

End

XX. Conclusions

The battles described are one of the more interesting parts of the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920. They give immensely rich material for study. Examples can be found in them of almost every tactical topic. Some will be worthy of imitation, with others one can study the mistakes made. However, the drawing of appropriate conclusions from this treasury of experience must be left to the readers, according to their taste or speciality.¹¹²

This section highlights what seem to have been the main reasons why Budënnny's horse army was able to advance so far into our country, and draws conclusions about infantry versus cavalry combat.

199. Communication. First and foremost there was a lack of communication between the individual infantry divisions and the higher commands among themselves. In the period of the 18th Infantry Division's pursuit of the Horse Army we already repeatedly see that even radios and aviation were unable to provide communication (Items 23, 31, 38, 41). During the period of containment and at the Battle of Brody, as well as with the 2nd Army, this lack was repeated (Items 33, 61, 72 note 2, 74, 93, 96, 106, 129 note 1, 133, 135, 138, 177) And remarks that one army command did not know where neighbouring army units were (Items 72, 76, 96, 114, 118, 119).

From the described incidents, one can conclude that in this type of fighting the usability of our means of communication must be revised, and therefore the organisation of the command, as well as the calculations of the time and place for cooperation of units involved and the economy of the forces, must be dealt with differently.

¹¹² Literally every weapon and service can see topics worthy of reflection. Using this example, for example, one can study:

- The grouping and use of large units in battles against cavalry,
 - The cooperation of large units,
 - The defence of broad fronts with weak forces against overwhelming enemy forces,
 - Infantry vs. cavalry combat,
 - How regiments and battalions might fight cavalry,
 - Manoeuvre of regiments and battalions in an infantry division,
 - The use of MG companies in combat with cavalry,
 - The use of rifle grenades instead of artillery,
 - The use of artillery in highly mobile combat,
 - Destructive and preparatory fire in mobile combat (Brody on 5 August),
 - Persistent defence of field points (Fort Zahorce),
 - Forced marches,
 - Night marches and battles,
 - Disposition of large cavalry units (Budënnny),
 - Cooperation of cavalry brigades with infantry divisions,
 - The use of cavalry brigades in suppression battles,
 - Replenishment of cavalry units during battles,
 - The functioning of the command apparatus at the army, division and brigade level,
 - The speed with which orders are carried out once they are received,
 - The operation of armoured trains and armoured cars,
 - The operation of means of communication in movement warfare,
 - The way the 18th ID dealt with their supply train,
 - Manner of provisioning and evacuation at the 18th ID,
- etc.



Our commanders were still thinking in terms of positional warfare and did not have modern means of communication in sufficient numbers. Suddenly confronted with the necessity of fighting a highly mobile battle, faced with an enemy army of cavalry, they were not always able to draw the appropriate conclusions quickly enough (and some of them not at all). This study leads us to believe that the main reason for our initial failures should be sought there.

The higher commands, lacking constant communication with the operating units, did not understand what was happening or found out too late in situations that were changing like in a kaleidoscope. Attempts to direct the action were shattered by the impossibility of getting the fighting units to cooperate in time and place, and by the lack of mutual understanding caused by the lack of communication. The command system failed in the situation, so we could say that the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing.

In battles of this kind – where radio, planes and armoured trains, to which the carrier pigeons may also be added, remain the mainstays of command – there can be no question of petty interference by the higher commander in the details of the execution of the orders of subordinate units. (For example: the operational order in Item 129, sent by telephone through the headquarters of the 13th ID and 10th CB; the orders of the Front commander listing in detail the actions of individual divisions of the 2nd Army, or given directly to the cavalry brigades, etc.).

The listed means of communication allow only very general orders, giving the commanders a main concept and guidelines, providing for various possibilities of execution and position, and which require absolute maintenance of constant communication between the executive bodies.

Under such conditions, use of less reliable means of communication must be abandoned in advance and, on the other hand, full attention must be given to ensuring the efficiency of the ones used.

Each independent unit taking part in a campaign against unfriendly cavalry must have at least one radio station, and the higher commands should, in addition to this, maintain daily communication with all subordinate units by plane and carrier pigeons. The breakdown or loss of radio stations, too great a distance between airfields and the aviators' lack of knowledge of the current theatre of operations, the difficulty of finding units in dense forests, bad weather, with damaged railways or bridges, or the lack of nearby railway lines, etc. make a high degree of communication difficult. However, it seems unacceptable that all the means listed should fail simultaneously – and for such a long time – as happened several times in the battles described.

When troops are assigned a task similar to that entrusted to the 18th ID, at least one radio station should be designated in advance, set up somewhere secure e.g. in this case in Tarnopol or Lwów, with the specific task of maintaining constant communication. This rule would have avoided the situation of the 8 August when the 18th ID was able to contact the radio station in Lwów (reception was good), but the latter, once it received the situation report, could not on its part, give any answers – firstly, it did not have any, and, secondly, it was assigned different tasks.

The result was that at important moments – 7 July in Ostróg, 8 July in Buderaż, and 9 July in Obgów – the 18th Division's commander did not have crucial information about the fact that at the same time the 2nd Army was attacking Równe, or that Fort Dubno was in our hands.

As further examples of the effects of inadequate communication, incidents in the 2nd Army can also be cited. In the period from 2 to 8 July near Równe, the 2nd Army twice lost an opportunity to strike at the enemy, due to a lack of communication with the 6th ID; later, in the period from 12 to 20 July, the lack of communication was quite frequent, according to the 2nd Army commander and the Front commander. The failure to take advantage of the 6th ID's strike on Dorogostaj (Sketch Map 10) was also due to a lack of communication.

The 6th Army Command was very seldom able to inform the 18th ID what the current position of the right wing of the 2nd Army was, or where the various cavalry brigades of the 2nd Army were.

200. Coordination between large units. Due to the lack of communication, there was also no concerted co-operation between the bigger units of the 2nd and 6th Armies.



On 16 July the 18th ID occupied Dubno and Chorupań for the second time; on the same day the 6th ID, having reached Dorogostai, retreated back to Łuck (Sketch Map 10). On 19 July (Sketch Map 12) the 18th ID and the 3rd ID, while being so close to each other (at noon hours barely 10 km apart) knew nothing of each other and retreated in the evening – the 18th ID to Werba, the 3rd ID to the Styr. On 23 July (Sketch Map 13) at Kozin, Dobrowodka and Demidówka the same situation was repeated almost exactly. In the battle of Brody several such incidents could be listed.

Here another deficiency is highlighted, mentioned above and arising as a result of the nature of the communication systems – that is, the need for a different system of command. If several units are pursuing a common objective, and each is subordinated to a different higher commander, any orders issued have to be very quickly and uniformly delivered, so that the combat units can be coordinated. However, if those various HQs are distant from each other, and from the battlefield, by several tens of kilometres, and do not have constant communication with the combat units, co-ordination is out of the question.

In the combats from 16 to 20 July, the 3rd and 6th IDs were subordinated to the 2nd Army, the 3rd CB directly to the Front, and General Krajowski's group to the 6th Army, and communication was known to be poor. So let us theoretically imagine that simultaneously General Krajowski would report his situation to the 6th Army in Zloczów, the commander of the 6th ID to the 2nd Army in Łuck, and both these army commands and the 3rd CB to the commander of the Front in Kowel. It is conceivable that before the Front commander managed to issue his orders, or before the 2nd and 6th Army manage to agree among themselves and issue their own orders, ideally in agreement with each other, the situation at the front will have changed so thoroughly that all the orders would be obsolete. Some of the units would carry out the orders, others will no longer be able to carry them out as prescribed. A lack of co-ordination will arise, just such as we observed from 13 to 25 July.

All the infantry divisions and cavalry brigades were striving for a common goal – to fight a major battle with Buděny's army. This is why, with the communications we had, they should all have been led as directly as possible by one hand.

In the description of the battles of 16 July, a report is cited showing how the 3rd CB was directed. The Front command, who notified the 3rd CB in Gorochów that the 18th ID had occupied Dubno on 13 July, seems to have forgotten to add that the 2nd Army had not yet taken its position at Młynów. The Front HQ failed to inform that brigade of the current situation, as is evident from the report given in Item 106.

On 18 July a liaison officer of the 4th CB arrived with a report to the commander of the 18th ID that the 4th CB was in Rogozno, and that the 1st and 3rd CBs were in Beresteczko and Ostrow. General Krajowski on his own initiative issued an order for those brigades to set off without delay for Młynów or Demidówka, naturally reporting that to the 6th Army. On 19 July, the staff of the 18th ID received the news that the Front commander approved all the orders from General Krajowski. The Front admitted that it was not able to direct the brigades in the way the current situation required from so great a distance. And it was not in a position to direct them because it had no constant communication link.

Every strike by enemy cavalry must be immediately be parried or followed by a counter-strike. The commander in charge in a battle against enemy cavalry must feel the pulse of that battle; he must notice the slightest change on the battlefield in order to counteract or exploit it. He must conduct the battle from phase to phase, from situation to situation. *A commander who leads his troops in battle against enemy cavalry should be as close to the front as a cavalry commander is – that is, between his units. Otherwise all his orders – given on the basis of invariably late situation reports – will be late and will not correspond to the changing situation.*¹¹³

¹¹³ Note where General Krajowski stationed himself in all the battles described, and where the HQ of the Horse Army was on 19 July (Sketch Map 12). Characteristic examples of the division commander's direct influence on the course of the fighting are the battles at Krzemieniec on 12 July (Item 56), at Dubno on 15 July (Items 85 and 87). at Chorupań on 18 and 19 July (Item 102 and 111) and the decision of General Krajowski at Turzu and



The entire campaign against Budënný's Horse Army was directed by the commander of the South-Eastern Front, for it was in his hands that all authority over the units that took part in the battle was centralised. But the wire communication from the Front to the two Army HQs, and from those to the combat units, was so distant and so often interrupted that it is understandable that the Front commander could not feel the pulse of the fighting in such a way as to be able to actually lead the battle – fought against an opponent who was personally on the battlefield and in command of all the cavalry.

It may have been advisable, therefore, to place all the units that took part in the battles against Budënný's army under one command. This could have been the commander of the 2nd Army, or of the 6th Army, or the commander of an independent group (corps), created for that purpose. That commander would then have been able to place himself on the battlefield and follow all the details of the action.

201. Budënný's army and infantry fighting cavalry. The essential characteristics of the actions of Budënný's army during the described period are given in the chapter "Results of the Struggle to Contain". The forces were dispersed over a wide area and there was a lack of a strong strategic decision.

Tactically, the command of the Horse Army can be credited with great resilience of action. Observing the attached sketch maps, one sees more than one quick decision. Budënný could not have known that the wings of our 2nd and 6th Armies were not working in unison. His energetic response to the seizure of Ostróg, by immediately sending several Cossack regiments to prevent the 18th ID from acting jointly with the 2nd Army at Równe (Sketch Map 5), must be given great credit. One cannot deny the wisdom of preventing the advance of the 6th ID on Dorogostaj Veliky on 17 July, then the vigorous strike on 19 July against the 18th ID at Chorupań and the simultaneous pushing back of the 3rd ID's advance in the Targowica – Perekale area (Sketch Maps 11 and 12), nor the desirability of rejecting the sortie of the 6th ID from Michajłówka to Demidówka and the simultaneous destruction of one brigade of the 18th ID on 23 and 24 July near Iwaszczuki (Sketch Map 14), as well as the flexibility of tactical arrangements during the Battle of Brody (Sketch Maps 18 and 20). But it is impossible to find any strategic value from these battles.

The persistence with which Budënný's Cossacks relentlessly attacked our infantry on horseback, suffering much greater losses than if they had tried to do the same on foot, was a great mistake on the part of the Horse Army. Budënný's Cossacks may be credited with great bravado, but bravado alone is not enough against an enemy wielding modern weapons. It may be that they previously achieved success in mounted formation through the moral effect of charging cavalry, but in the battles with the 18th ID this method failed, as it absolutely must fail wherever the infantry retains even a little calm under pressure.

So sometimes the Cossack charges were successful, and other times they failed? This requires an answer to the question: when should a cavalry charge on horseback and when on foot?

It seems that the simplest answer would be to make the type of attack dependent on the enemy's fire. This can only be decided on the battlefield. If the opponent keeps his cool, the success of a cavalry charge is out of the question. The manner of attacking cavalry could be put into words: cavalry should manoeuvre on horseback, but fight mainly on foot; an enemy that is fresh, or well trained and disciplined, should always be attacked on foot, and the horses should be mounted only when disorganisation or the beginning of panic is perceived. Even in the rear, when conducting a raid, it is possible to come across well-run troops (such as the four march companies at the Radziwiłłów railway station on 18 July) and suffer unnecessarily heavy losses.

Stanisławczyk on 31 July and 2 August (Items 174 and 186.) The rapid detachment of the main forces of the 18th ID from near Krzemieniec on 12 July – even before the end of the fighting, at the moment when the offensive of the 42nd and 44th IR began to progress well to the south – meant that the division was able to occupy the Werba – Ptycza area in the evening of the same day, which was only possible thanks to the general's personal observation of the course of the fighting.



It is sometimes said that infantry in close formation can be surprised by the charge of a cavalry unit. From the experience of the battles described, it can be argued that good infantry can only be surprised by fire. Such a surprise can be very unpleasant. Good infantry cannot be surprised by a charge, even from the shortest distance. A charge by cavalry can only be successful against an enemy already disorganised or of low spirit.

In the battles with the 18th ID, Budëunny's army was successful by smashing wagon trains and breaking communications to the rear and on the rare occasion, on 16 and 25 July, with attacks on infantry. In both of these charges, however, it encountered the 9th Border Rifle Regiment, i.e. infantry of little combat value. In addition, it should be noted that the 35th IB was badly commanded at Iwaszczuki, because, as has already been said, even though the 9th Border Rifle Regiment was rejected, the situation could have been rectified – as it was rectified by General Krajowski at Dubno on 16 July.

From 20 July to 1 August Budëunny's army was moving towards Lwów. But these movements were so slow that the 18th ID kept pace with it, and even marched faster and further than the enemy cavalry. This is where the consequences of General Krajowski's tactics of attacking at night became clearly visible. Cavalry, constantly harassed at night by infantry units, after two weeks loses its greatest advantage, that is mobility. Humans can be active at night and sleep during the day, or whenever there is a break, but horses that cannot rest at night will soon begin to fade.

To sum up, it can be said that Budëunny's army, over the course of persistent offensive battles, was not successful against the good infantry of the 18th ID, having no substantial successes. Butowce on 2 July, Ostróg on 7 July, Chorupań on 17, 18 and 19 July, Brody on 25 July; all are proof of this. The retreat of the 18th ID from near Dubno to Podhorce was caused not by loss in combat, but by the manoeuvre of the cavalry; the isolated division, defending a large section of the front, had to fight both against the enemy in front of it and against one coming towards its rear at the same time. The Army did not have any reserves.

On the defensive, Budëunny's cavalry almost never withstood the infantry attacks of the 18th ID.

Thanks to the early success and the resulting feeling of self-confidence, and thanks to the soldier's boundless trust in the division commander, the behaviour of our infantry in the face of the enemy's superiority in numbers was so good that outflanking the division, even reaching complete encirclement, did not frighten it at all. General Krajowski was confident of his troops and was always convinced that he would be able to break through wherever he wanted at night.

But even during the day Budëunny's cavalry could not withstand a solid assault by our infantry. Unfortunately, the 18th ID did not have any assigned cavalry¹¹⁴ to exploit the success of its assaults. Each infantry division fighting against a mass of enemy cavalry, should have a subordinated brigade of cavalry to exploit its successes.

Looking at the attached sketch maps, one sees that the 18th ID for a full four weeks had its flanks and rear constantly threatened, and was completely surrounded on 19, 24 and 25 July and the 36th IB on 1 August. This by no means prevented General Krajowski from carrying out his intentions properly. Such situations are often considered worse than they are, and then really only by those who by virtue of their rear assignments believe that they are not obliged to fight with arms in hand, in the way every infantryman in the front line does – and may so fail on the field of glory, carried away by personal nervousness, mostly caused by their own ineptitude.

It is understood that a commander, undertaking a battle against enemy cavalry, must be confident in the spirit of his troops. The charge of several squadrons of cavalry is a disheartening thing. When a company or battalion commander loses confidence at such a moment, his unit feels it immediately, instinctively and involuntarily, just as a horse feels the willpower of its rider when jumping over an obstacle. The words "as is the commander, so are the troops" are probably never more true than under these conditions.

¹¹⁴ The 6th Lancer Regiment had barely 140 sabres, and the division's squadron only 50 – all of which had to be used for reconnaissance, communication, sending reports and orders, etc.



In the individual sub-units – of all weapons – of the 18th ID, it was always noticeable that the combat value of the units depended mainly on the commander. Specially characteristic symptoms were observed in this respect. General Krajowski's strength of will and energy affected all the officers and soldiers of the entire division; that is why the division fought so valiantly. The regiments were formed in France from men coming from all the counties of Poland, and some even came from America, France, Italy and so on. The human material was thus the most varied, and each of the regiments had its own period during the Bolshevik campaign when it was regarded as the best regiment in the division, depending on who commanded it. Thus, the 42nd IR under Colonel Szemiot was considered the best in May and June 1920, the 49th IR under Captain Nadachowski in July, the 144th IR under Major Ocetekiewicz in August, the 145th IR under Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk in August and September 1920. Poland's soldier material is excellent, it just needs commanders who can lead it and use its advantages. To prove this we have plenty of examples across the history of Poland's wars.

On the other hand, it can be said that the repulse of a cavalry charge is a matter of practice and habit. An infantry unit which succeeds in deflecting its first charge by enemy cavalry will never be frightened by such a charge again; in the reverse, a unit once overrun by a cavalry charge will very easily panic as soon as it sees a cavalry unit. Thus, for example, Battalion 3/144, which managed to repel the first charge at Butowce, later on at Iwaszczuki did not fail – despite the panic of the surrounding troops. On the other hand, no measures were able to hold back the bulk of the men of the 105th IR or the 9th Border Rifles when Bolshevik cavalry approached.

From this it follows that, even in peacetime, joint infantry-cavalry exercises should be organised as often as possible, and the infantry should be accustomed to the sight of charging cavalry. As, I repeat, that sight can be quite unnerving.

202. Guidelines for battles between infantry and cavalry. To supplement the above remarks, let us look at a short "Summary of the experience of the 18th Infantry Division in battles against Budenny's Horse Army", issued to its units by the division's staff in August 1920:¹¹⁵

I. *The smallest tactical unit of infantry is the regiment with one or two batteries.* The detachment of single battalions is permissible only in exceptional cases and in places where the battalion is able to protect itself from the charge of large enemy forces (for example: manning small villages, manor houses, small forests, cemeteries, bridges, marsh crossings, etc.). In these exceptional cases the communication between the detached battalion and the rest of the regiment must be extremely close.

It is desirable to operate in groups of compact infantry brigades, consisting of two regiments and at least one *divizion* of artillery.

On the march the regiments should be so close to each other that, in the event of fighting, mutual assistance is assured and the encroachment of large enemy forces between the two columns is prevented. This distance can therefore be a maximum of 6 km on the march and 4 km at a standstill.

II. *Regimental and brigade commanders should generally be with the troops.* The presence of commanders away from their battalions deprives them of the possibility of immediate, spontaneous action if the enemy appears, and also exposes them to attacks by enemy cavalry.

III. *Carry out marches and assaults, as far as possible, at night.*

During the day the men should rest in villages or woods, having barricaded themselves in.

In conjunction with a strong cavalry of their own, the infantry should approach the enemy at night, attack at dawn, and our cavalry then pursue the retreating enemy cavalry.

¹¹⁵ Adopted almost entirely into the Field Service Regulations, Part II.



As far as possible, do not fight in open fields, but try to reach forest plots, farmsteads, etc, which make it highly difficult for the enemy to charge.

IV. *Every officer and soldier, whether in a company or battery, or in the command, staff or wagons, must possess a rifle and at least 40 cartridges.*

Every unit must, in every situation – whether in quarters, on the march, at rest, in retreat or in any other situation – be on such a degree of combat alert that it can go into battle in the shortest possible time, as the situation demands. At staging areas, the men should occupy quarters with guards, rifles stacked, officers with their units, wagons loaded, pickets posted. On the march, all soldiers should watch to the right and the left. By practising alarms the soldier's alertness and combat readiness should be kept high.

Wagon commanders shall be personally responsible to ensure that all men sitting on the wagons have their rifles at the ready at all times.

V. Infantry.

Good infantry, keeping its cool, can boldly and in the open field repel and even destroy a superior force of cavalry, if properly deployed. The enemy cavalry usually attacks in a loose formation, encircling the wings and rear of the infantry.¹¹⁶ The Cossacks fire as early as 2,000 metres from horseback and MGs to demoralise the infantry with flanking and rear fire. Only when the cavalry perceives that the infantry is losing its confidence does it charge; otherwise the enemy cavalry retreats behind the hills and woods.

The first sign of any infantry's vacillation and nervousness is to respond to that long-range fire of the cavalry.

In a fight against cavalry, the most important thing is to maintain fire discipline. Machine guns start firing at a *lava* at 1,000 metres, at 500 metres against compact squadrons; small arms do not start firing beyond 500 metres, showering the enemy with a hurricane of bullets from that point.

On large targets or deep targets the company commander can direct rifle fire by salvos, and can in these cases start firing as early as 1,000 metres.

Firing by salvo is the best means of disciplining infantry fire and should, against cavalry, be almost the exclusive type of fire.

Without this method of conducting fire, the ranks will fire all their ammunition at 2,000 to 500 metres, hit no one, and when the Cossacks catch up with them, will stand defenceless and die to sabre blows.

As soon as attacking cavalry approach to a distance of less than 200 metres, single sections and squads along the rifle line should join together in groups of six to eight men and, standing with their backs to each other, repel the attack with fire.

Do not shoot at Cossack patrols of two to six men at all. Bring them within 50 paces and, having surprised them, take them prisoner.

VI. Artillery.

In a march the artillery should be distributed along the whole column, possibly even in platoons. Both with the front guard and rear guard, as well as in the centre, there must be columns of infantry interspersed with guns. Infantry units with artillery platoons should be intermingled in long columns of wagons.

In combat the artillery must show extreme mobility and initiative. The targets that appear are very mobile and only visible for a short time. Those few minutes during which a

¹¹⁶ This is the traditional Cossack *lava*, used by virtually all Russian cavalry of the time, apart from a few regular White units.



squadron or regiment of enemy cavalry is visible must be utilised for the most violent fire. At the moment the enemy squadrons, batteries, or MGs appear, *the artillery should not wait for orders*, but should independently and as quickly as possible, at a trot or gallop, leave the march column, stand close to the road and immediately commence a rapid fire. Such fire will be short-lived, as the target will quickly disappear. Continuing to fire single shells at clouds of dust, or at the area from where the enemy cavalry has fled, is completely pointless.

The artillery should only fire when careful observation is possible. As soon as a target appears it must be showered with rapid fire, and similarly, as soon as the target is not visible the battery must cease firing at all.

It is reprehensible for artillery to fire on patrols or at very thin lines of horsemen.

VII. The machine-guns are to be distributed: on the march a platoon of HMGs should be behind each infantry company. Single MGs should be interposed between the wagons, both combat and heavy. It is not good when a whole MG company marches as a compact group, leaving long stretches of the columns without any MGs.¹¹⁷

VIII. Reconnaissance.

All troops should independently reconnoitre in their immediate area, up to 1,500 metres; further reconnaissance by mounted and foot patrols should extend to a distance of up to 10 km. Surveillance of the surrounding area must be carried out continuously, and with such intensity and accuracy, that the units are never surprised.

Reconnaissance, pickets and look-outs ordered by higher commanders, by no means relieve lower commanders from their duty of independent observation of area immediately around them.

IX. Communications.

Immediate notification of neighbouring troops and higher commands of observations and reporting changing situations is the most important prerequisite for success against cavalry. From the battalion headquarters up to the division headquarters, all observations must be communicated instantly in order to allow us to break up lone enemy brigades with a rapid response and a quick blow of one's own – not allowing large enemy units to join in. Where possible, telephone lines should be run. The most certain link, however, is mounted messengers. Each infantry regiment must have 21 liaison riders. If there are captured horses, aim to increase the number of mounted men in the regiments.

X. *Keep unit wagons to a minimum.*

The amount of rolling stock should not be increased by a single unnecessary wagon, under the strict responsibility of the regimental and division commanders. Only the field kitchens and enough ammunition and provisions for two days. All other wagons – baggage, mess kitchens, provisions, etc – are without exception are to be sent to the divisional assembly point for the train, to be moved by the division commander's order. One battery will always be left at the disposal of the commander of the heavy wagons. A defence unit will be formed from the soldiers attached to the wagons by the train's commander. In an emergency a larger guard will be assigned to the rolling stock.

When stationary, the wagons will be placed in villages or towns so that the wagons themselves are not too concentrated.¹¹⁸ Streets will be barricaded. Special attention should be paid to the constant observation of the surrounding area by patrols and observers on high points.

¹¹⁷ The 18th ID had a very small number of MGs; hence these instructions.

¹¹⁸ To prevent enemy artillery causing undesirable panic in the wagons.



XI. Adjutants of the regiments and battalions should only have packs in which the clerks can carry a few of the most important files, relating to the records of officers and soldiers. Taking the entire administration's carts alongside the combat troops is harmful ballast.

XII. Warrant officers should remain with their combat units, administration officers are to remain with the train, coming to their units at intervals determined by the commander.

XIII. The division's economic base is generally to be located at the nearest railway station. That is where the hospital and administrative base is to be. The distribution point for food and ammunition will be advanced at all times and must be at the nearest railway station, even if that requires transport at night or under cover of armoured trains.

XIV. The transport of ammunition and food from the nearest railway station to the troops positioned in the front lines will be carried out by the division's wagons or the unit rolling sections made up of requisitioned peasant wagons.

XV. The wounded shall be sent by cart to the mobile hospital column with the brigade commands, and from there to the division assembly point, at the nearest railway station.

203. Reconnaissance. Communications, aerial reconnaissance and the Second Department of headquarters units play a huge role in battles against enemy cavalry. There was often a lack of communication during the battles described.

Not much can be said about aerial activity in the battles described, as there were only a few planes for the entire 2nd and 6th Armies.

However, the Second Department of the 18th ID deserves a special mention. From the descriptions of the fighting, it can be concluded that the division HQ was generally quite well informed of enemy troop movements. The division commander could usually base his decisions on good information. However this was only achieved because the Second Department missed no opportunity to get close to the battle line, to interrogate each prisoner immediately on their capture – or even, in the humorous extreme, taking prisoners personally, as the head of the 18th ID's Second Department, Lieutenant Harasymowicz, did.

204. Final conclusion. In campaigns against enemy cavalry fought over wide areas, there will always be breaks in the front, flanking movement, encirclements and interrupted communications with the rear. This, however, must not frighten the commander on the defence.

A unit that flanks someone is usually at the same time flanked himself, and the winner will be the one who, in the moments of uncertainty, manages to get himself under control sooner and shows stronger will through decisive action.

