiy were looking for a way out of the situation. They decided that Tornovskiy would go in the morning to look for the Chinese. There was no communication between the Mongol scouts and the Whites, so the latter did not know the enemy's route. According to Genden's memoirs, he followed the Chinese to the very northeast of Ulaan Khad, and only there did he meet the Whites.

Where did the Whites stop that night? They could not have been Knyazev's "five versts from the Chinese camp.... in one of the wide valleys of the Bayan-gol road" because there is no place of that name there. Nor could it be the fourth or fifth *orton* of the Uliastai road: in the morning the Whites would have moved from there toward the northeast to meet the Chinese, but Knyazev and Tornovskiy indicate otherwise. According to Knyazev, Rezukhin approached the Chinese to the northeast. Obviously, he means the direction from where he came to the Uliastai road.

On the morning of 31 March, Tornovskiy, having marched about 15 km to the northwest, came across a patrol of Chinese cavalry and sent a report to Rezukhin. After five or six kilometres of pursuit, he came across a column of Chinese troops and baggage trains, moving to the southwest.

This information is consistent only if the Whites came to them not from the fifth *urton* or even from the fourth, but to the east – from the third, 80-90 km from Niislel Khüree. Tornovskiy probably came across the Chinese detachment in the area of Ikh Tsav Khangai Mountain²⁵ and, in pursuit, entered the valley between Heights Nos 1 and 2. This locality lies between the third and fourth *urtions*. Having received a report from Tornovskiy, Rezukhin hastened to him with the main forces. Before Rezukhin's approach, Tornovskiy assessed the situation.

According to a rough estimate, there were up to 2,000 mounted men, 3,000 on foot, up to 2,000 civilian Chinese merchants and a convoy of 200-300 laden Mongolian carts.

Or, in Knyazev's account:

About 6,000 soldiers, of whom 2,000 belonged to the cavalry. They were accompanied by up to 2000 refugees from Urga and Maimaicheng (near Kyakhta), merchants and officials.

The Chinese stretched for 3-4 kilometres. Apparently, they occupied the entire valley from the road north of Height 8 to Height 1 (Fig. 4). The Chinese had up to 30 machine guns and 12 guns (15 guns according to Magsarjav). So, they had almost tenfold advantage in manpower (especially since they armed the civilians, see later), and a sixfold superiority in artillery and fourfold in machine guns.

After a short meeting with Rezukhin, it was decided that Tornovskiy, with the Mongolian *sotnia* and Ochirov's Buryat *sotnia*, would occupy Height 1 (the "southwestern height" blocking the exit from the valley) and would not get involved in the battle until the approach of Khobotov's 2nd Cavalry Regiment from the north. Rezukhin was supposed to occupy the "southeastern heights" – i.e. Height 2, which has two peaks.

After a skirmish with the lead *sotnia*, the Chinese retreated in confusion to the southern outskirts of the road,²⁶ making almost no attempt to hold the two hills that towered in the middle of the Bayan-gol valley.²⁷

But we will see later that they did try to hold those hills.

One of our *sotnias*²⁸ went forward to occupy the mountain in the western side of the road.²⁹

²⁵ 47°56.137'N, 105°41.092'E

²⁶ i.e. withdrew part of the troops and carts to the west and southwest of Height 1.

²⁷ i.e. Height 2, which has two peaks

²⁸ Tornovskiy's.

²⁹ Height 1.



Having occupied Height 1, Tornovskiy:

... scattered the Mongolian *sotnia* into a chain along the slope of the hill,³⁰ with a machine gun on the top of the mountain, while the Buryat *sotnia* hid in cavalry formation at the foot of the mountain on the south-eastern side,³¹ as a reserve, ready to act immediately.

This hill has very smooth and gentle slopes (not steeper than 15°) and is accessible for cavalry attack. The Whites' cavalry reserve was apparently at the foot under the cover of an elevation: the Chinese were to the northwest (Fig. 5).

Rezukhin and the main forces moved through the valley to the "two hills" (Height 2 with two peaks). Its 300-400 rifles were fired from one of the peaks, forcing a Chinese battalion to leave its position and flee to its main forces. Rezukhin immediately occupied the second peak and placed four *sotnias* and the artillery there.³² Tornovskiy had two further *sotnias*.

The remaining two *sotnias* were Ensign Stepanenko's *divizion* on the right flank. He climbed "half-way up a mountain" to the level of Height 2 and entrenched himself on its eastern slope. The Chinese, who held the crest of the mountain, "shot him as they pleased... artillery and machine-gun fire from a distance of 1400-1500 paces."³³ This ridge is Height 11. The minimum distance from it to Height 2 is 1400-1800 m. Obviously, Stepanenko covered the Whites' carts on the southeastern slope of Height 2. Judging by Tornovskiy's sketch, during the battle some of the Chinese carts were located between Heights Nos 8, 9 and 10 (Figs. 2 and 4).

Having occupied the hills, the Whites waited.

Chinese chains with a strength of about two battalions and three following chains led an attack on Height 1. The cavalry was formed for an attack south of Height 1.

Judging by the sketches, the cavalry was to the west. Tornovskiy ordered the machine gun officer to keep the Chinese cavalry under fire, not allowing them to line up in battle formation, and he and his officers directed the fire of the Mongolian chain against the Chinese infantry advancing from the north and northwest.

Tornovskiy recalled:

Chinese officers on horseback galloped along their chains and drove on the Chinese soldiers with whips. The chains advanced as if on parade. The first chain approached to within 400-500 paces of the foot of the mountain. I ordered the Buryat *sotnia* to go on the attack, and the machine-gunner officer to transfer fire his to the first chain. At the very first bursts of the machine gun, the chain lay down, and the officers were blown off their horses as if by a wind (their horses killed under them). I launched the Buryat *sotnia* into the attack from the flank and the first chain ran. The second and third calmly retreated and, moving 800-1000 paces away from the hill, lay down. The Mongols cheered up, beginning to shoot more calmly, inflicting damage on the Chinese. We could see the wounded Chinese leave and crawl to the rear.

The lack of machine gun fire against the cavalry for 20-30 minutes made it possible for some of the Chinese cavalry to form a battle formation and attack at a distance of 1500-1800 paces, but with the very first bursts of the machine gun, from a distance of 1000-800 paces, a hundred horsemen were mowed down. The cavalry turned back, leaving more than 100 dead on the battlefield. Horses ran across the plain. Five or six machine guns appeared in their infantry chains, and they began to "water" the hill with proper aimed fire. There was no time to think about restraining the Mongols, as they, suffering losses from machine-gun fire, could flee from the mountain at any moment as a mob. Five shots from the Hotchkiss cannon at the

³⁰ This is a gentle north-western slope with a small elevation.

³¹ Where the slope forms an elevation to the south-east.

³² Knyazev, 1942, p. 92. 56

³³ Knyazev, 1942, p. 92. 57



attacking cavalry during a second attack brought significant morale benefits. Captain Sementovskiy could not shoot any more, since he saved his five remaining shells for extreme cases.

Our finds in those places agree with this (colour photo 5). At the top of Height 1, a piece of cartridge feed from a Hotchkiss machine gun was found (Fig. 6). It fits 6.5 mm cartridges for a Arisaka 1897–1905 rifle. On the northwestern slope, where the Mongolian chain had been, we found shells for Arisaka rifles and Mosin carbines (Fig. 12-14). One of the Mosin cases was produced in Kainsk in 1917 – which the Whites could have had, but not the Chinese. Occasionally we found cartridges from Mauser rifles (Fig. 15 and 16). The latter could have been with the Chinese, who later captured this hill. A cartridge case for an American Winchester rifle was also found (Figs. 17 and 18).

The Chinese infantry were advancing, obviously, from the direction of Heights 3, 4 and 6. At 400 m southwest of Height Height1, near the road, shells from Arisaka rifles were found (the Chinese fired from there) (colour photo 6), and a pointed and blunt bullet from an Arisaka (from the Whites' shots).

At 2:30 a.m., Tornovskiy was wounded (the bone of his lower left leg was pierced through) and was put out of action. He entrusted the command to Ochirov, who commanded the Buryat *sotnia*. Leaving Height 1, Tornovskiy reminded *Sotnik* Ochirov and the machine gunner officer to try to disable the Chinese machine guns. Tornovskiy was taken to a dressing station in the Whites' rear, located 1000-1500 m southeast of Height 2. During the night about 10 more people were taken there, reporting that the Chinese had made two more attempts to attack Height 1, but could not reach it. At night, one squadron of Chinese troops "moved into Rezukhin's rear, but, without harming anyone, headed west." This means that the Chinese bypassed Heights 1 and 2 from the south, and entered the Whites' rear south of Height 2.

On 1 April (the second day of fighting, according to Knyazev), the Chinese put vigorous pressure on the Whites' flanks. After repeated attacks, they knocked down Ochirov's *divizion* from Height 1 (left flank). The Chinese used artillery for that purpose: we found a shell fragment and several shrapnel bullets at Height 1 (colour Fig. 7). At the same time, the Chinese systematically pressed Stepanenko's division on the Whites' right flank, east of Height 2 (Fig. 19).

But the assistant commander of the 3rd Regiment, Colonel of the General Staff Ostrovskiy, took another *sotnia* there, and by decisive actions restored the original situation.

As a result of the second day of fighting, only Height 2 remained in White hands. Their carts were located in the same place as the infirmary: 1000-1500 m southeast of Height 2. Repelling the attacks, the Whites fired from the top of that hill, on its northern and eastern slopes. There we mainly found cartridges and clips for Arisaka rifles, fewer for the Mosin, and one case from a German-made Mauser rifle. Two Lebel rifle cartridges were also found there (Figs. 20 and 21). According to local residents, in the 1970s, children found some kind of iron box there, which then disappeared, its contents unknown. Traces of firing from the eastern slope of Height 2 are shown by several Arisaka clips and cartridge. Attacks on the Whites' right flank (east of Height 2) were covered by the Chinese with fire from the southern parts of Heights 10 and 11 (1200-1400 metres distant). There we found a lot of Arisaka rifle casings and several cartridges for Mosin and Mauser rifles.

The Whites may have raised a gun to the southwestern concave peak of Height 2. There is a large circle made of stones, possibly for a cannon (colour photo 7). From there it is convenient to fire at the Chinese positions on Height 6 from a distance of 2000-2500 m. On Height 6 we found fragments, two bullets and a piece of the head part of a shrapnel shell, and an object similar to a shell tray (Figs. 22 and 23).

The Chinese camp, obviously, was located northwest of Height 4 – near the present village of Bayankhangai. According to Bujinkham, debris, broken weapons, bayonets, cartridge cases, many heads of Chinese smoking pipes (*gaans*), skulls, etc., were found there during the construction of the village. Ariunbold, Bujinkham's son, told us that as a child, he and other children dug trenches between the old and new centre of the village to play. But Bujinkham's thinks that there were already old pits and trenches there.

The rear positions of the Chinese were clearly located at the entrance to the gorges in the Ulaan Khad mountain range northwest of their camp (Heights 5, 12, 13, 14). An important task for the Chinese was to



lock up the widest gorge east of the ridge of the mountain, which goes to the rear of their camp. It is called Tavan Dzutyn-am (Gorge of the Five Hundred) – they say that there were 500 *Gamins* in it. The Chinese dug a trench³⁴ at the beginning of this gorge level with Height 12 – that is Mount Dzurkh Uul (Fig. 9; colour photo 8). According to local residents, there is a well dug by the Chinese, Dzurkhiin khuduk, nearby. To the north, in the pass, we were shown several large wide ditches in the sand – like other Chinese trenches.³⁵

The third day of the battle, 2 April, began with us in a very unfavourable situation. The *Gamins* were now shelling the General's Hill with artillery and machine-gun fire³⁶ and were accumulating menacingly against Ostrovskiy's position.³⁷ Very soon the Chinese reached such audacity that their *sotnia* attacked the transport of the wounded being taken to the rear from the General's Hill. True, that *sotnia* retired in the direction of the Tornovskiy's Hill, declining to face an attack by the orderlies of the regimental headquarters, but it was unpleasant that the enemy's cavalry unit had passed with impunity into the rear, along our entire position... At 12 o'clock in the afternoon of 2 April, the enemy's position began to deteriorate. Up to that moment, it seemed that it was enough for them to increase the pressure on our right flank to force it to retreat to the rear. Taking this into account this circumstance, the general sent half a *sotnia* with machine guns to the line of the wagons, in order to ensure a more or less calm retreat to the rear positions.

According to eyewitnesses, Volkov wrote:

And so, the Chinese attacked quickly five times in a row. The corpses of their Mongol wives, who fought side by side with their husbands, were found next to the corpses of the Chinese soldiers. The Mongols, who usually succumbed to panic easily, fired their rifles as if in training. Sometimes there were from 10 to 15 Chinese facing each Russian horseman.

It is not only the balance of power that is noteworthy here. The Mongol wives would have been with the officials and merchants. This means that the Chinese command has mobilized its civilians, who it had previously attached to its columns. So the Chinese forces had to exceed the five to six thousand military men that Knyazev and Tornovskiy had counted.

On 2 April, the situation for the Chinese began to deteriorate because reinforcements began to approach for the Whites. Early in the morning Khobotov's 2nd Cavalry Regiment began to arrive from the north. It attacked the Chinese from the rear. The regiment had four *sotnias*, with two guns and four machine guns.

Cannon shots were heard from the right: a cannon was firing, the shrapnel of which exploded behind the Chinese left flank. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment was approaching, two days late. That regiment should have "sat on the tail" of the Chinese, starting from the Iro River,³⁸ after the battle with their rearguard. But on the night of 30 March such a strong snowstorm arose that Khobotov lost their trail and had only just found it again, guided by the sounds of our battle.

Apparently, Khobotov's Cossacks attacked Height 11 from the north and knocked the enemy off its crest (Fig. 24). As a result, the Chinese, who had launched an offensive on Rezukhin's right flank in the morning, were thrown back.

Ungern, who had arrived earlier in Niislel Khüree from the campaign against Choiryn, together with the Mongol Minister of War Dorjtseren gathered the Chakhar soldiers who were in the capital. The baron arrived on 2 April by car, delayed by snow drifts. The Chakhars arrived with him.³⁹ Perhaps it was Jamts-

³⁴ 48°00.276'N, 105°29.682'E

³⁵ 48°00.763'N, 105°29.179'E to 48°00.834'N, 105°29.195'E

³⁶ Judging by the distances, from Height 1.

³⁷ Height 11.

³⁸ Some 60 km south of Kyakhta.

³⁹ Tornovskiy writes that the Chakhars arrived in the evening. But Knyazev, Baljinnyam and Magsarjav indicate that the Chakhars entered into the battle with the Chinese. They could only do so in the morning or in the afternoon. It seems that Tornovskiy had in mind the late arrival of Sundui-gun's detachment, coming from the west.



gun's *division*. Apparently, the Chakhars attacked from the north towards Heights 6 and 7 opposite the Chinese camp.

Solid volleys thundered from those mountains that were darkening to our left, in the rear of the enemy's right flank. "They're the baron's volleys," we thought. ... The baron explained that he had brought Chakhars from Urga. They are the ones shooting at the Chinese camp from the green hills.

Earlier Baljinnyam-gun's detachment was sent from the Lkha-Bayan region to join up with Sundui-gun's detachment. Baljinnyam's detachment approached Ulaan Khad from the west,⁴⁰ and Sundui's detachment from the northwest. Apparently, Baljinnyam captured Heights 12, 13 and 14 after a fight. He wrote in his report:

We met with a large number of thieving *Gamin*-soldiers and entered the battle together with the Russian and Chakhar troops. The battle lasted until evening.

Finds in those places are consistent with this. At Heights 8, 9 and 10, cartridges and clips from Arisaka, Mosin (St. Petersburg and Tula factories), and Mauser (German-made) rifles were found. Many cartridges and clips were found on Height 11. With the exception of the southern part of that mountain, all the shells there lay on the western ridges descending into the valley. From there it is convenient to shell the valley and hills occupied by the Chinese to the west, but not southwestern Height 2, occupied by the Whites. This means that there were hardly any Chinese positions on these ridges. As elsewhere, on Height 11, casings from Arisakas predominated. About the same number of clips and cartridge cases for the 7.62 mm Mosin rifle, for a blunt bullet, produced in St. Petersburg in 1897-1906 and in Tula in 1901, were also found. However, in the southernmost part (convenient for firing at the Whites on Height 2) Chinese-made cartridges from the Mauser rifle were found, but most were still Arisakas and Mosins (blunt bullet of the St. Petersburg type). The Mosin cartridges are most likely from those that were delivered to Mongolia in 1912, after the declaration of independence. At the same time, we found a Mosin rifle case, most likely of the 1908 pointed bullet model and a Kern rifle cartridge (1891 model, modified in 1910). The Whites, rather than the Chinese, used them. This means that the Whites also captured the southern part of Height 11.

At the pass at Height 12, the locals showed us the Chinese trenches (see above). In the southernmost one they found a Japanese bayonet in the 1980s. There were many old cartridges around (colour photo 8). Nearby we found a case from a Mauser rifle of the 1898 model, for a 7.92 mm calibre cartridge, for the pointed bullet model 1904, produced by Deutsche Munitionsfabrik, apparently in 1911.

Local residents found old cartridge cases (including large ones – 10-12 cm across), bayonets, swords, wooden butts, rifles, pistols and human bones on Heights 12, 13 and 14 and in the gorges at the exit to the plain to the village of Bayankhangai. There were an especially large number of bones in the Tavan Dzutyin-am gorge, where the Chinese hid for some time. The large cartridges may have been from old Berdan rifles, which the Mongols often had.

At Heights 6 and 7 we found a lot of rifle cases and clips – but only on the slopes facing Bayankhangai, where there was a Chinese camp. There we also found a bolt cover from an Arisaka rifle or carbine (Fig. 25). The most common cartridges and clips were for Arisaka and Mosin rifles, but there were several cartridges and a clip from a Mauser rifle, as well as a cartridge clip for a Mauser pistol (Figs. 26 and 27).

By this point the Chinese were surrounded from the north, east and southeast.

While repelling an attack on the right flank, a Chinese officer with the rank of captain was captured. The first thing Ungern did upon arrival at the position was to summon the Chinese captain and ask him to go to his superiors and offer a surrender on the following conditions: lay down all arms, surrender military uniforms and property, and in return he, General Ungern, would allow all soldiers and civilians to go south with their property and give them food and the required number of carts. The Chinese captain assured General Ungern that such conditions would be acceptable to the Chinese command, and promised to give an

⁴⁰ Apparently on the morning of 2 April.



answer in three or four hours. The Chinese accepted Ungern's conditions. The Chinese officer returned two and a half hours later.

According to Genden's memoirs, ten Chinese appeared with a banner, on horseback: they stopped, and one of them approached, his head was covered with a white cloth.

With a joyful look, he handed the baron the written consent of the head of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Zhou (one of the generals and senior officers fled from Urga), on the proposed terms. The baron ordered three copies be made of Lieutenant Colonel Zhou's reply and immediately sent those copies with Russian officers to the Chinese positions in the centre and on both flanks."

But it was not in Ungern's nature to sit and wait. He demanded a horse and galloped with an interpreter to the Chinese camp. The latter fired at him quite vigorously "from the centre and from the round hill" (Tornovskiy's) – i.e. from Heights 1 and, apparently, 3. Ungern arrived at the camp and met with Zhou. The baron agreed on the terms of the surrender of weapons on the morning of 3 April. The Chinese were to surrender a total of 14,000 firearms, including 15 cannons, 6 machine guns and 5,000 Mausers. Ungern returned late at night.

By that time, the Bisherelt-gun Sundui's detachment had approached from the west. According to Magsarjav, the total number of troops under Ungern's command reached 2500 men. Sundui-gun wrote that, having received an order from Bogd Gegen VIII and the Ministry of War, he had to mobilize 2000 soldiers. According to Sundui, when he arrived at the battlefield he learned that the next day, at 9 o'clock in the morning, that a surrender of weapons was scheduled. This means that Sundui's soldiers did not participate in the battles of Ulaan Khad, and the Chinese rear positions had been previously attacked by different Mongols.

Before dawn on 3 April, it turned out that:

The Chinese cavalry commanders did not want to disarm and surrender all the cavalry's property, and in the evening quietly left for the southwest.

According to Alioshin's memoirs:

Looking at their fires at night, I was surprised how a handful of Cossacks could defeat such a multitude. In the morning, we found ourselves deceived. The fires had burned all night, but the camp was empty: the had Chinese fled to the desert.

Golubev also wrote about the fires that burned all night.

About half of the Chinese fled, in particular, the entire cavalry and a group of infantrymen on carts. But the detachment commander and most of the senior officers did not want to share the vicissitudes of fate with them. They surrendered to the baron.

Tornovskiy wrote:

There was great confusion in the Chinese camp due to the violation of the treaty. General Ungern ordered the Chakhars and three *sotnias* of the 2nd Regiment, led by Captain Neyman, to catch up with the fugitives and mercilessly defeat them. Colonel Khobotov and one *sotnia* was appointed to receive the weapons from the Chinese troops who had not fled. Rezhukhin and the 3rd Regiment was ordered to go in pursuit to support Neyman and the Chakhars. All day on 21 March⁴¹ there was a surrender of weapons and property, military and horse equipment. A convoy and food were allocated for the Chinese. Nothing was taken away from the peaceful merchants, and their carts were specially marked out. When surrendering their weapons many of the Chinese soldiers asked General Ungern to accept them into his service. Ungern selected 600 from among those who wished that and sent them to Urga to form a cavalry regiment.

⁴¹ Like most Whites Tornovskiy used the "Old Style" (Julian) dates, not the "New Style" Gregorian.



Not only merchants remained in the camp, but also Chinese peasants with children and Mongol wives.

There is information that about a thousand people remained in the camp (more than half of them were soldiers), a wagon train and livestock. This contradicts the memoirs: many more should have remained (see later). Weapons from the Chinese camp were accepted by the remaining *sotnias* of the 2nd Regiment, the Tibetan (or Chakhar) *division* received prisoners to escort to Niislel Khüree. 990 Chinese and 700 wagons were sent there.

The Chinese caught in robbery were ordered to be separated from the rest and executed. Genden recalled:

Moving from there along the northern side of the Zamar Dugan,⁴² we had to divide off and kill the bandits among the *Gamins*. The rest were to be sent to Khüree. The following message came. We stopped on the southern side of Tsav Khangai, and there they began to separate out who to kill and who not to. In the evening, after the separating, more than 400 people were sent to Khüree. Forty Mongolian women were also separated out there.

So, the reason for the flight could be that many *Gamins* had been involved in the robberies and murders of the Mongol population. Fearing punishment, they preferred to flee.

Ungern ordered the fleeing *Gamins* be caught and “to cut down the shaved ones (revolutionaries) without mercy, but not to touch the monarchists (with pigtails).” According to Knyazev’s and Tornovskiy’s memoirs the Whites caught up with the fugitives after five kms and pursued for three more days. During this time, hundreds of fugitives were killed, and the Whites also took losses. Further pursuit was entrusted to the Mongols. Bayar-gun’s detachment was moving towards them from the southeast, but did not make it to Kharukhyn and Lkha Uul in time. On 6 April in the Bugudur-Tsagan-Temetyn-usu area, in the northeastern part of the Sangiin-Dalai, Bayar-gun met:

Gamins who appeared from different directions, who continued to flee from the scene of hostilities in detachments of 200-300 men. ... Battalion commander Ma Huapai and company commander Sheng Chengzai voluntarily and without any objection surrendered. After this, the *Gamins* began to arrive again without cease, and until they outnumbered our men.

In total, about a thousand *Gamins* from this group surrendered. According to eyewitnesses, only a few Chinese were able to pass more than the three crossings over the Gobi from the Uver-Unjul pass south of Tuul.

Thus, the idea that Ungern, by secret agreement with the Chinese, helped them to escape, and then pursued them very sluggishly, is wrong.

The shortest way to China is to the south towards the former Tariat district. One of the local residents told us that he had heard about the flight of the Chinese to Tariat. Information about their further path has been published earlier. In 2012 we travelled part of the way: from Talyn Ulaan Khad to Tariat through the passes north of Tuul,⁴³ then to the Bichigtiyn-Khutul pass south of Tuul,⁴⁴ and to the northern slope of the Uver-Unjul mountains.⁴⁵

Obviously, some of the Chinese went to the west (along the highway towards Uliastai) and northwest (through the territory of the Zaamar).⁴⁶ Perhaps they wanted to join up with their compatriots in Uliastai and Kovd and then go to Xinjiang. A soldier of the People’s Army, P. Togtokh, recalled the flight of the Chinese to the west. He met a cart with wounded *Gamins* moving from Ulaan Khad towards Tsegen (i.e. along the Niislel Khüree to Ulyasutai main road). An anonymous writer wrote that in April 1921 a Chakhar *division* pursued the Chinese who had fled to the west. It is possible that it was Jamts-gun’s detachment. It

⁴² It is unclear which Dugan is meant. Zamar is far to the northwest. To Mount Tsav Khangai (Ikh Tsav Khangai) you need to go only 5 km southeast of Height 2, and not to the west to Zamar.

⁴³ 47°50.959'N, 105°36.491'E and 47°49.262'N, 105°36.287'E and 47°41.141'N, 105°39.729'E

⁴⁴ 47°05.162'N, 105°20.583'E

⁴⁵ 47°05.532'N, 105°25.172'E

⁴⁶ The inhabitants of Bayankhangai also told us about the flight of the *Gamins* to the west and towards Zaamar.



is unlikely that these were Sundui-gun's people mobilised from the north-west. Sundui, pursuing the Chinese, reached Dzorigtu-van *khoshun* (this *khoshun* was adjacent to Tuul from the south-west), the Tostyn Zaamar, area and from there he headed north to Bulgan along with Rezukhin.

Ossendovskiy recalled:

Having crossed the Burgut Mountains, we entered the valley of the Tuul River, on the upper reaches of which the Urga lies. Overcoats, shirts, boots and hats were lying on the road, which the Chinese had abandoned as they retreated. There were also corpses. A little further on our path was crossed by a swamp, at the edges of which piles of dead bodies lay – people, horses and camels, mangled carts, military ammunition. It was here that Baron Ungern's Tibetan units defeated the retreating Chinese convoy.

It may be the swampy lower reaches of Kharukhyn-gol.

Conclusion

The events at Ulaan Khad were not the “capture and massacre” of hungry and freezing soldiers and officers who were leaving for their homeland. These were heavy battles for Ungern's troops against many times superior enemy forces, in which both sides suffered serious losses.

The Chinese sought to leave Mongolia, the *Ungernovtsy* sought to destroy them. The Chinese still posed a serious threat to the country. These troops were hardly going to take Niislel Khüree, but their way through Mongolia was marked by large-scale looting and killings of the population. The defeat at Ulaan Khad undermined their strength. This undoubtedly reduced the scale of looting and allowed the Mongols on the ground to successfully fight the small demoralised groups of *Gamins*.

According to an intelligence report to the headquarters of the Soviet 5th Army on 16 April 1921, more than a thousand Chinese, about 100 Mongols and about 30 Russians and Buryats were killed in the battles “on 13 and 14 April, 150 km from Urga in the direction of Uliastai”.

A Chinese cavalry regiment of four *sotnias* was formed under the command of Major Li and the senior instructor Lt-Colonel Kostromitinov from the captured Chinese soldiers who wished to serve under General Ungern. Six Russian officers and 24 sergeants were appointed to the Chinese regiment.

Ungern wrote to Nayden-gun about the results of the battles at Ulaan Khad:

I have just returned from a campaign against the *Gamins* that were coming from Kyakhta, thinking to make their way to the south between Urga and Zain-shabi.⁴⁷ I managed to surround them, despite their huge number, but not all were captured – only thanks to the fact that some of the Mongol *sotnias* were missing. In any case, about 4,000 were captured, led by General Ja-wu. A lot of people were killed, weapons, machine guns and baggage were captured. News has been received from Ulyasatui and Zain-shabi that the Chinese troops have surrendered their weapons there. So all is well in the west now, and everything is going well in the east as well.

The Battle of Ulaan Khad was the last major battle with the Chinese invaders in Mongolia. This is one of the most important events in the struggle of the Mongolian people for independence. At the same time, this is an important episode in Russian-Mongolian military cooperation. It is wrong to include in this cooperation the joint actions of the troops of the MNP and the Soviet Red Army against the White Guards and the Mongolian feudal lords: those actions belong to the civil war and not to the national liberation war. Mongolian and Russian soldiers under the command of Ungern acted with the sanction of the legitimate monarch of Mongolia, Bogd Gegen VIII.

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⁴⁷ Tsetserleg



Colour Illustrations

Figure 1. Height 1 (Khaliun-Tolgoi, "Tornovskiy's Hill").

Figure 2. Height 2 (Talyn Ulaan Khad, "General's Hill"). On the right you can see Height 1.

Figure 3. The area of Ulaan Khad with elevation numbers, places of finds of the remains of weapons and ammunition (red dots) and Chinese trenches (blue dots).

Figure 4. View of the Ulaan Khad area from Height 11. The following places are visible (from left to right): Height 2 (with two peaks), Bayankhangai village and Heights 6 and 7. (The small Heights 3 and 4 in front of Bayankhangai are invisible.)

Figure 5. Cartridge cases and clips from cartridges for an Arisaka rifle, clips from Mosin rifle, a bullet from a shrapnel shell for a 76 mm cannon, a fragment from a shell (?), unspecified items. Height 1.

Figure 6. Cartridge cases for an Arisaka rifle from the positions of the Chinese during their attack on Height 1.

Figure 7. Possible position of White's cannon at Height 2.

Figure 8. Chinese trench. Height 12.

Black and White Illustrations

Figure 1. Locations of the main events discussed in this article. The solid line is the path of the Whites before the battles with the Chinese, the dashed line is the path of the Chinese withdrawal from Mongolia.

Figure 2. Scheme of the Battle of Ulan-Khad (Tornovskiy, 1942).

Figure 3. Fragment of an old map of Mongolia (Kozlov, 1923).

Figure 4. The battle of 31 March. Note that this is from the original article and hence in Mongolia (using Cyrillic script).

Figure 5. White positions on Height 1 in the battle of 31 March 1921.

Figure 6. A piece of cartridge from a Hotchkiss. This is the so-called "Hotchkiss Type 4 machine gun", model 1914. It has more fins for cooling, three-legged stand, etc.; was used as early as 1938. Height 1.

Figures 7–11. Cartridges and clips from 6.5 mm cartridges for an Arisaka rifle. Judging by the absence of stamps on most of these cartridge cases, they could have been produced in Japan, Russia and Great Britain, 1897-1905. Occasionally there were cartridge cases, probably Chinese-made (with characters on the bottom). The case with the K 17 II stamp was made in Great Britain, from there it arrived in Russia, and from there to Mongolia. Different areas around Height 2.

Figures 12–14. Cartridge cases and clips from 7.62 mm cartridges for the 1891 model Mosin rifle and the 1907 Mosin carbine, made in the St. Petersburg and Tula cartridge factories during 1901-1904 and at the Kainsk plant in 1917.

Figures 15, 16. Cartridge cases and a pack of 7.92 mm cartridges for the Mauser rifle of the 1898 model. China bought such rifles in Germany. Cartridges were also made in Germany (by Deutsche Munitionfabrik, apparently in 1911). Such cartridges could have been supplied by Germany to China before its own production was organised there (these cartridges have Chinese markings). The Russians had Mauser rifles and German cartridges for them after the First World War. Different areas around Height 2.

Figure 17, 18. Case from an American cartridge of 7.62 mm calibre for the 1903 model Winchester rifle.

Figure 19. The Battle of 1 April. In Mongolian.



Figures 20, 21. A cartridge case from an 8 mm cartridge of the 1886 model French Lebel infantry rifle of the 1886-1893, 1907-1915 and 1916 models. The Chinese could scarcely have had such weapons. Height 2.

Figure 22. Fragment of the head (where the fuse was screwed in) of a shrapnel shell for a 76 mm gun.

Figure 23. A shrapnel shell bullet for a 76 mm cannon.

Figure 24. The battle of 2 April and the directions of the Chinese flight (towards Zaamar, Uliastai and Tariat). In Mongolian.

Figure 25. Bolt cover of a 1905 model Arisaka rifle or carbine.

Figure 26. Pack for 5 cartridges for a 1888 model Mauser rifle.

Figure 27. A 7.63 mm 1912 model Mauser pistol cartridge clip. It holds 10 rounds. The Chinese ordered them in Germany. Height 6.

