

Capture of the Chinese Advanced Positions near Urga by the Troops of Baron R. F. Ungern in 1921

S. L. Kuzmin

In 1915, the Russian Empire, the state of Mongolia and the Republic of China signed a tripartite agreement in the settlement of Kyakhta. Important provisions of this document were the recognition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under the suzerainty of China, the latter's non-interference in its internal affairs, and the strict limitation of the number of Chinese and Russian armed convoys under the auspices of representatives of both countries.

In 1918, taking advantage of Russia's weakness as a result of two revolutions and the Civil War, the Republic of China unilaterally announced the abolition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. An occupation regime under General Xu Shuzheng was established, the goal of which was to sinicise the country. A contingent of Chinese troops was brought to its capital, Niislel-khüree, also known as Urga. The Mongol theocratic monarch – Bogd Gegen Jebtsundamba Khutukhta VIII – was deprived of his secular power and the Mongol government and the two chambers were dissolved. Preparations were made for the settlement of the territory by Chinese. Economic measures were taken that were intended to tie the economy of Outer Mongolia to the Chinese one, and to make the Mongols debtors to Chinese capital.

Only the representatives of the Russian Whites made official protests. A. A. Orlov, Russia's diplomatic representative in Urga since Tsarist times, protested to the Chinese authorities soon after the introduction of Xu Shuzheng's troops. Then the head of the Russian mission in Beijing, Prince N. A. Kudashev, sent a protest to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These protests were rejected. The position of the Russian Reds was different. On 25 July 1919 the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R., in an appeal to the Chinese people and government, announced the renunciation of all secret treaties between Russia and Japan, China, and former allies, and declared that the peoples in those areas would decide for themselves within the boundaries of which state they wished to be. The next day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR confirmed the rejection of secret treaties with Japan and China, as well as the Kyakhta Agreement, and at the same time declared Mongolia an independent country.

So, under the conditions of dual power that existed in Russia at that time, representatives of both the Whites and the Reds did not recognise the Chinese occupation of Outer Mongolia. At the same time, they did not want to aggravate their relationships with China, as a result of which they did not take any practical steps to end the occupation. This was also due to the inaction of Japan, the United States and the European powers.

Under the influence of the defeats of the Whites in Siberia, the Chinese government began to listen to Soviet envoys and Western advisers who sympathised with its rapprochement with the RSFSR. As a result, Prince Kudashev ceased to be recognised, and on 1 January 1921, the Russian mission in Beijing was closed. For the Soviet government at that time, Outer Mongolia was of interest not as an independent state, but as an instrument for spreading the world revolution to China.

So in practice Outer Mongolia was left alone to face its Chinese occupiers. Lacking the strength to fight effectively, it was doomed to be sinicised and become an "integral part of China," just as Inner Mongolia had done.

In 1920, Baron R. F. Ungern Sternberg's Asiatic Horse Division left Transbaikalia under pressure from Red troops. However, unlike most other White Guard detachments, it did not go to Manchuria, but to Outer Mongolia. Baron Ungern differed from most Whites in his views. He was a traditionalist and set himself the goal of restoring the monarchies overthrown by the revolutions in Asia, and then in Europe. Leaving for Mongolia, he began to implement his plan. He partially succeeded: with the sanction of the Bogd Gegen, he drove the Chinese occupiers out of the country and restored the theocratic monarchy for a short time. Outer Mongolia once again became a *de facto* independent state. In subsequent historical development, despite the changes in the social system, this independence was strengthened and became universally recognised at the international level, including by China.

For ideological reasons, until recently Baron Ungern's activities in Mongolia were assessed unequivocally negatively, although without him there would have been no prerequisites for the restoration and subsequent strengthening of the country's independence. The battles of Ungern's followers for the



liberation of Outer Mongolia remained unstudied until recently, and only in modern times have documents, memoirs and some reconstructions been introduced into scientific circulation.

One of the decisive events in the liberation of Outer Mongolia from Chinese occupation was the fighting for the liberation of its capital on 1 to 4 February 1921. As a result a force of 1,460 White Guards and Mongols, drove about 7,000 Chinese troops out of Urga. This was preceded by unsuccessful attacks by the Asiatic Horse Division on Niislel-khüree in the autumn of 1920. A Mongolian eyewitness and the author of the first monograph on the modern history of Mongolia, written in 1925-1927, N. Magsarjav recalled that the Chinese commander ordered trenches to be dug in the mountains around Urga, telegraphs were sent out and guards were posted to close the roads and gorges leading to the city. Soldiers served there in shifts. Chinese guards and trenches were located:

... in the northern corner of Bayan-Dzurkh, at the Russian bridge over the Tuul and on the south-western side of the same mountain, at Modochin, which is located on the eastern side of Bogd Uul, in Chulutyn-am and Tur-Khurkhyn-am on the eastern side [of Bogd Uul], in Dzun-Modny-am in the southern part [of Bogd Uul], to the west at the Turgeniy-dava pass, on the northern side [of Bogd Uul] in Ikh Tengeriin-am, in Tolgoityn-am on the north-western side of Bogd Uul, and at the Dambadarzha monastery to the northeast.

Thus, the Chinese blocked the passages via Bogd Uul, adjacent to the capital to the south, as well as the approaches to the city from the northeast.

At the same time, special attention was paid to blocking the Urga to Kalgan (Zhangjiakou, China) main road, along which the White Guards' new offensive was expected. Where this road passes through the narrowest point (defile) between the hills on the southeastern side of Bogd Uul, the Chinese carried out work on the fortification of their forward positions. The Chinese forced civilians, including Russians, to do these works. There were officers who had graduated from the Academy of the German General Staff in the Chinese headquarters and the fortification work was carried out under their leadership. As a result, everything was done at a high level. The White Guards had to take these advanced positions before they could launch their decisive assault on Urga.

Until recently, almost nothing was known about those battles. Monographs on this period published in the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR did not mention these events at all. Little-known memoirs of eyewitnesses, published in emigration, were not introduced into scientific circulation until recently. A participant in these battles, Captain A. S. Makeev, only mentions them briefly. Another eyewitness, the White Guard officer N. N. Knyazev, describes them in more detail. In addition, it was possible to identify two more manuscripts describing these events, those of Colonel M. G. Tornovskiy and Golubev (the latter not being yet identified). Tornovskiy and, obviously, Golubev did not participate in those battles themselves, but they were able to give a fairly detailed picture from the descriptions of participants.

In his manuscript, Tornovskiy gives sketches (maps based on a visual survey) of those battles. These sketches were compiled from the memoirs of contemporaries, and therefore it makes sense to cite them in the original (Fig. 1). I have superimposed them on a modern map.

Based on the Tornovskiy's sketches and the modern main roads in that area, I believed that the fighting took place between the mountains of Bogd Uul and Bayan Dzurkh near Ulaanbaatar, where the highway and railway now pass. On the western slopes of Bayan Dzurkh, there should have been traces of the trenches which the eyewitnesses mentioned. But they could not be located there.

The search area was expanded to Mount Bogd Uul. The Mongolian historian Z. Lonjid told me that in one of the valleys of the Bogd Uul opposite Bayan Dzurkh there are large old pits, which were deepened soon after the 1921 revolution and used as cellars for storing food. In addition, it turns out that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Urga to Kalgan road ran a different route from where the highway and the railway now go by Bayan Dzurkh. It was to the west – on the other side of the river (in fact, the stream) Khulyin-gol: among the spurs at the foot of the Bogd Uul (Figs. 2 and 3). It is now a winding dirt road that is little used, but in the past it was the main road from the capital to the south. The Khulyin-gol stream, which flows between Bayan Dzurkh and the hills on the side of Bogd Uul, was a full river in the past. The valley between the Bogd Uul and Bayan Dzurkh mountains was not inhabited and was swampy.



Along the Kalgan road near Bogd Uul, not far from the Tuul River, there were small settlements of Mongols who supplied firewood for heating the institutions in the capital. They also chopped firewood for sale. Logging was carried out upstream on the river. At the end of the 19th Century, 2.5 to 3 kilometres along the Urga-Kalgan road from the Tuul River was the first of these settlements – Baga Modochin (from *modoch* – carpenter, woodworker). However, judging by the memoirs of Knyazev, Golubev and Tornovskiy, at least by the beginning of the 20th Century there was a second Modochin settlement located closer to Urga and to the Tuul River than the first one – Ikh Modochin. The Russians called Baga Modochin the Little (Malyy) or Upper (Verkhniy) Modochin, and they called Ikh-Modochin, the Big (Bolshoy) or Lower (Nizhniy) Modochin.

The availability of large-scale satellite images of this area, posted on the Internet by the Google Earth project, has made it possible to view the current state of the area between Bayan Dzurkh and Bogd Uul. On some of the hills, you can see depressions of regular shape, resembling trenches. Based on this, in 2011 and 2012 I explored this area. I located old trenches, in two lines, as well as a line of large excavations and deep holes of regular shape, which Z. Lonjid had spoken. Each object was mapped using GPS. The coordinates were then entered into Google Earth. Satellite imagery later found several more structures, identified as trenches but not seen from the ground. They were marked separately. Then, using the Global Mapper 15.1 software, a digitised topographic map of the area was overlaid on the Google Earth satellite coverage, marking each trench based on its coordinates. In this way, a topographic map of the location of the trenches was built. The coordinates of each of them are given at the end of the article (for long trenches, the coordinates of the beginning and end are given).

The hills on which the trenches are located are around the village of Chulut.¹ This village was built relatively recently: its residents did not know that the pits on the hills had been trenches. I could not find a person in Chulut, Ulaanbaatar or anywhere else who knew that they were trenches. To the south-west of this village is the Chulutyn-am valley on the side of Bogd Uul. In that valley there are the pits that Z. Lonjid told me about.

The next valley to the north-west of there is called Modochin-am. Only one old man in the village of Chulut remembered that name, and no one knew about the Modochin villages. That old man said that in the Modochin-am gorge they used to harvest wood. This toponym is the only one that has preserved traces of the name Modochin.

Some 340 metres southeast of Chulut we found overgrown earthen mounds.² Based on Tornovskiy's sketches and information from the Mongolian scholar A. M. Pozdneev, who was there earlier, we can conclude that this is all that remains of the former village of Modochin and the "workers' barracks". At 1.5 km southeast of the Chulutyn-am valley there are abandoned houses of several stories. Residents say that this is a former Soviet military town. In the space between it and Chulutyn-am there is a large pit and on the slopes of the adjacent hills there are several large pits. Their origin is unknown. Unlike the old pits and trenches, they look new and are probably related to the military town or to the construction of Chulut village.

The description of the structures found allows us to imagine the location of the battles. There are gentle recesses and pits in the Chulutyn-am valley. The excavations are located at its mouth, 30 metres long, about 7-8 metres wide, and less than 1 metre deep. In the valley, about 500 metres from its mouth, there are 26 pits, arranged in a regular order in four rows. The rows are about 39 metres long. The pits are mostly round, with a cross-section of 1.5 to 1.8 metre, almost as tall as a man. From them towards the mouth there are three large gently sloping recesses of about 69 metres. The place corresponds to Line No 1 opposite "M. Madachan" on the Tornovskiy sketches (see Fig. 1).

There are trenches on the hills around the village of Chulut. On two hills, forty-nine trenches were found, forming two groups (Figs. 2 and 3). They run from the old Urga to Kalgan highway along the south-eastern slopes to the end of those hills. At present the outermost trenches are crossed by barbed wire, which encloses the protected zone of the railway (Fig. 4). These Chinese trenches correspond to the two lines between "B. Madachan" and "M. Madachan" on Tornovskiy's sketches (Fig. 1). Perhaps these two hills were

¹ The centre of the village is 47°52.353'N, 107°05.305'E

² 47°52.246'N, 107°05.729'E



also called that Tornovskiy's time: his sketches show that the trenches were located on two hills without buildings, and it is on them that these names are written.

The workers' barracks mentioned by M. G. Tornovskiy were apparently located beside the Khulylin-gol River, and not beside the road: no traces of settlement were found along the road, but they were found beside the river. All the trenches are heavily weathered and overgrown, but their shape is clearly visible on the ground (Fig. 4-7). At present the trenches are shallow (about 10-30 cm deep) and their parapets have barely been preserved. The trenches are 3 to 43 metres long, most often 5 to 20 metres, and 1.2 to 3 metres wide. The distance between the traverses is 3 to 5 metres. Most of the trenches are designed for 1 to 11 people.

The first line (apparently in the area of the former "M. Madachan") – of eleven trenches – is located on an elevation of two adjacent hills, and runs in an arc between the outermost trenches,³ just opposite the Chulutyn-am valley. Trenches encircle the hill along the southern and eastern slopes. They did not allow it to be bypassed along the valley opposite Chulutyn-am heading north-east from the river. These two hills only have rifle trenches.

The second line – of thirty-seven trenches – is located on the ridges, southern and eastern slopes of another elevation made up of three hills, located to the north ("B. Madachan" in Tornovskiy). The trenches are located from the old Kalgan road to the northeastern end of the hill, as well as in the middle of its peak.⁴ As well as rifle trenches, there are four artillery trenches, located on the top of the hill. From these positions, the Urga to Kalgan road and the entire valley in front of the hill can be targeted.

Tornovskiy's memoirs indicate the Chinese position No. 2 on the other side of the Urga to Kalgan road, opposite "B. Madachan". Similarly also the position to the west from which Lieutenant Plyasunov opened fire with a cannon on the rear and flank of the enemy entrenched on two hills (No 3 in the sketches). Both of these places can only be on the slope of Bogd Uul. A search for them was unsuccessful, including Hill No 2 on the sketches, where Tornovskiy indicated a trench. Perhaps this trench was destroyed by some later earthworks.

It should be noted that, other than the trenches, no traces of hostilities could be found. This is probably due to the fact that the battles were short-lived and local in nature. In addition, metal objects might have been collected later and some fell into the loose soil. Field research in other battlefields of the Asiatic Horse Division in Mongolia has seen similar: Choiryn yielded few finds; Dzun-Burkhiin-gol had none at all; and even Talyn Ulaan Khad, where there was intense fighting for several days, now rarely gives remains of weapons and ammunition, despite the ground being rocky, and the vegetation sparse.

The Chinese forward positions in the area of Ikh Modochin and Baga Modochin were chosen in order to block the main and most convenient road to the capital – the Kalgan Highway – to the White Guards advancing from the southeast. The presence of a forest on the slope of Mount Bogd Uul, two Mongolian villages and workers' barracks made it possible to quarter the troops and create supply bases. In addition, the forward positions were connected by a direct road to the eastern outskirts of the city, where the Chinese barracks were located and to Maimaicheng, a Chinese trading settlement, in which troops were also entrenched. This made it possible to quickly communicate with and supply the troops from the city. The lines of trenches were dug on the hills in such a way that the Kalgan highway and the valley adjacent to the northeast, between the mountains of Bogd Uul and Bayan Dzurkh, could be shot at from them.

For the attack on Urga, the Asiatic Horse Division was divided into three columns at the end of January 1921. According to Tornovskiy and Golubev, the right column (relative to Urga) under the command of Captain Khobotov (five *sotnias*) was supposed to bypass Bayan Dzurkh and then cross the ice of the Tuul River. The second, middle, column under the command of Major-General Rezhukhin, with three and a half *sotnias* and one gun, was supposed to advance along the Kalgan highway through Baga Modochin and Ikh Modochin to Maimaicheng. The third, leftmost, column was a detachment under the command of Ts. Zh. Tubanov, which was to penetrate into the palace on the edge of Urga where the Bogd Gegen was under Chinese arrest, and rescue him. The reserve was the two Chakhar Mongol *sotnias* of Prince Naidan-gun. The

³ With coordinates 47°51.885' N, 107°05.112' E - 47°52.219' N, 107°05.798' E

⁴ These trenches are located along a line from 47°52.313'N, 107°04.595'E to 47°52.320'N, 107°04.669'E.



main blow was aimed at the Modochin defile. Its capture would open the way along the Kalgan road to Maimaicheng and the Chinese barracks.

On the night of 31 January the main forces – three and a half *sotnias* and one gun under the command of Rezukhin – headed along the Kalgan road from the south to Modochin.

The calculation was to approach the Chinese outpost located in Verkhniy Moduchan in the dark and remove it without shooting.

But the yaks with the cannon were late and arrived only in the morning, when one could already distinguish the contours of the buildings. According to Knyazev, on the morning of 1 February, Rezukhin's detachment removed a battalion of Chinese infantry and a detachment of 200 horsemen by shooting, which retreated to the main forces on the hills to the right and left of the road. Makeev recalled that they:

... in an instant knocked the Chinese out of their first positions and moved on to Upper and Lower Moduchan. The Chinese, noticing the enemy's approach, met the division with rifle and machine-gun fire, as a result of which the Mongolian and Chakhar *sotnias* scattered – and were only gathered and put in order with great difficulty. Rezukhin's column was immediately transferred to the left side of the Kalgan road valley and reached the rear of V. Moduchan, which forced the Chinese to leave V. Moduchan and retreat to the trenches, in which they lay down.

Ungern's men appeared in front of the trenches at three o'clock in the afternoon.

Rezukhin's column advanced without stopping to a distance of 1½ versts from the Chinese trenches, which stretched in an uninterrupted line across the entire Kalgan road valley and went into the hills, where there were light wire obstacles in front of them. Rezukhin's dismounted column, advanced on the hills in chains, without running. After a short but stubborn battle they were occupied, and the Chinese slowly retreated to Nizhniy Moduchan.

The Whites occupied the Chinese positions of Baga Modochin (“Verkhniy Moduchan” for Knyazev and Golubev, “Malyi Madachan” for Tornovskiy) in the evening. By 5 p.m., Rezukhin occupied the “village of Verkhniy Moduchan”. The Chinese retreated and entrenched themselves on the heights near Ikh Modochin (“Nizhniy Moduchan” for Knyazev, “Bolshoy Madachan” and Bogd Uul for Tornovskiy).

Thus in the first day of fighting Ungern's troops quickly pushed out the Chinese outpost and then, after about two hours of fighting, occupied the first line of their trenches. For this purpose, the reserve of Naidan-gun's two Chakhar Mongol *sotnias* was introduced into the battle. The enemy retreated to their second line. Their positions there were better prepared, judging by the fact that there were several times more trenches on that line and there were artillery positions.

Two or three kilometres from the front line, behind a rocky outcrop, were positioned the division's chief of staff, Dubovik, Dr. Klingenberg, Commandant Bezrodny and the reserve under Naidan-gun. The Whites decided to organize a dressing station there. When they began to bring back the wounded, it turned out that there were no tents, water, firewood, etc. The wounded were sent on ox carts to Sukharev's lodge in U-Bulan (about 30 km east of Modochin), where the paramedic Logunov was sent. Golubev noted that the wounded, especially those with fractures, suffered greatly from being shaken on the road – five of them died.

Early in the morning of February 2, Rezukhin continued his offensive on the Modochin defile. According to Knyazev, the five *sotnias* were commanded by Ungern and Rezukhin. Consequently, Ungern joined Rezukhin, and Naidan-gun's reserve squadrons were again brought into play. The fighting was stubborn, affected not only by the superiority of the Chinese in manpower and weapons, but also by the good preparation of positions. Makeev recalled:

Here the Chinese fiercely resisted for two hours, but were defeated and fled, leaving behind a mass of rifles and Mausers.

Tornovskiy noted that the Chinese barely used their superiority in artillery and machine guns. At the same time:



The fire of the Chinese cannon was directed exclusively at the advancing *sotnia*. Very few lucky ones reached the Chinese trenches.

Why the Chinese did not use their superiority in artillery and machine guns is unclear. Judging by the fact that they had dug four trenches for artillery on the second line, they were going to use not one, but four guns. In that case, it would have been much more difficult for Ungern's men to break through this line of defence. Tornovskiy relates:

The success of the battle was decided by Lieutenant Plyasunov. Before daylight Rezhukhin ordered Plyasunov to take a *sotnia* and to try to outflank the right end of the Chinese positions, who were strongly entrenched on the southeastern slope of Bogd Uul. Lieutenant Plyasunov fulfilled his task brilliantly. At dawn, he led a *sotnia* west of the Chinese positions, into their rear, and established himself on Hill 3, from where he opened fire on the rear and flank of Hills 1 and 2. The Chinese were forced to leave Hills 1 and 2, and after that they retreated from the position of Bolshoy Madachan. Even before nightfall, the *sotnias* camped for the night in the Madachan barracks.

Golubev erroneously stated that it was Khobotov, rather than Plyasunov, who went to the Chinese rear.

Knyazev noted that the Chinese, who were not used to conducting night battles, were pushed from the heights on the evening of 2 February. He also recalled that the Whites captured two two-wheel carts with cartridges at Nizhny Modochin, which was very helpful: they were running out of bullets. The Whites and the Chinese had small arms of the same Japanese model, apparently mainly Arisaka rifles.

The battles in the area of Ikh Modochin and Baga Modochin played an important role in one of the most important events in the modern history of Mongolia – the liberation of its capital from the Chinese occupiers. The capture of the Chinese advanced positions opened the shortest and most convenient route to Urga for Baron Ungern's troops. By the evening of 4 February 1921, the Mongolian capital was cleared of the invaders.

On 22 February a solemn ceremony was held to enthrone Bogd Gegen VIII as the Mongol Great Khan, and the legitimate government of the country was restored.

The fighting in the area of Ikh Modochin and Baga Modochin is still little known, even in Mongolia.

The article uses the materials of the author's field research made by him during his stay in Mongolia. The author expresses his gratitude to Z. Lonjid for the information about Chulutyn-am, B. Bayar and J. Oyunchimeg for their help in the field work, and to the residents of Chulut for their responses.

The coordinates below can be used for further research of historical events of that time. Coordinates of objects in Chulutyn-am

1: Approximately 47°51.509'N, 107°04.975'E (gently sloping excavations for 30 metres near the mouth of the valley);

2: From 47°51.381'N, 107°04.775'E to 47°51.338'N, 107°04.728'E (line of round holes).

Coordinates of the trenches on the two hills near the village of Chulut (for large trenches, the coordinates of both ends are indicated)

3: 47°56.162'N, 107°04.444'E; 4: 47°52.248'N, 107°04.468'E – 47°52.261'N, 107°04.484'E; 5: 47°52.306'N, 107°04.476'E – 47°52.293'N, 107°04.468'E; 6: 47°52.311'N, 107°04.595'E; 7: 47°52.309'N, 107°04.595'E; 8: 47°52.308'N, 107°04.651'E; 9: 47°52.313'N, 107°04.671'E; 10: 47°52.305'N, 107°04.748'E; 11: 47°52.307'N, 107°04.782'E; 12: 47°52.325'N, 107°04.802'E; 13: 47°52.327'N, 107°04.821'E; 14: 47°52.342'N, 107°04.809'E; 15: 47°52.338'N, 107°04.823'E; 16: 47°52.340'N, 107°04.834'E; 17: 47°52.330'N, 107°04.845'E; 18: 47°52.342'N, 107°04.846'E; 19: 47°52.364'N, 107°04.859'E; 20: 47°52.365'N, 107°04.914'E; 21: 47°52.358'N, 107°04.948'E – 47°52.373'N, 107°04.987'E; 22: 47°52.477'N, 107°04.839'E;



23: 47°52.478'N, 107°04.859'E; 24: 47°52.483'N, 107°04.874'E; 25: 47°52.611'N, 107°04.698'E; 26: 47°52.605'N, 107°04.695'E; 27: 47°52.589'N, 107°04.692'E; 28: 47°52.537'N, 107°04.678'E; 29: 47°52.470'N, 107°04.576'E – 47°52.458'N, 107°04.571'E; 30: 47°52.421'N, 107°04.479'E – 47°52.418'N, 107°04.482'E; 31: 47°52.407'N, 107°04.492'E – 47°52.405'N, 107°04.483'E; 32: 47°52.199'N, 107°04.421'E; 33: 47°51.895'N, 107°05.183'E – 47°51.880'N, 107°05.165'E; 34: 47°51.885'N, 107°05.112'E – 47°51.883'N, 107°05.089'E; 35: 47°51.909'N, 107°05.324'E – 47°51.903'N, 107°05.305'E; 36: 47°51.961'N, 107°05.459'E – 47°51.9521'N, 107°05.434'E; 37: 47°52.041'N, 107°05.880'E – 47°52.046'N, 107°05.877'E; 38: 47°52.050'N, 107°05.883'E – 47°52.034'N, 107°05.887'E; 39: 47°52.226'N, 107°05.802'E – 47°52.226'N, 107°05.805'E; 40: 47°52.219'N, 107°05.798'E – 47°52.224'N, 107°05.800'E; 41: 47°52.216'N, 107°05.788'E; 42: 47°52.100'N, 107°05.938'E – 47°52.094'N, 107°05.942'E; 43: 47°52.093'N, 107°05.928'E – 47°52.099'N, 107°05.916'E; 44: 47°52.659'N, 107°05.083'E – 47°52.668'N, 107°05.117'E; 45: 47°52.668'N, 107°05.117'E – 47°52.678'N, 107°05.116'E; 46: 47°52.675'N, 107°05.127'E – 47°52.683'N, 107°05.108'E.

Coordinates of trenches not found on the ground but determined on the map

47: 47°52.473'N, 107°4.484'E – 47°52.479'N, 107°4.499'E; 48: 47°52.567'N, 107°4.695'E; 49: 47°52.521'N, 107°5.036'E; 50: 47°52.595'N, 107°5.187'E; 51: 47°52.012'N, 107°5.539'E.

Figures

Figure 1. Fragment of the Battles for Urga from Tornovskiy's manuscript

Figure 2. Lines of Chinese trenches on a modern map

Figure 3. Location of the Chinese trenches at Baga Modochin (lower right) and Ikh Modochin (top left)

Figure 4. Chinese rifle trench on the edge of modern Ulaanbaatar Railway zone

Figures 5 and 6. Chinese rifle trenches near the former Urga – Kalgan main road

Figure 7. Chinese artillery trench. On the horizon is a mount Bayan-Dzurkh with the village at its foot

